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The need for lightweight cryptographic primitives to replace the traditional standardized
primitives such as AES, SHA-2 and SHA-3, which are unrealistic in constrained environments,
has been anticipated by the cryptographic community for over a decade and half. Such
an anticipation came to reality by the apparent proliferation of Radio Frequency Identifiers
(RFIDs), Internet of Things (IoT), smart devices and sensor networks in our daily lives. All
these devices operate in constrained environments and require reasonable efficiency with low
implementation costs and sufficient security. Accordingly, designing lightweight symmetric
key cryptographic primitives and analyzing the state-of-the-art algorithms is an active area of
research for both academia and industry, which is directly followed by the ongoing National
Institute of Standards and Technology’s lightweight cryptography (NIST LWC) standardiza-
tion project. In this thesis, we focus on the design and security analysis of such primitives.
First, we present the design of four lightweight cryptographic permutations, namely
sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light, ACE and WAGE. At a high level, these permutations adopt a Nonlinear
Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR) based design paradigm. sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light and ACE
use reduced-round Simeck block cipher, while WAGE employs Welch-Gong (WG) permutation
and two 7-bit sboxes over the finite field F27 as their underlying nonlinear components. We
discuss their design rationale and analyze the security with respect to differential and linear,
integral and symmetry based distinguishers using automated tools such as Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) and SAT/SMT solvers.
Second, we show the applications of these permutations to achieve Authenticated Encryp-
tion with Associated Data (AEAD), Message Authentication Code (MAC), Pseudorandom
Bit Generator (PRBG) and Hash functionalities. We introduce the idea of the unified round
function, which, when combined in a sponge mode can provide all the aforementioned func-
tionalities with the same circuitry. We give concrete instantiations of several AEAD and hash
schemes with varying security levels, e.g., 80, 96, 112 and 128 bits. Next, we present Spoc, a
new AEAD mode of operation which offers higher security guarantees compared to traditional
sponge-based AEAD schemes with smaller states. We instantiate Spoc with sLiSCP-light
permutation and propose another two lightweight AEAD algorithms. Notably, 4 of our pro-
posed schemes, namely ACE, Spix, Spoc and WAGE are round 2 candidates of NIST’s LWC
v
project.
Finally, we present cryptanalytic results on some lightweight ciphers. We first analyze the
nonlinear initialization phase of WG-5 stream cipher using the division property based cube
attack, and give a key recovery attack on 24 (out of 64) rounds with data and time complexities
26.32 and 276.81, respectively. Next, we propose a novel property of block ciphers called
correlated sequences and show its applications to meet-in-the-middle attack. Consequently, we
give the best key recovery attacks (up to 27 out of 32 rounds in a single key setting) on Simon
and Simeck ciphers with block and key sizes 32 and 64 bits, respectively. The attack requires
3 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and has a time complexity close to average exhaustive
search. It is worth noting that variants of WG-5 and Simeck are the core components of
aforementioned AEAD and hash schemes. Lastly, we present practical forgery attacks on
Limdolen and HERN which are round 1 candidates of NIST LWC project. We show the
existence of structural weaknesses which could be exploited to forge any message with success
probability of 1. For Limdolen, we require the output of a single encryption query while for
HERN we need at most 4 encryption queries for a valid forgery. Following our attack, both
designs are eliminated from second round.
vi
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1.1 Motivation
Over the past few years, there has been an overwhelming surge in development of Internet
of Things (IoT) including Radio Frequency Identifiers (RFIDs), smart devices and sensor
networks. The IoT connects an extraordinarily wide spectrum of devices ranging from personal
computers to remote servers to smart devices (e.g., smart watches, smart speakers, home
automation) to embedded systems. The RFIDs such as Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags
[6] are typically used in identification of market products, while sensor networks monitor
the physical environment (e.g., weather forecast, industrial process on site) by connecting a
network of sensors to a central hub. It is expected that the number of such devices will be
more than 20 billion by 2020 with an approximate market value of 7.1 trillion US dollars [75].
All these devices collect and transmit a huge volume of data which may risk the privacy
of users. Therefore, attaining proper security goals is the primary requirement. In particular,
the transmitted data needs to be encrypted and/or authenticated. Additionally, such devices
operate in varying environments and thus have different resource and performance require-
ments. For example, EPC tags [6, 80] are highly constrained in terms of physical implemen-
tation area and power consumption, while vehicular embedded systems require a very low
latency and real-time response [84]. Sensor networks mostly operate on low power batteries
(e.g., solar energy). For IoTs, low latency and/or high throughput are required. Accordingly,
the three metrics, namely 1) security and functionalities: encryption, authentication or both;
2) resource constraints: area and code size (in case of software); 3) performance: latency,
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power consumption, throughput and RAM size, define lightweight crytpography which aims to
find a balance of trade-off among them. In simple words, lightweight cryptography is about
designing secure cryptographic primitives for resource constrained applications.
Designing an algorithm with optimal metrics for constrained environments is a challenging
task. The current National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) approved standards
such as AES [102], SHA-2 [103] and SHA-3 [104] perform well in desktop and server environ-
ments but not in resource constrained devices. For example, AES round-based hardware cost
is too high in Gate Equivalents (GE). The hash functions SHA-2 and SHA-3 with state sizes
512 and 1600 bits have large memory and area requirements. In this context, designing algo-
rithms which fit the resource constrained scenarios and can outperform the current standards
remains an active area of research. Starting from the eSTREAM project [4] to Competition
for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) [1] to the
ongoing NIST lightweight cryptography (NIST LWC) standardization project [5], numerous
lightweight symmetric key primitives such as stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions
and authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithms have been proposed.
The stream ciphers expand a fixed length secret key to long keystream sequence using a
Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PRBG) based on Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR)
design paradigm. Examples of lightweight stream ciphers include Grain [73], Trivium [53],
Micky [20], WG [101], Plantlet [99] and Lizard [72]. Block ciphers take an n-bit plaintext and
κ-bit (κ ≥ n) secret key as input and output a random looking n-bit ciphertext after iterating
the round function multiple times. Such a round function can be designed using the two well
known constructions, namely Feistel structure and Substitution Permutation Network (SPN).
Examples of lightweight block ciphers with a Feistel round are TEA [132], Hight [74], Twine
[125], Simon and Speck [23] and Simeck [135], while LED [71], PRESENT [42], EPCBC [136],
Prince [43], Skinny [25], GIFT [21] and Craft [26] are based on an SPN round function.
A cryptographic hash function takes an arbitrary length message as an input and output a
short fixed length fingerprint of the message. Their constructions rely on stream ciphers, block
ciphers or cryptographic permutations. Examples of lightweight hash functions that utilize
cryptographic permutation encompass Keccak (smaller versions) [37], Photon [70], Quark [17],
Spongent [41] and Gimli [29]. On the other hand, an AEAD scheme provides integrity and
authenticity in addition to confidentiality. Such schemes are constructed by using stream
ciphers, block ciphers or cryptographic permutations in a mode, e.g., GCM [96], OCB [114],
OCB3 [88] and sponge [31]. A majority of the NIST LWC round 2 candidates are based on
sponge mode or its variants. A few examples are Ascon [60], ACE [7], Gimli [29], PHOTON-
Bettle [22], SPARKLE [24], SPIX [13], SpoC [12], Spook [28], Subterranean 2.0 [51], WAGE [8]
and Xoodyak [50].
Although lightweight, the aforementioned schemes vary in hardware and software perfor-
mances because of structural differences. In particular, the choice of the round function, i.e.,
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Feistel or SPN, together with the number of rounds determine the performance. A Feistel
round is cheaper in hardware than an SPN round but has slower diffusion. Low number
of rounds is good for high throughput but may not guarantee security against generic at-
tacks. Thus, there exist a multitude of options which needs to be analyzed thoroughly for a
lightweight design.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
This thesis presents research contributions in the area of lightweight cryptography including
both the design and cryptanalysis. We push the design limits to low hardware area and
power consumption with efficient software performance. Consequently, we propose the design
of four lightweight cryptographic permutations: sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light, ACE and WAGE.
Another aspect is the design of ‘one-for-all ’ unified round function in a sponge mode which
can provide multiple cryptographic functionalities with a cheap hardware overhead (extra cost
for control logic only). Our proposed AEAD and hash algorithms have better or comparable
performance relative to existing symmetric key primitives at the same security level. Notably,
four of the NIST LWC round 2 candidates, namely ACE, Spix, Spoc and WAGE are the
contribution of this thesis. From a cryptanalysis perspective, a novel contribution is the idea
of correlated sequences and their applications to meet-in-the-middle attack, which resulted
in best key recovery attacks on NSA’s cipher Simon-32/64 and its variant Simeck-32/64. In
addition, we find forgery attacks on NIST LWC round 1 candidates Limdolen and HERN. As
a result, these algorithms are removed from the second round of the competition.
1.3 Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the preliminaries and
related work. We give the mathematical description of symmetric key primitives and generic
cryptanalysis techniques. We also discuss the metrics that define lightweight cryptography
and introduce our design principles.
The thesis is then divided into three parts: 1) Design of lightweight cryptographic permu-
tations (Chapters 3-5), 2) Mode of operations for AEAD and Hash (Chapters 6 and 7), and
3) Cryptanalysis of lightweight symmetric key primitives (Chapters 8-10).
In Chapter 3, we propose sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light family of permutations which utilize
unkeyed reduced-round Simeck block cipher as their building block. We provide an in-depth
security analysis of Simeck, and hence sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light, using automated tools.
Chapter 4 introduces ACE which is a generalized version of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light. We
present its detailed security analysis along with the design rationale. In Chapter 5, we propose
WAGE, a lightweight permutation based on the WG family of stream ciphers. We show that
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simple tweaks can transform WAGE to the original WG cipher. We further discuss its security
analysis and justify our design choices.
Chapter 6 introduces the idea of the unified round function for a sponge mode. We show
its adaptability to multiple cryptographic functionalities with a low hardware overhead. We
give the generic descriptions of AEAD and hash algorithms, and present several instances of
these algorithms with varying security levels using sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light, ACE and WAGE
permutations. In Chapter 7, we present a new AEAD mode of operation called Spoc, and its
two instantiation using sLiSCP-light.
Chapter 8 presents a key recovery attack on the reduced-round WG-5 stream cipher using
the division property based cube attacks. In Chapter 9, we propose a novel property of block
ciphers called correlated sequences. We show their applications to meet-in-the-middle attacks,
and then provide key recovery attacks (27 out of 32 rounds) on two lightweight block ciphers
Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64 in a single key setting. Chapter 10 presents the practical
forgery attacks on two NIST LWC round 1 candidates Limdolen and HERN.
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2.1 Notation
We denote by F2 the finite field consisting of {0, 1}. For a positive integer n, Fn2 and F2n
denote the n dimensional vector space over F2 and an extension field over F2 defined using a
irreducible polynomial over F2 of degree n, respectively. Let Cs represent the coset modulo
2n − 1, i.e., Cs = {s, 2s, . . . , 2ns−1s} where ns is the smallest number such that s ≡ 2nss mod
2n − 1, and s is the smallest number in Cs, and denoted as the coset leader.
We use {0, 1}n, {0, 1}? and ε to denote the set of all length n, variable length and empty
bitstrings, respectively. For any string X ∈ {0, 1}?, |X| denotes the length of X in bits
and by (X0, · · · , Xl−1) n←− X we refer to the n-bit block parsing of X where |Xi|= n for
0 ≤ i ≤ l − 2 and 1 ≤ |Xl−1|≤ n. By X $←− {0, 1}n, we mean a random n bitstring drawn
from {0, 1}n. We write X in bits as (x0, x1, · · · , x|X|−1). For strings X and Y , the operations
XY,X⊕Y,X|Y,X||Y and < X,Y > denote the bitwise AND, XOR, OR, concatenation and
scalar product of X and Y , respectively. Moreover, L(·) denotes the left cyclic shift operator,
i.e., for x ∈ {0, 1}n, Li(x) = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xn−1, x0, x1, . . . , xi−1).
We use Pr(X = x) to denote the probability that a random variable X equals x. By
Pr(X0 = x0, X1 = x1, . . . , Xl−1 = xl−1) we refer to the joint probability of random variables
X0, X1, . . . , Xl−1 taking values x0, x1, . . . , xl−1, respectively. Pr(A|B) denotes the conditional
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probability of A given B. Furthermore, the symbol X ∼ U({0, 1}n) denotes that X follows a
uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. Finally, the secret key space is denoted by K.
Note that we use ’+’ and ’⊕’ and ’⊕’ interchangeably throughout this chapter, if the
meaning is clear in context.
2.2 Modern Cryptography
Cryptography, the word derived from two Greek words kryptos meaning “hidden secret”
and graphein meaning “to write”, is the science of secret communications in the presence
of malicious adversaries. The history dates back to 2000 B.C with its initial use as secret
hieroglyphics by Egyptians [81]. Other historic examples include Caesar and Vignere ciphers,
and German Enigma used in World War II. Although the former ciphers could preserve
the secrecy, they got attacked with the advent in computing power. Cryptography has now
evolved to modern cryptography which is based on hard mathematical problems such as integer
factorization, discrete logarithm or one-way functions, i.e., recovering a secret key which lies
in an exponential search space.
In the following, we give a high level overview of the fundamental problem in modern
cryptography and its major branches.
2.2.1 The fundamental cryptographic problem and goals
Consider two parties Alice and Bob1. Let’s say Alice has a message x which she wants to send
to Bob over the insecure channel, e.g., internet. If Alice sends x as it is to Bob (Figure 2.1),
then an adversary Eve knows the message in plaintext. Eve could further change x to x′
and then send x′ to Bob. In this case, Bob is unaware of the modification and cannot
ensure whether the message is coming from Alice or Eve. Furthermore, on receiving the
exchanged message, Alice or Bob cannot deny it. Thus, the fundamental problem in modern
cryptography is to address these issues and achieve secure communication over a insecure
channel. More precisely, a secure communication requires the following four goals.





Figure 2.1: Communication over insecure channel
1In real world Alice and Bob could be laptops, smartphones, servers or IoT devices.
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1. Confidentiality. For a passive adversary, i.e., an adversary who is only listening over
the channel, it must be infeasible to learn any information about the message x. In particular,
no one except the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) learns x.
2. Integrity. It must be infeasible for an active adversary, i.e., an adversary who modifies
the message x to x′, to have x′ be accepted. In other words, any changes in the exchanged
messages are easily detectable by Alice or Bob.
3. Authenticity. For an active adversary, it must be infeasible to impersonate the identity
of sender or receiver by modifying the message or creating a complete new message. In
particular, Alice and Bob should be able to detect that the exchanged messages are originating
from either of them or from an adversary. Note that there is a subtle difference between
integrity and authenticity. For integrity, any changes in the message should be detectable,
while authenticity requires that message is exactly the same as it was sent.
4. Non-repudiation. For the above three properties, we have considered that Alice and
Bob are honest and Eve is the adversary. What if either of Alice or Bob acts as an adversary?
In this case, we require that a denial in the commitment of exchanged messages by either
of them is easily detectable. Note that this property can only be achieved by asymmetric
cryptography.
2.2.2 Branches of cryptography
Cryptography is mainly divided into symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography
(Figure 2.2), based on which party/parties hold the secret key. A third branch often termed
as crytographic protocols use the former two cryptographic approaches as building blocks. We








Figure 2.2: Branches of cryptography
2.2.2.1 Symmetric cryptography
As the name suggests, both sender and receiver hold the same secret key k. To send a
message x, Alice uses an encryption function Enc which takes x and k as input and output
7
a random looking y. Alice then sends y to Bob over the insecure channel. On receiving y,
Bob computes the decryption function Dec(y, k) which returns the message x as the output.
The entire procedure is depicted in Figure 2.3. In addition to classical encryption, symmetric
key cryptography can also provide data integrity and authentication (as described later in
Section 2.3).
Alice Enc insecure channel Dec Bob
Eve
k k
x y y x
y
Figure 2.3: Symmetric key encryption and decryption
Remark 2.1. The shared secret key could be obtained via some secure channel. In real
applications, it is done through a combination of asymmetric cryptography and certificates
(e.g., Diffie Hellman key exchange protocol [56] where public keys are certified by a trusted
CA). From now onwards, when we talk about symmetric cryptography, we assume that only
Alice and Bob know the secret key independent of how they obtain it.
2.2.2.2 Asymmetric cryptography
In asymmetric or public-key cryptography, a user posses two keys, i.e., (pk, sk), namely public
key pk and private key sk. For a typical encryption such as RSA, Alice uses Bob’s public
key pkBob to encrypt a message. Bob then uses his private key skBob for decryption. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.4. In addition to classic encryption, asymmetric key cryptography can
be used for key establishment and digital signatures2.
Alice Enc insecure channel Dec Bob
Eve
pkBob skBob
x y y x
y
Figure 2.4: Asymmetric (public-key) encryption and decryption
2Non-repudiation can be achieved through digital signatures as private key is only known to the user who
signs the message.
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Remark 2.2. The hardness in asymmetric key cryptography is based on hard computational
problems such as integer factorization or discrete logarithm. For symmetric cryptography, it
is based on recovering the secret key which has an exponential search space in the length of
key.
2.2.2.3 Cryptographic protocols
Roughly speaking, a cryptographic protocol is a set of rules which uses symmetric and asym-
metric primitives as building blocks for secure communication. The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol used in every modern-day web browser is such an example. It initially uses
asymmetric approach for key establishment, and then utilizes symmetric cryptography with
established keys for exchanging encrypted (and/or authenticated) messages (Chapter 8 [48]).
2.3 Symmetric Key Primitives
Symmetric key primitives are widely deployed cryptographic primitives in day-to-day life.
They have a wide range of applications, e.g., secure communications such as TLS 1.2/1.3,
IPSec and SSL, online and chip based payments, WIFI and sensor networks or RFIDs. Such
primitives typically offer three functionalities: confidentiality, data integrity and authenti-
cation. The major symmetric key primitives which offer these functionalities include stream
ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions, message authentication codes and authenticated encryp-
tion with associated data algorithms. In the following, we give a generic description of these
primitives.
2.3.1 Stream ciphers
A stream cipher encrypts/decrypts a message bit by bit (or byte by byte). The idea is to
expand a secret key with fixed length to large keystream. Mathematically, it is a function F
which takes a κ-bit secret key K and an n-bit initialization vector IV as input and output a
sequence of keystream bits z0, z1, . . . (Figure 2.5). The encryption and decryption is simply
done using bitwise XOR operation and given by
Encryption: ci = mi ⊕ zi
Decryption: mi = ci ⊕ zi
Assumption. For a fixed K, the public value IV should never be repeated otherwise the
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Figure 2.5: Schematic of stream cipher encryption and decryption
Properties. The security properties of keystream highly depends on the choice of F . In
general, the following properties are needed.
1. Indistinguishability: It should be infeasible to distinguish an l-bit keystream from a
randomly drawn l-bit string from {0, 1}l.
2. Unpredictibility: Given l bits of keystream z0, . . . , zl−1, the difference between Pr(zl = 0)
and Pr(zl = 1) is negligible.
Sometimes we also require that keystream has a long period. Since it is difficult to guar-
antee a lower bound on the period (especially when F is an NLFSR [67, 68]), this property
is desirable but not easy to achieve.
Working procedure of F . F typically operates in two phases: 1) Key Initialization Phase
(KIA) and 2) Keystream Generation Phase (KSG). Both phases are explained below.
1. KIA phase: The state is first loaded with K, IV and some constants. Next, we update
the state for R rounds without producing any output.
2. KSG phase: Output the keystream bit and update the state. Repeat till the required
number of keystream bits are obtained.
Examples of F . A trivial example of F is an m-stage Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) defined using a degree m primitive poynomial over F2. It guarantees a period of
2m − 1, however such constructions are easily attacked using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
with the knowledge of only 2m keystream bits. Other well known examples of F include
Grain [73], Trivium [53], WG [101], Acorn [133], Lizard [72] and Plantlet [99] which are based
on NLFSR or a combination of LFSR and NLFSR with a filtering function.
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2.3.2 Block ciphers
A block cipher is a deterministic algorithm which encrypts/decrypts a block of bits at a
time. In particular, it is a combination of two algorithms, an encryption algorithm E and
the decryption algorithm E−1. Let K be a κ-bit secret key, and P and C denote the n-bit
plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. Furthermore, assume κ ≥ n. A pictorial illustration of
block cipher is shown in Figure 2.6.
Alice E insecure channel E−1 Bob
Eve
K K




Figure 2.6: Schematic of block cipher encryption and decryption
An encryption algorithm E is a function E : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that for
each K ∈ {0, 1}κ, the function EK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a permutation. The decryption
algorithm is symmetrical to the encryption algorithm. In addition, for correctness it should
satisy E−1K (EK(P )) = P for all P ∈ {0, 1}n and K ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Remark 2.3. There exists 2n! permutations which map n bits to n bits. A block cipher is
small subset of this set with 2κ permutations. In Chapters 3-5, we will look at the design of
cryptographic permutations.
In Figure 2.6, we have shown the encryption and decryption procedures for a single block.
However, in real applications, the message length is greater than n. There exist many ways
of encrypting a long message by using a block cipher in a mode.
2.3.2.1 Block cipher modes
Let K be fixed, IV be an n-bit public initialization vector, and assume that the message
length is always a multiple of block size n3. Figure 2.7 depicts the most commonly used
block cipher modes where blue and red colored boxes denote the encryption and decryption,
respectively. Note that OFB, CFB and counter modes are of stream cipher encryption using
block ciphers and may use only a portion of the output of EK depending on the length of the
last plaintext block.


























Z0 = IV ,
Zi = EK(Zi−1), for i ≥ 1







Z0 = IV ,
Zi = EK(Ci−1), for i ≥ 1







Z0 = IV ,
Zi = Zi−1 + 1, for i ≥ 1
e) Counter mode
Figure 2.7: Block cipher modes of operation
2.3.2.2 Generic structures of block ciphers
Until now, we have seen the encryption and decryption procedures using a block cipher. We
now look into the structural details of EK and E
−1
K . As depicted in Figure 2.8, the encryption
(resp. decryption) algorithm is an iterative permutation where the output is obtained after
iterating the round function RF (resp. RF−1) R times. The round function takes n-bit
intermediate stage and κ′-bit round key (κ′ ≤ n) as input and produces an n-bit output.
The round keys ki are derived from the master key K using a Key Scheduling Algorithm.
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A typical design of round function is based on either Feistel or Substitution Permutation
Network (SPN) which are described below.


















Figure 2.8: Block cipher as an iterative structure
Feistel round function. Roughly speaking, a Feistel round function process only half of
the bits in a single round. Let xi = x
1
i ‖x0i , x1i and x0i ∈ {0, 1}n/2, and S:{0, 1}n/2 → {0, 1}n/2
be a nonlinear function. Then, a single round of Feistel network is shown in Figure 2.9 and
computed as follows.
x1i+1 ← S(x1i )⊕ x0i ⊕ ki,
x0i+1 ← x1i .
For a Feistel round function, S does not have to be invertible. Thus, encryption and de-
cryption can be performed using the same round function by changing the order of round keys.
Notable examples of such construction are Lucifier [65], DES [121], Simon [23] and Simeck
[135]. This structure was later generalized into Type I, Type II and Type III Generalized
Feistel Structures (GFS) [140, 106]. The classic DES is an example of Type I GFS, while the






















Figure 2.9: Feistel round function (as an NLFSR on right)
















Figure 2.10: Type II GFS round function without round keys
SPN round function. Contrary to the Fesitel round, an SPN round function process all
bits in a single round. It is basically a composition of 3 layers, namely 1) AddRoundKey, 2)
Substitution layer and 3) Linear layer. The substitution layer divides the n-bit state into nm
m-bit words and then applies the nonlinear invertible function S to each word4. The linear
layer then mixes the bits of the state in a word or bit wise fashion (Figure 2.11).
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S








Figure 2.11: SPN round function
4Here S is a m-bit to m-bit mapping
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Most notable example of an SPN round is the AES round function [52] where n = 128,
m = 8 and linear layer is the combination of ShiftRows and MixColumns operations. Other
examples with linear layer as bit permutation include lightweight block ciphers PRESENT
[42] and GIFT [21] where n = 64 and m = 4.
2.3.2.3 Tweakable block ciphers
Roughly speaking, a block cipher with a public value (referred to as tweak) as an input in
addition to plaintext and key is a tweakable block cipher (TBC) [91] (Figure 2.12). Mathe-
matically, it is a function E : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}t × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that for all key and
tweak pairs (K,TK) ∈ {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}t, E(K,TK) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a permutation. The











Figure 2.12: Tweakable block cipher
The modes of operation and underlying structures of round function is similar to classic
block ciphers. The only difference is in the key scheduling algorithm which now gives tweakey
tki as the output in each round. Note that only TK value is public and not tki’s. Examples
include Skinny [25], Deoxys-BC [78] and CRAFT [26].
2.3.3 Hash functions
A cryptographic hash is an unkeyed primitive which takes an arbitrary length message as an
input and output a short fixed length fingerprint of the message. The fingerprint is often
called as a hash value or message digest.
Security properties. A hash function H : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}n should satisy the following
properties.
1. Preimage resistance: Given a message digest y ∈ {0, 1}n, it is infeasible to find x such
that H(x) = y.
2. Collision resistance: It is infeasible to find any two messages x1 6= x2 such that H(x1) =
H(x2).
3. Second preimage resistance: Given x1, and thus H(x1), it is infeasible to find any x2
such that x1 6= x2 and H(x1) = H(x2).
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2.3.3.1 Merkle-Damg̊ard construction
The Merkle-Damg̊ard construction is a well known method to construct a hash function using
a one-way compression function. Let f be a compression function and M0, · · · ,Ml−1 be l
blocks of message M obtained after padding. The hash value is computed as follows.
H−1 = constant
Hi ← f(Hi−1,Mi), for 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1
H(M) = Hl−1




H−1 H0 Hl−2 Hl−1
· · ·
Figure 2.13: Merkle-Damg̊ard hash construction
2.3.3.2 Hash functions from block ciphers
Block ciphers can be used in multiple ways to construct hash functions. Two such widely
known constructions are Davies-Meyer and Miyaguchi-Preneel hash modes. In Davies-Meyer
construction a message block is used as the key, while for Miyaguchi-Preneel mode the chaining
value Hi is taken as the key. For both constructions the initial chaining value H−1 is a fixed
constant and the last chaining value is taken as the message digest (Figure 2.14).
2.3.3.3 Sponge based hash
Sponge functions introduced by Bertoni et al. [31] take arbitrary length input and produce
an arbitrary length output. Their underlying primitive is a b-bit unkeyed cryptographic
permutation P where b = r + c and r denotes the rate part of state, while c is the capacity.
The message M after padding is divided into chunks of r-bit blocks which are then absorbed
into the state r bits at a time. This phase is called as absorbing phase. After all the message
blocks are processed, squeezing phase begins where r-bit digest is taken at a time until l = cr
blocks are squeezed. Finally, the hash of message is given by H(M) = H0‖H1‖· · · ‖Hl−1. The












Figure 2.14: Block cipher based hash functions
0b P P P P P





Absorbing phase Squeezing phase
Figure 2.15: Sponge based hash function
Hash functions such as SHA-3 winner Keccak [32], Photon [70], Quark [17] and Spongent
[41] are based on sponge construction with different permutations. In Chapter 6, we present
new lightweight hash functions which have better or comparable performance with all the
aforementioned hash functions at the same security level.
2.3.4 Message authentication codes
At a high level, a message authentication code (MAC) is a keyed hash function. A MAC
function MAC : {0, 1}? × {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}t takes arbitrary length message M and κ-bit secret
key as input and output a t-bit tag T which authenticates the message M . The receiver with
the knowledge of secret key and M computes the tag T ′. If T ′ equals T , then only the message
authentication is successful.
Examples of block cipher based MACs include CBC-MAC, PMAC [39] and CMAC [77],
while HMAC [27] is a hash based MAC. To use sponge based hash (Figure 2.15) as a MAC, we
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load the state with the secret key and public initialization vector and then call the permutation
P. Next, we absorb the message blocks and then extract the tag similarly to hash digest.
2.3.5 Authenticated encryption with associated data algorithms
The authenticated encryption with associated data algorithm (AEAD) provides confidential-
ity, integrity and authenticity at the same time. The AEAD algorithm AE is a combination
of two algorithms, an authenticated encryption algorithm AEenc and the verified decryption


















Figure 2.16: Schematic of AEAD algorithm
An authenticated encryption algorithm AEenc takes as input a secret key K of length κ
bits, a public message number N (nonce) of size n bits, a block header AD (a.k.a, associated
data) and a message M . The output of AEenc is an authenticated ciphertext C of the same
length as M , and an authentication tag T of size t bits. Mathematically, AEenc is defined as
AEenc : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}t
with
AEenc(K,N,AD,M) = (C, T ).
The decryption and verification algorithm AEdec takes as input the secret key K, nonce N ,
associated data AD, ciphertext C and tag T , and outputs the plaintext M of the same length
as C only if the verification of tag is correct, and ⊥ (error symbol) if the tag verification fails.
More formally,
AEdec(K,N,AD,C, T ) ∈ {M,⊥}.
2.3.5.1 Constructions of AEAD
Figure 2.17 shows the three main approaches to construct an AEAD algorithm. They are 1)





















Figure 2.17: Generic constructions of AEAD. Dotted line denotes that the input vary with
respect to specific instantiations of encryption and MAC algorithms.
Encrypt-then-MAC. The sender initially computes the ciphertext C and then uses it as
an input to MAC algorithm for the tag generation (Figure 2.17 (a)). For verification, the
receiver computes the tag first, and if it matches with the received tag, then only he decrypts
C.
MAC-then-Encrypt. In this case, tag T is computed first. Next, T and the plaintext
M are used as input to the encryption algorithm for generating C (Figure 2.17 (b)). For
verification, the receiver has to decrypt C to obtain M . The plaintext is then fed to the MAC
algorithm which outputs tag T ′. If T ′ equals T , then only verification is successful.
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Encrypt-and-MAC. In this approach, encryption and MAC computations are done in
parallel. However, similar to the MAC-then-Encrypt approach, a receiver has to perform
decryption first (Figure 2.17 (c)).
2.3.5.2 Mode of operations for AEAD
In the previous section, we have seen three different approaches of AEAD construction. How-
ever, both encryption and MAC procedures require a mode of operation to handle long mes-
sages. We now explain different AEAD modes based on block ciphers and sponge construction.
Block cipher based AEAD. Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [96], OCB [114] and OCB3
[88] are widely adopted AEAD modes of operation based on Encrypt-then-MAC paradigm.
Roughly speaking, all three modes adopt the counter mode of operation for encryption. For
OCB, the input and output of the block cipher is randomized by XORing a secret mask.
On the other hand, OCB3 uses a tweakable block cipher where the tweak value acts as a
counter. For OCB and OCB3, authentication is achieved by an additional call of primitive
after the processing of associated data and plaintext, while GCM authentication is based on
the evaluation of a polynomial function in a finite field. The exact structures of these modes



















Figure 2.18: GCM mode where ⊗ denotes the finite field multiplication in F2n
Remark 2.4. The choice of secret masks (Figure 2.19) and tweaks (Figure 2.20) are crucial




















































Figure 2.20: OCB3 mode where tk(a,i), tk(m,i) and tkt are tweaks
present practial forgery attacks on some AEAD modes which exploit weaknesses in secret
masks.
Sponge based AEAD. A sponge based AEAD is a permutation based sequential mode of
operation. Let P be a b-bit permutation with b = r + c where r and c denote the rate and
capacity part of the state, respectively. The entire algorithm is divided into 4 phases which















Initialization Processing Associated data Encryption Tag Generation
Figure 2.21: Schematic of AEAD using sponge where da and dm are the domain separators.
For simplicity, we have considered the processing of two complete AD and M blocks that are
obtained after padding. Furthermore, tag size equals r.
1. Initialization: The state is first loaded with K and N , and then P is called once. The
goal is to have a random looking initial state after the single call of P.
2. Processing Associated data: Each r-bit AD block is XORed to the rate and then P is
applied. During the processing of last AD block, a domain separator da is XORed to
the capacity to indicate that the current block is the last block of associated data.
3. Encryption: Each r-bit M block is XORed to the rate which gives the ciphertext. Next,
the ciphertext block is fed to the state and then P is applied. While processing the
last block of M , a domain separator dm is XORed to the capacity to indicate that the
current block is the last message block.
4. Tag Generation/Finalization: The tag is extracted from the rate part of the state r-bits
at a time.
Figure 2.21 describes sponge based AEAD scheme at a very high level. There exists many
variants of the same structure with tweaks in the above mentioned 4 phases and domain
separators. A majority of NIST LWC round 2 candidates are based on the sponge construction
[5]. Chapters 6 and 7 present two such variants.
2.4 Generic Cryptanalysis Techniques
Cryptanalysis is the art of finding hidden aspects of a cryptographic primitive or a cryp-
tographic protocol that can be exploited by an attacker to learn something about the key
or the plaintext. It is a broad and never-ending field as attacks often get better with time.
Cryptanalysis is categorized into two major branches, namely mathematical cryptanalysis and
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implementation attacks. The former targets the mathematical structure while the later ex-
ploits side channel information such as power consumption or execution time to analyze a
cryptosystem. In both cases, to launch a attack, an attacker requires data, time and memory
storage which are called attack complexity metrics. The better the attack complextity metrics
the better is the attack.
In the following, we first explain different adversarial models5 and attack goals. Next, we
discuss generic attack techniques which are essential from designer’s perspective.
2.4.1 Adversarial models and goals
An adversarial model is the set of rules followed by an adversary for an attack. There are six
major adversarial models based on the type of data available to an adversary.
1. Ciphertext-only: Only ciphertexts.
2. Known-plaintext: The plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts.
3. Chosen-ciphertext: Adversary chooses a ciphertext C, queries it to the decryption oracle
and obtains the corresponding plaintext P .
4. Chosen-plaintext: Adversary chooses a plaintext P , queries it to the encryption oracle
and obtains the corresponding ciphertext C.
5. Adaptive-chosen-ciphertext: This is similar to chosen-ciphertext model. The only dif-
ference is that after observing N plaintext and ciphertext pairs (Mi, Ci) i = 1 to N , the
adversary adaptively chooses the next ciphertext based on the previous N pairs.
6. Adaptive-chosen-plaintext: This is a dual of adaptive-chosen-ciphertext. In this scenario,
the adversary adaptively chooses the next plaintext based on the previous N pairs.
Note that for ciphertext-only and known-plaintext models, there is no interaction with the
oracles. In addition, for each of these models it is necessary to define in which setting those
data are obtained.
• Single-key setting. Adversary obtains the data corresponding to a fixed secret key.
• Related-key setting. Adversary gets the victim or oracle to encrypt/decrypt with a
key that is related in a chosen way to the original key.
• Nonce-misuse setting. Adversary is allowed to repeat the nonce for both encryption
and decryption queries.
5Our focus here is on mathematical cryptanalysis
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• Nonce-respecting setting. Adversary is not allowed to repeat the nonce for an
encryption query. However, for a decryption query nonce can be repeated. This is
the case of forgery attacks when adversary tries to pass the verification by repeating
nonce and changing ciphertext and/or associated data.
Now, once the adversary has enough data corresponding to a particular setting and specific
model, he tries to achieve either of the following goals.
1. Distinguishing attack: In this scenario, the adversary tries to distinguish whether the
data he obtained is from the real world (i.e., the actual encryption/decryption oracle)
or the ideal world. In an ideal world, an idealized oracle outputs a fixed length string
by picking it randomly from the uniform distribution.
2. Key recovery attack or breaking the confidentiality, integrity or authenticity.
2.4.2 Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis is one of the most powerful cryptanalytic techniques against sym-
metric key primitives. It was proposed by Biham and Shamir [38] to cryptanalyze the block
cipher DES, and subsequently other ciphers. The attack exploits the fact that a single round
of a primitive is usually weaker than multiple rounds.
2.4.2.1 Basic idea and definitions
Let RF : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an n to n bit vectorial boolean function and X ∼ U({0, 1}n).
The idea is to find a pair of input and output difference α and β ∈ {0, 1}n with α 6= 0 for
which the probability Pr(RF(X) + RF(X + α) = β) is maximum. For a random RF the
value is close to 2−n. In case RF is a cryptographic primitive, we aim to find (α, β) for which
it is greater than 2−n. The pair can then be used as a distinguisher or for key recovery attack
as described later. This value is often called differential probability and we formally define it
in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Probability (DP) [38, 107]). For a given α and β, the differential
probability is given by
Pr(RF(X) +RF(X + α) = β) = |{x | RF(x) +RF(x+ α) = β}|
2n
.
Moreover, we call (α, β) a differential.
Typically, a cryptographic primitive is an iterative structure and the final output is ob-
tained after applying the round function RF multiple times (say r). Accordingly, we have a
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sequence of random variables ∆Y0,∆Y1, · · · ,∆Yr, which we call an r-round differential char-
acteristic (Figure 2.22). The differential characteristic satisfies
∆Yi = αi = xi + x
′
i, for 0 ≤ i ≤ r and
Pr(∆Yi = αi,∆Yi+1 = αi+1) > 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
Computing the exact probability of an r-round differential characteristic is infeasible be-
cause of the exponential search space in n. A common approach is to exploit the properties
of the round function, compute the probability of a single round differential, assume the
independence of rounds, and then take the product of probabilities (Definition 2.2). By inde-
pendence of rounds, we mean that the differential probability of the output difference at the
(i+ 1)-th round depends only on the output difference at round i. Note that the assumption
of independence of rounds is not true in general (as we see later), however it provides a good
approximation in practice.
RF RF · · · RFx0 x1 x2 xr−1 xr
α0 α1 α2 αr−1 αr
RF RF · · · RFx′0 x′1 x′2 x′r−1 x′r
· · ·
Figure 2.22: r-round differential characteristic
Definition 2.2 (Differential Characteristic Probability (DCP)). Let r > 0 and ∆Y0 =
α0,∆Y1 = α1, · · · ,∆Yr = αr be an r-round differential characteristic. Assuming that all
rounds are independent, the r-round differential characteristic probability is given by
Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Y1 = α1, · · · ,∆Yr = αr) =
r−1∏
i=0
Pr(∆Yi = αi,∆Yi+1 = αi+1).
As an adversary, one is only interested in the differential (α0, αr) and not the intermediate
differences. This is because there might be multiple paths with the same input and output
difference. Thus, the probability of an r-round differential (α0, αr) is always at least the
probability of a single characteristic. We introduce the following definition to reflect this fact.
Definition 2.3 (r-round Differential Probability). For an r round differential (α0, αr), its
probability is given by
Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr) =
∑
α1,...,αr−1
Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Y1 = α1, · · · ,∆Yr = αr).
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Remark 2.5. Definition 2.1 is a special case of Definition 2.3 with r = 1.
The phenomenon in Definition 2.3 is often termed differential effect. For simplicity, let
w = d−log2(DCP(·))e denote the weight of a differential characteristic. Then, an alternate
expression of an r-round differential is given by





where si is the number of r-round differential characteristics with w = i.
2.4.2.2 Effect of round keys
RFk0 RFk1 · · · RFkr−1x0 x1 x2 xr−1 xr
α0 α1 α2 αr−1 αr
RFk0 RFk1 · · · RFkr−1x′0 x′1 x′2 x′r−1 x′r
· · ·
Figure 2.23: r-round differential characteristic with keyed round function
In the previous definitions, we have ignored the effect of round key additions. However, the
round function RF is usually parameterized by a round key (e.g., block cipher). We denote
it by RFki where ki is the i-th round key and Ki is the random variable corresponding to ki.
Now, consider an r-round differential as shown in Figure 2.23. The main problem here is
that we need to compute the value of
Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr | K0 = k0, · · · ,Kr−1 = kr−1) (2.2)
without the knowledge of secret key. Thus, in most of the cases, we are only able to compute
the value of Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr) by assuming that
1. Ki ∼ U({0, 1}n) for all i.
2. For all i 6= j, Ki and Kj are independent random variables.
Remark 2.6. Both the above assumptions are not true in general as the round keys are
derived from the master key which has fixed size.
Furthermore, we have to assume that Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr) is roughly same for almost all
keys. This additional condition is referred to as the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence.
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Definition 2.4 (Hypothesis of stochastic equivalence [90]). For an r-round differential (α0, αr)
Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr | K0 = k0, · · · ,Kr−1 = kr−1) ≈ Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr)
for almost all round keys k0, · · · , kr−1.
In practice, the above hypothesis may not hold as pointed out by Canteaut [45]. This
means a differential may have low probability on average but for some keys6 its probability
may be high.
2.4.2.3 Expected differential probabilities and Markov ciphers
Let Ek be a keyed cipher with r rounds, i.e. Ek(·) = RFkr−1 ◦ · · · ◦ RFk0(·).
Definition 2.5 (Expected Differential Probability (EDP) [90]). For an r-round differential
(α0, αr), the expected differential probability is given by





Pr(Ek(X) + Ek(X + α0) = αr).
Definition 2.6 (Markov cipher (cf. Page 6 [90])). We say Ek is a Markov cipher if for all
0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,
Pr(RFki(xi) +RFki(xi + αi) = αi+1 | Xi = xi) = Pr(RFki(xi) +RFki(xi + αi) = αi+1)
for all choices of xi and uniformly random chosen ki.
For a Markov cipher with all independent round keys, the EDP can be estimated as follows
EDP(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr) ≈ Pr(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr).
From Definition 2.5, it is clear that if one needs to compute EDP for a given (α0, αr), the
number of encryption queries is of order O(2n+|K|). By Markov assumption, this is reduced
to O(2n). The complexity is for a given (α0, αr), and is still not practical. Thus, an adversary
tries to find a differential characteristic with maximum probability rather than a differential.
The former is easier to compute, thanks to automated tools such as CryptoSMT and MILP
solvers [122, 2].
Let Vr denote the set of all r-round differential characteristics. Then, the Maximum
Expected Differential Characteristic Probability (MEDCP) is defined as follows.
6considered as weak keys
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Pr(∆Yi = αi,∆Yi+1 = αi+1)
We call a differential characteristic with probability equal to MEDCP(Erk) an optimal r-
round differential characteristic.
2.4.2.4 Differential distinguishers and key recovery attack
Consider a typical example of a block cipher with r rounds as shown in Figure 2.24. The
differential attack is a chosen plaintext/chosen-ciphertext attack. Thus, the adversary could
choose either of encryption or decryption oracle. We focus on the chosen-plaintext scenario
here. Let (α0, αr−1) be an (r − 1)-round differential with probability p > 2−n.
RF RF · · · RFx0 x1 x2 xr−1 xr
α0 α1 α2 αr−1 αr
k0 k1 k2 kr−1 kr
RF RF · · · RFx′0 x′1 x′2 x′r−1 x′r
· · ·
k0 k1 k2 kr−1 kr
Figure 2.24: Difference propagation for a typical block cipher
Distinguishing attack. The distinguishing attack works as follows.
Step 1 Choose a random x0. Query x0 and x
′
0 = x0 +α0 to the oracle, and obtain xr−1 and
x′r−1.
Step 2 Compute xr−1 + x′r−1.
Step 3 Repeat Step 1 and Step 2.
If the oracle is an encryption oracle, then after N trials, we expect that Np values in Step
2 satisfy xr−1 + x′r−1 = αr−1. For an ideal oracle, the output difference looks random. Thus,
on average N = 1p plaintext-ciphertext pairs are needed for the distinguishing attack.
Key recovery attack. We now show how to exploit an (r − 1)-round differential distin-
guisher for an r round key recovery attack. Assume that the attacker obtains N plaintex-
t/ciphertext pairs (Pi, Ci) and (Pi + α0, C
′
i) for i = 1, . . . , N . The attack then proceeds as
follows.
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Step 1 Initialize an array of counter CNT with CNT[i] = 0 for i = 0, . . . , 2κ−1 where |kr|= κ′.
Step 2 For each of 2κ
′
guesses of kr and for each i, decrypt one round, and compute xr−1 =
RF−1(Ci + kr), x′r−1 = RF−1(C ′i + kr). If xr−1 + x′r−1 equals αr−1, increment the
corresponding key counter by 1.
Note that there might be false positives, i.e., wrong keys which satisfy xr−1+x′r−1 = αr−1.
Let p′ be the probability of false positives and assume that p′  p. Since the differential
probability is p, we repeat the experiment N = cp times for some constant c. Thus, one of the
counter values will be significantly higher (in fact, equal to c) than others. The corresponding
key is then considered as a right key candidate for kr.
Attack complexities. In Step 2, we do not guess all last round keys in an actual attack. We
exploit the properties of RF such as the sboxes which are affected by the difference (αr−1, αr).
The kr values are then guessed accordingly. Let N =
c
p be the number of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs and l be the number of such keys. Then, the attack time complexity is N ×2l+1 1-round
decryptions. Note that this highly depends on RF .
2.4.3 Linear cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis was introduced by Matsui and Atsuhiro [95] to cryptanalyze the FEAL
cipher. Contrary to the differential attack, it is a known-plaintext attack where an adversary
tries to approximate the output of the cipher with a linear boolean function of the input.
2.4.3.1 Basic idea and definitions
Let RF : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an n to n bit vectorial boolean function and X ∼ Unif({0, 1}n).
The idea is to find a pair of input and output masks α and β ∈ {0, 1}n with α 6= 0 for which
the bias εα,β in the equation
Pr(< X,α >=< RF(X), β >) = 1
2
+ ε(α,β)
is maximum. Let R̂F(α, β) = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)<x,α>+<RF(x),β> denote the Fourier coefficient of
RF with respect to α and β. Then, an alternate form of computing bias in terms of square
correlation is defined in Definition 2.8.







Moreover, we call (α, β) a linear hull.
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Analogous to an r-round differential characteristic, the linear masks form a sequence of
boolean random variables ∆Y0, . . . ,∆Yr where ∆Yi =< xi, αi > for i = 0, . . . , r. We call
it an r-round linear characteristic. Accordingly, we have the following definitions similar to
Definitions 2.2-2.7.
Definition 2.9 (Linear Characteristic Square Correlation (LCSC)). Let r > 0 and ∆Y0 =
α0,∆Y1 = α1, · · · ,∆Yr = αr be an r-round linear characteristic. Assuming that ∆Yi’s are
independent for all i, then the r-round linear characteristic square correlation is given by
SC(∆Y0 = α0,∆Y1 = α1, · · · ,∆Yr = αr) =
r−1∏
i=0
SC(∆Yi = αi,∆Yi+1 = αi+1).
Definition 2.10 (r-round Linear Hull Square Correlation (LHSC)). For an r-round linear
hull (α0, αr), its square correlation is given by
SC(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr) =
∑
α1,...,αr−1
SC(∆Y0 = α0,∆Y1 = α1, · · · ,∆Yr = αr).
The phenomenon in Definition 2.10 is often termed linear effect. For simplicity, let w =
d−log2(LCSC(·))e denote the weight of a linear characteristic. Then, an alternate expression
of an r-round linear hull is given by





where si is the number of r-round linear characteristics with w = i.
Definition 2.11 (Expected Linear Hull Square Correlation (ELHSC)). For an r-round linear
hull (α0, αr), the expected linear hull square correlation is given by





SC(∆Y0 = α0,∆Yr = αr).
Definition 2.12 (Maximum Expected Linear Characteristic Square Correlation (MELCSC)).
Let Erk be a Markov cipher with r rounds and let Lr be the set of all r-round linear charac-





SC(∆Yi = αi,∆Yi+1 = αi+1)
We call a linear characteristic with probability equal to MELCSC(Erk) an optimal r-round
linear characteristic.
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2.4.3.2 Linear hull as a distinguisher
Let (α0, αr) be an r-round linear hull with square correlation greater than 2
−n+1. The dis-
tinguishing attack work as follows.
Step 1 Initialize two counters CNT0 = 0 and CNT1 = 0.
Step 2 Query x0 and xr.
Step 3 Compute < x0, α0 > + < xr, αr >. If < x0, α0 > + < xr, αr > equals zero, increment
CNT0, else increment CNT1.
Step 4 Repeat Step 1 and Step 2.
For an ideal oracle, CNT0 and CNT1 are roughly equal to
N
2 after N trials. However, CNT0





2.4.4 High order differential attacks
Recall Definition 2.1 of differential probability, i.e., Pr(RF(X) + RF(X + α) = β). Alter-
natively, it is the probability that first order derivative of RF at α equals β when X follows
a uniform distribution. The idea was generalized to higher order derivatives by Lai [89] and
later extended to integral attacks [85] and division propery based attacks [126]. The high level
idea of these attacks can be described as follows. Let f be a boolean function with algebraic
degree d, then its (d+ 1)-th order derivative is constant. In particular, evaluating f on 2d+1
points and then summing the output, the final sum is zero with probability 1.
2.4.4.1 Division property
We present a toy example (Table 2.1) before defining it formally in Definitions 2.13 and 2.14.




i where u, x ∈ Fn2 and wu denotes






0 = x2x0. If
x = (110) then πu(x) = 0. We observe that ∀ u satisfying
- wu < 3 =⇒
⊕
x∈F32




- wu < 2 =⇒
⊕
x∈F32




Definition 2.13 (Word based division property [126]). Let X ⊆ Fn2 , 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we say that
X has the division property Dnk if⊕
x∈X
πu(x) = 0, for all u ∈ Fn2 s.t wu < k.
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Table 2.1: Toy example for the division property
u\x 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 ⊕
x
πu(x)
000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
001 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
010 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
011 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
100 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
101 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
110 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Moreover, X is called as a multiset.
Definition 2.14 (Bit based division property [128]). Let X,W ⊆ Fn2 . The multiset X has the




unknown if there exists w ∈W s.t u  w,0 otherwise
where u,w, x ∈ Fn2 and we denote u  w if ui ≥ wi for all i.
Table 2.2: Bit based division property propagation rules
Division property
Operation Input multiset X Output multiset Y































Definitions 2.13 and 2.14 consider the propagation rules for a single round. Thus, similarly
to an r-round differential/linear characteristic we define an r-round division trail as follows.
Definition 2.15 (r-round division trail [134]). Let {v} def= W0 → W1 → · · · → Wr be an r-
round division property propagation where Wi ⊆ Fn2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ r. We call (w0, w1, . . . , wr) ∈
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W0×W1× . . .×Wr an r-round division trail if wi−1 can propagate to wi by division property
propagation rules for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} (Table 2.2).
Example 2.1. Let f : F32 → F32 given by f(x0, x1, x2) = (x0x1 ⊕ x2, x0, x1) and W0 =
{(1, 1, 0)}, then W1 = {(1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} and W2 = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1)}.
MILP models for division property. Finding r-round division trails was infeasible due
to large number of vectors in Wi until Xiang et al. [134] showed how to model the division
property propagation rules using MILP. As a result, they found the best known integral
disinguishers for block ciphers Simon, Simeck, Present, Rectangle and Twine. We now explain
how to model COPY, XOR and AND using MILP. We use M to denote the MILP model.
- MILP model for COPY. Let the division trail through a copy operation be denoted by
a→ (b1, b2, . . . , bm), then the following inequalities are used to model such propagation:
M.var ← a, b1, b2, . . . , bm as binary.
M.con← a = b1 + b2 + . . .+ bm.
- MILP model for XOR. Let (a1, a2, · · · , am) → b denote the division trail of XOR, then
the following inequalities are sufficient to describe the propagation of the division prop-
erty:
M.var ← a1, a2, · · · am, b as binary.
M.con← a1 + a2 + · · ·+ am = b.
- MILP model for AND. Let (a1, a2, · · · , am)→ b denote the division trail for AND, then
the following inequalities are used to describe the propagation:
M.var ← a1, a2, · · · am, b as binary.
M.con← b ≥ ai for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
2.4.4.2 Cube attacks
The cube attack proposed in [59, 129] is a powerful cryptanalytic technique against stream
ciphers. The idea is to analyze the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of summation of the first
keystream bit corresponding to a set of public input variables. For example, let f : F52 → F2
given by
f(k0, k1, k2, v0, v1) = v0v1k0 ⊕ v0v1k2 ⊕ v0v1 ⊕ k0k1 ⊕ v1k2 ⊕ k2 ⊕ 1
=⇒ f(k0, k1, k2, v0, v1) = v0v1(k0 ⊕ k2 ⊕ 1)⊕ k0k1 ⊕ v1k2 ⊕ k2 ⊕ 1
where k0, k1, k2 are secret variables while v0 and v1 are public variables. Summing f over
all possible choices of v0, v1 gives f(k0, k1, k2, 0, 0) ⊕ f(k0, k1, k2, 0, 1) ⊕ f(k0, k1, k2, 1, 0) ⊕
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f(k0, k1, k2, 1, 1) = k0 ⊕ k2 ⊕ 1, which is a linear relation of the two key bits k0 and k2. In
cube attacks, such relationships are exploited to recover secret bits.
Mathematical description. Let the stream cipher take an n-bit secret key k = (k0, · · · , kn−1)
and an m-bit IV = (v0, v1, · · · , vm−1), then the first keystream bit is given by the polynomial
f(k, v) which operates on n+m bits to output 1 bit and can be represented as:
f(k, v) = tI · p(k, v)⊕ q(k, v)
where I = {i1, i2, · · · , i|I|} ⊆ {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1}, tI = vi1vi2 · · · vi|I| , p(k, v) is a polynomial that
does not contain any of the variables (vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vi|I|), and q(k, v) is independent of at least
one variable from (vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vi|I|).
We denote a cube indices set by I and the corresponding cube by CI where CI is the set
of all the possible 2|I| values of (vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vi|I|). The remaining input n+m− |I| variables




f(k, v) = (
⊕
CI






Since such summation reduces tI to 1 because the set CI has only one possibility where
all the |I| variables are equal to 1, and q(k, v) vanishes because it misses at least one variable




f(k, v) = p(k, v).
If the ANF of the superpoly is simple enough, then an attacker can query the encryption
oracle with the chosen cube CI . Hence, the returned first keystream bits are summed to
evaluate the right-hand side of the superpoly and accordingly, secret variables can be recovered
by solving a system of equations. For more detailed examples, please see Section 3.7 in [48].
Cube attacks and division property. In [127], Todo et al. proposed a method to ap-
ply cube attacks on stream ciphers using the division property. Since the cube attack is a
higher-order differential attack and the division property is a technique to find higher-order
differential trails, the division property can then be used to analyze the ANF of the superpoly
by analyzing division trails corresponding to a given cube.
34
2.4.5 Meet-in-the-middle attacks
The meet-in-the-the middle (MitM) attack is a generic Time-Memory-Data (TMD) trade-
off attack proposed by Diffie and Hellman [57]. The idea is to decompose an encryption
algorithm E as a composition of two subciphers Ef and Eb (Figure 2.25) such that C =
E(k, P ) = Eb(kb,Ef (kf , P )).
−→v←−vP C
Ef (kf , P ) E
−1
b (kb, C)
Figure 2.25: MitM attack
The steps of a standard MitM attack are divided into two phases.
1. MitM phase. For all possible values of kf , compute
−→v = Ef (kf , P ) and store (kf ,−→v )
in data structure DS. Compute ←−v = E−1b (kb, C) and check if ←−v ∈ DS. If so, the value
of k corresponding to the pair (kf , kb) is one of the key candidates.
2. Brute force phase. If the number of keys obtained from MitM phase is more than
one, we perform an exhaustive search on additional plaintext-ciphertext pairs to get the
correct key.
The standard MitM attack decomposes a cipher into two subciphers with two independent
keys kf and kb. The attack was generalized to multiple subciphers with more than two
matching phases by Zhu and Gong [141]. An illustration of multi-dimensional MitM with 4
subciphers is shown in Figure 2.26.
−→v1←−v1P





Ef2(kf2 , ·) E−1b2 (kb2 , C)
C
G
Figure 2.26: Multi-dimensional MitM attack with 4 subciphers and one guess value G
2.5 Lightweight Cryptography and Design Principles
Lightweight Cryptography is the study of cryptographic algorithms which are suitable for
resource constrained environments such as RFIDs, Smart cards, Internet of Things (IoT) or
sensor networks. In particular, it is more about finding a trade-off among the three metrics
security and functionalities, resources and performance (Figure 2.27). In the following, we
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Figure 2.27: Lightweight cryptography metrics
2.5.1 Metrics of lightweight cryptography
Security and functionalities. For a fixed security, are we aiming for a single functionality
or multiple functionalities? It could be confidentiality, data integrity and authenticity, hash
or psuedorandom number generator.
Resources. Area which is the implementation size or physical area (in Gate Equivalents).
In case of software, it is code size which is the amount of data needed to evaluate the function
independent of input (in bytes).
Performance. The performance can be evaluated in terms of Throughput, Latency, Power
or RAM.
1. Throughput. Amount of data processed per time unit (in bits/bytes per second)
2. Latency. Time taken to obtain the output of the circuit once its input has been set (in
seconds)
3. Power. Amount of power needed to use the circuit (in Watts)
4. RAM. Amount of data written to memory during each evaluation of the function (in
bytes)
The overall goal of lightweight cryptography is to find a solution in Figure 2.27 which
can optimize a single metric or a combination of metrics. Obviously, security and resources
are directly proportional but not resources and performance. For example, AES software
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implementation has very low code size but if we want to implement it in hardware within
2000 GE, then its performance degrades. There exist many primitives (Figure 2.28) which
try to find a balance of trade-off among the above three metrics.
Symmetric key primitives































Figure 2.28: Existing lightweight symmetric key primitives. † Keccak with state size 200 bits.
2.5.2 Design principles
Our primary goal is to design secure and lightweight symmetric key primitives. The secondary
goal is to achieve multiple functionalities with a low implementation overhead. For instance,
to attain AEAD functionality and hash using a block cipher, we have to implement both
AEAD mode (GCM/OCB/OCB3 Section 2.3.5) and hash mode (Davies Meyer or Merkle
Damg̊ard Section 2.3.3). Moreover, using a block cipher as primitive implies we need registers
for both state and key scheduling. For lightweight scenario, this may require more resources.
However, sponge based modes can be easily adapted to meet these requirements and do not
require key scheduling.
Since the underlying primitive of sponges is a cryptographic permutation, we aim to design
permutations which have low hardware cost. At the same time, they are efficient in software.
Most importantly, from a security perspective the permutation should be indistinguishable
from a random permutation. In this context, we first look into round functions which have
the following properties.
• High algebraic degree
• Low differential probability and square correlation
• High diffusion rate, i.e., a state bit depends on most of the other state bits








Figure 2.29: Flowchart of design approach
Next, we choose the number of rounds of permutation by analyzing its differential, linear
and algebraic properties using MILP and SAT/SMT solvers. More precisely, as a designer
we ensure that there exists no distinguisher with probability better than 2−b/2 where b is the
permutation size in bits. Our entire design approach is illustrated in Figure 2.29.
In what follows, we present the specifications of lightweight ciphers whose underlying struc-
tures with varying tweaks are used in the design of permutations proposed in Chapters 3-5.
2.5.3 Simon-like block biphers
Simon-2n/mn where 2n and mn denote the blocksize and key length, respectively, is a family
of block ciphers proposed by NSA in 2013 [23]. A generic diagram of a Simon-like block cipher
is depicted in Figure 2.30. It adopts an NLFSR [67] based structure where the nonlinearity
comes from the quadratic function f(a,b,c)(x) = L
a(x)&Lb(x) + Lc(x). We refer to f(a,b,c) as a
Simon-like nonlinear function unless the shift parameter set (a, b, c) is explicitly mentioned.
For an r-round cipher, the (i+ 2)-th element of NLFSR sequence is given by
si+2 = f(a,b,c)(si+1) + si + ki
where ki ∈ Fn2 is the i-th round subkey7 and 0 ≤ i < r. Finally, the ciphertext is the r-th state
of NLFSR, i.e., (sr+1, sr). The shift parameters of Simon are given by (a, b, c) = (8, 1, 2).
Simeck-2n/mn was proposed in CHES 2015 by Yang et al. [135] and adopts a Simon-






kr−1, · · · , k1, k0
n
Figure 2.30: Simon-like block cipher
like structure with the shift parameters given by (5, 0, 1). In a way, it has more efficient
and compact hardware implementation because of reuse of the round function in the key
scheduling algorithm.
Key scheduling algorithms. For n = 16 and m = 4, r = 32 and the subkeys are calculated
as follows.




Simeck-32/64 : ki+4 = Zi + f(5,0,1)(ki+1) + ki,
where Zi denotes the i-th round constant.
2.5.4 Welch-Gong stream ciphers
The Welch-Gong (WG) stream cipher family is a hardware oriented stream cipher based on
word-oriented NLFSR over extension fields [101]. We denote an instance of WG stream cipher
by WG-m where m is the dimension of the finite field over F2, i.e., base field. Figure 2.31
shows a generic structure of WG-m and the individual components are described below.
1. Base field defining polynomial. Degree m primitive polynomial over F2.
2. Extension field defining polynomial. Degree l primitive polynomial over F2m .
3. WG permutation (WGP). Let m 6≡ 0 mod 3, 3k ≡ 1 mod m and gcd(d, 2m− 1) = 1.
Then the function WGP : F2m → F2m is given by WGP(x) = h(x + 1) + 1 where




2k + 2k + 1
q3 = 2
2k − 2k + 1
q4 = 2
2k + 2k − 1.
39
al−1 al−2 . . . . . . a2 a1 a0










Figure 2.31: Generic structure of WG stream cipher
More about the selection of optimal parameters for WGP is discussed in [94].
4. Trace function. The Trace function Tr : F2m → F2 is given by
Tr(x) = x+ x2 + · · ·+ x2m−1 .
The cipher runs in two phases: key initialization phase and key generation phase. During
the key initialization phase, the state is first loaded with key and nonce, and then updated
for 2l clock cycles with nonlinear feedback (output of WGP(·) is feedback for updating the
state). No output is generated for first 2l clock cycles. After that, the key generation phase
starts where a single bit is taken as output and the state is updated linearly. This is repeated
until desired number of keystream bits is obtained.
Cryptographic properties of WG stream cipher. The keystream sequence of WG-m
has the following properties.
1. Period is 2ml − 1.
2. It is balanced.
3. It has an ideal 2-level autocorrelation property.
4. Any t-tuple is equally likely distributed (ideal t-tuple distribution) for 1 ≤ t ≤ l.
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5. Linear complexity of the keystream increases exponentially with m.
Family members. The first family member WG-29 [100] proceeded to Phase 2 of the eS-
TREAM competition. Later, the lightweight variants WG-5 [9], WG-7 [93] and WG-8 [63] were
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Declaration of Contributions
This chapter is based on [14, 16, 15]. My main contributions are as follows.
• Equal contribution in design of both permutations.
• Analysis of the differential and linear properties of Simeck sbox using the SAT/SMT
tool [86]. MILP model for bounding the minimum number of active Simeck sboxes.
• Modeled the word-based division property of sLiSCP and the bit-based division prop-
erty of sLiSCP-light using MILP to find algebraic degree bounds, integral and zero-sum
distinguishers.
3.1 Introduction
Ever since the introduction of sponge functions in 2008 by Bertoni et al. [31], there has been
a surge in the design of sponge based cryptographic primitives. The main reason being a
cryptographic permutation utilizing sponge construction can be easily transformed to AEAD,
Hash, MAC or Pseduorandom Bit Generator (PRBG) (Sections 2.3.3-2.3.5) [36, 35, 33]. As
a result, there is a natural inclination towards designing a cryptographic permutation rather
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than designing a specific mode. Consequently, starting from the Keccak family of permutations
[37], several lightweight cryptographic permutations such as Quark [17], Photon [70], Spongent
[41], Norx [19], Ascon [60] and Gimli [29] have been proposed. Our goal here is to design
permutations that can achieve more efficient hardware and software performances than the
existing permutations at the same security level.
In this chapter, we present the design and security analysis of two lightweight crypto-
graphic permutations, namely sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light. The design of these permutations
utilizes two simple and hardware efficient components, namely 4-branch Type-II GFS (Section
2.3.2.2) and unkeyed reduced-round Simeck block cipher (Section 2.5.3). These two structures
are well studied in the literature and makes our security analysis easier. We analyze the se-
curity of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light with respect to distinguishing attacks such as differential
and linear, and integral distinguishers.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the detailed
specifications of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutations along with their underlying nonlinear
component Simeck sbox. In Section 3.3, we present the detailed security analysis of the Simeck
sbox. Finally, in Section 3.4, we extend the analysis of the Simeck sbox to provide security
bounds of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutations.
3.2 Specifications of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light
sLiSCP, Simeck-based Permutations for Lightweight Sponge Cryptographic Primitives is a
family of cryptographic permutations which have low hardware implementation cost and are
efficient in software. sLiSCP-light is a tweaked variant of sLiSCP. In this section, we present
their specifications.
3.2.1 The nonlinear function SB-[2n, u]
We use the unkeyed reduced-round Simeck block cipher with block size 2n (n ∈ {16, 24, 32})and
u rounds as the nonlinear operation of both permutations, and denote it by SB-[2n, u]. Below
we provide the details of SB-[2n, u], henceforth referred to as Simeck sbox.
Definition 3.1 (SB-[2n, u]: Simeck sbox). Let rc = (qu−1, . . . , q0) where qj ∈ {0, 1} and
0 ≤ j < u. A Simeck sbox is a permutation of a 2n-bit input, constructed by iterating the
Simeck-2n block cipher for u rounds with round constant addition γj = 1
n−1||qj in place of
key addition.
An illustrated description of the Simeck sbox (as an NLFSR) is shown in Figure 3.1 and
is given by






γu−1, · · · , γ1, γ0
n
Figure 3.1: Simeck sbox (SB-[2n, u])
where
xj ← f(5,0,1)(xj−1)⊕ xj−2 ⊕ γj−2, 2 ≤ j < u
and f(5,0,1) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined as
f(5,0,1)(x) = (L
5(x) x)⊕ L1(x).
For the properties of general f(a,b,c)(x) = L
a(x)&Lb(x) + Lc(x), please see Section 9.3.
3.2.2 Description of sLiSCP
sLiSCP is an iterative permutation that takes a b-bit input and produces an output of b bits
where b = 4 × 2n and n ∈ {24, 32}. We denote by sLiSCP-b a b-bit sLiSCP permutation.






3 where i denotes the state at
the beginning of the i-th step. As shown in Figure 3.2, the i-th step of sLiSCP-b is evaluated
in three sub-steps which are described below.
1. Store the original values of Xi1 and X
i




3 , and then update
Xi1 and X
i





Y i1 ← Xi1
Y i3 ← Xi3
Xi1 ← SB-[2n, u](Xi1)
Xi3 ← SB-[2n, u](Xi3)
2. Mix the blocks and add the step constant tuple (sci0, sc
i
1), i.e.,
Xi0 ← Xi0 ⊕ sci0 ⊕Xi1
Xi2 ← Xi2 ⊕ sci1 ⊕Xi3
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3. Blockwise left cyclic shuffle, i.e., (0, 1, 2, 3)→ (1, 2, 3, 0). More precisely,
Xi+10 ← Y i1
Xi+11 ← Xi2







































2n 2n 2n 2n
(b) Type-II GFS
Figure 3.2: Step function of sLiSCP where (a) NLFSR structure and (b) Type-II GFS
3.2.3 Towards sLiSCP-light
A careful look at the design of sLiSCP’s step function reveals that two extra temporary
registers, each of size 2n bits (shown in yellow color in Figure 3.3 (a)) are needed to store the
values of odd indexed blocks at each step. This is due to Type-II GFS round function which is
invertible by design, and does not require the invertibility of the nonlinear component. In our
case, the nonlinear function SB-[2n, u] is a permutation. Thus, for lightweight applications,
this extra hardware overhead of 2× 2n bits register for temporary storage is unjustified. As
a result, we look for a solution to remove this overhead without lowering the overall security.
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We observe that a simple tweak, i.e., changing the position of Simeck sboxes (Figure 3.3
(b)) could solve the above problem. However, we are unware of any similar construction
except Skipjack Rule A [40]. Thus, a thorough security analysis of this new design is required
which we discuss in Section 3.4.
Description of sLiSCP-light. sLiSCP-light is a tweaked variant of sLiSCP. It utilizes the
same components as of sLiSCP, i.e., Simeck sboxes, round and step constants. The only
difference is in the step function (Figure 3.3 (b)) where the positions of Simeck sboxes are












































2n 2n 2n 2n
(a) sLiSCP permutation
(b) sLiSCP-light permutation
Figure 3.3: Step functions of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light
1. Application of SB-[2n, u] to odd indexed blocks Xi1 and X
i




Xi1 ← SB-[2n, u](Xi1)
Xi3 ← SB-[2n, u](Xi3)
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2. Mix the blocks and add the step constants (sci0, sc
i
1), i.e.,
Xi0 ← Xi0 ⊕ sci0 ⊕Xi1
Xi2 ← Xi2 ⊕ sci1 ⊕Xi3






Table 3.1 presents the recommended parameters for two lightweight instances of the sLiSCP
and sLiSCP-light permutations.
Table 3.1: Recommended parameter sets for sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutations
Permutation (b-bit) 2n Rounds u Steps s Total # rounds (u× s)
sLiSCP-192 48 6 18 108
sLiSCP-256 64 8 18 144
sLiSCP-light-192 48 6 12 72
sLiSCP-light-256 64 8 12 96
Remark 3.1. The number of steps for sLiSCP-light is 12 compared to 18 in sLiSCP. More-
over, we do not require additional two 2n bit registers. Thus, sLiSCP-light reduces the
hardware area of sLiSCP by 16% and at the same time improves the throughput by 30%.
3.2.5 Round and step constants
In Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we list the hex values of the constants. Each step constant is appended
with 140‖00 and 156 for b = 192 and b = 256, respectively. This procedure results in a number
of inversions, which break the propagation of the rotational property in one step.
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Table 3.2: Round and step constants when b = 192







0 - 5 (7, 27), (4, 34), (6, 2e), (25, 19), (17, 35), (1c, f) (8, 29), (c, 1d), (a, 33), (2f, 2a), (38, 1f), (24, 10)
6 - 11 (12, 8), (3b, c), (26, a), (15, 2f), (3f, 38), (20, 24) (36, 18), (d, 14), (2b, 1e), (3e, 31), (1, 9), (21, 2d)
12 - 17 (30, 36), (28, d), (3c, 2b), (22, 3e), (13, 1), (1a, 21) (11, 1b), (39, 16), (5, 3d), (27, 3), (34, 2), (2e, 23)
Table 3.3: Round and step constants when b = 256







0 - 5 (f, 47), (4, b2), (43, b5), (f1, 37), (44, 96), (73, ee) (8, 64), (86, 6b), (e2, 6f), (89, 2c), (e6, dd), (ca, 99)
6 - 11 (e5, 4c), (b, f5), (47, 7), (b2, 82), (b5, a1), (37, 78) (17, ea), (8e, 0f), (64, 04), (6b, 43), (6f, f1), (2c, 44)
12 - 17 (96, a2), (ee, b9), (4c, f2), (f5, 85), (7, 23), (82, d9) (dd, 73), (99, e5), (ea, 0b), (0f, 47), (04, b2), (43, b5)
3.3 Security Analysis of Simeck Sbox
In this section, we discuss the security of SB-[2n, u] which is the nonlinear function of sLiSCP
and sLiSCP-light permutations.
3.3.1 Differential and linear properties
Our goal is to find a u-round differential (α1‖α0, αu+1‖αu) (αi ∈ Fn2 ) with maximum prob-
ability. Since the block size is 2n, an exhaustive search requires 26n u-round evaluations
of SB-[2n, u]. For example, the case of n = 24 and u = 6 implies 2144 6-round evaluations
of SB-[48, 6], which is infeasible. We present two different approaches to estimate an up-
per bound of u-round differential probability (Definition 2.3). We denote it by Maximum
Estimated Differential Probability (MEDP).
3.3.1.1 Approach 1
We assume that SB-[2n, u] is a Markov cipher (Definition 2.6). The procedure to compute
MEDP is given in Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Approach 1 to compute MEDP
1: Extract all u-round optimal differential characteristics (Definition 2.7) using SAT/SMT
tool [86]. Denote this set by ∆u.
2: Take an empty list List. For each (α0, α1, . . . , αu+1) ∈ ∆u, take the differential pair
(α1‖α0, αu+1‖αu), compute the r-round differential probability and append it to the List.
3: Assign MEDP(SB-[2n, u]) as the maximum value of List.
The obtained results using Algorithm 3.1 are given in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Optimal differential characteristic probability and linear characteristic square cor-
relation for SB-[2n, u] where 2n = 32, 48 and 64. The values are given in the log2(·) scale.
Rounds (u) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
SB-[2n, u] 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -12 -14 -18 -20 -24 -26 -30 -32
Table 3.5: MEDP for SB-[2n, u] for 2n = 32, 48 and 64
Rounds (u) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
MEDP 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -11.3 -13.3 -16.6 -18.6
3.3.1.2 Approach 2
In the previous approach, we have adopted the conventional Markov assumption. However,
this is not true as Simeck sboxes are parameterized by a set of fixed round constants. Thus, we
use an alternative approach to derive tight upper bounds on the MEDP of the constant-based
Simeck sboxes. Our approach is based on the following two important observations on the
differential properties of different block sizes of Simeck round function.
1. The probabilities of optimal differential characteristics are exactly equal for reduced-
round Simeck with block sizes 32, 48, and 64 bits (Table 3.4).
2. There exist optimal differential characteristics in Simeck-32 which are related to optimal
differential characteristics in Simeck-48 and Simeck-64. One such example is given in
Table 3.6 where we only add zeros at specific positions to match the block size.
We first compute the MEDP of SB-[32, 6] and SB-[32, 8] following Algorithm 3.2, and then
use these results to compute the MEDP of SB-[48, 6]. For SB-[64, 8], we conjecture its MEDP
value.
We find that ∆6 = 3072 and ∆8 = 2560. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 depict the sets of maximum
probability differentials parametrized by the round constants (given in hex) for SB-[32, 6] and
SB-[32, 8], respectively. Thus, we set MEDP(SB-[32, 6]) = 2−10.35 and MEDP(SB-[32, 8]) =
2−15.4.
MEDP of SB-[48, 6] and SB-[48, 8]. In Tables 3.7 and 3.8, we observe that there are six
(resp. eleven) sets for which each set has the same differential probability. Given that the
optimal differential characteristic probabilities of u-round Simeck sbox are equal (Table 3.4)
when the block sizes are 32, 48, and 64 bits, we pick one differential candidate, i.e., differentials
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Table 3.6: Related optimal differential characteristics of Simeck with block sizes 32, 48 and
64
Simeck-32 Simeck-48 Simeck-64
Round (u) αu+1 αu αu+1 αu αu+1 αu log2(p)
0 0x0001 0x0002 0x000001 0x000002 0x00000001 0x00000002 -2
1 0x0000 0x0001 0x000000 0x000001 0x00000000 0x00000001 -0
2 0x0001 0x0000 0x000001 0x000000 0x00000001 0x00000000 -2
3 0x0002 0x0001 0x000002 0x000001 0x00000002 0x00000001 -2
4 0x0005 0x0002 0x000005 0x000002 0x00000005 0x00000002 -4
5 0x0008 0x0005 0x000008 0x000005 0x00000008 0x00000005 -2
6 0x0015 0x0008 0x000015 0x000008 0x00000015 0x00000008 -
Algorithm 3.2 Approach 2 to compute MEDP
1: For SB-[32, 6], extract all 6 rounds optimal differential characteristics. Denote this set by
∆6.
2: For each round constant and for each (α0, α1, . . . , α7) ∈ ∆6, we calculate the exact differ-
ential probability of 6-round differential (α1‖α0, α7‖α6) by running a parallel exhaustive
search for determining the number of solutions (out of the 232 possible inputs). We then
set the MEDP for each Simeck sbox to the maximum probability among all the tested
differentials.
3: Repeat the same procedure for SB-[32, 8].
marked with blue color in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Next, we check if it is one of the differentials
associated to the extracted optimal characteristic. Then, for these selected differentials, we
run a parallel exhaustive search to get their exact differential probability. Table 3.9 shows the
probabilities of selected differentials.
MEDP of SB-[64, 8]. We note that the differential probabilities of Simeck sboxes with 48-bit
block size are slightly lower than that of 32-bit block size. Since it is computationally infeasible
for us to run an exhaustive search on 64-bit blocks, we conjecture that the MEDP of SB-[64, 8]
sbox is also slightly lower than that of SB-[48, 8]. Accordingly, we set MEDP(SB-[64, 8]) to be
equal to the one we extracted for SB-[48, 8] which is equal to 2−15.86.
Details of the experimental setup. All the experiments are conducted on a server with
the following specifications: 8 cores per node, 16 GB RAM per node, Intel Xeon E5540 @2.53
GHz, 64 bit Linux Centos 6.4 OS.
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Table 3.7: Differentials with maximum probability for SB-[32, 6] sboxes. Here time denotes
the average time to find all solutions of one differential.
Round constants (α1‖α0, α7‖α6) # solutions DP (log2(.)) Time(s)
7, 27, 4, 6, 25, 26, 24 (04000a00, 1a000a00), (04000a00, 5a000a00),
(04000a00, 52000a00), (04000a00, 12000a00)
3293184 -10.348948 324.75
34, 17, 35, 15 (04000a00, 1a010a00), (04000a00, 5a010a00),
(04000a00, 52010a00), (04000a00, 12010a00)
3293184 -10.348948 323.62
19, 8, 38 (0a001a00, 0a000400), (0a005a00, 0a000400),
(0a005200, 0a000400), (0a001200, 0a000400)
3293184 -10.348948 324.26
3b, a (0a001a01, 0a000400), (0a005a01, 0a000400),
(0a005201, 0a000400), (0a001201, 0a000400)
3293184 -10.348948 323.92
12, 20 (40014023, 40018000), (4001402b, 40018000),
(80004001, 402b4001), (80004001, 40234001)
3280896 -10.354342 324.03
2e, 1c, 1f, c, 2f, 3f (00020005, 00890005), (00018002, 80548002),
(80004001, 402a4001), (20005000, 900a5000),
(00018002, 80448002), (00020005, 00a90005),
(0004000a, 0152000a), (4000a000, 2011a000),
(80004001, 40224001), (0004000a, 0112000a),
(20005000, 90085000), (00800140, 22400140),
(10002800, 48052800), (10002800, 48042800),
(05008900, 05000200), (000500a9, 00050002),
(00200050, 08900050), (4001402a, 40018000),
(4000a000, 2015a000), (0a001201, 0a000400),
(00800140, 2a400140), (00080014, 02a40014),
(00080014, 02240014), (5000900a, 50002000),
(08001400, 24021400), (08001400, a4021400),
(28004805, 28001000), (80028054, 80020001),
(0500a900, 05000200), (00280548, 00280010),
(80028044, 80020001), (50009008, 50002000),
(28004804, 28001000), (40014022, 40018000),
(a0002011, a0004000), (00050089, 00050002),
(02804480, 02800100), (004000a0, 150000a0),
(a0002015, a0004000), (000a0112, 000a0004),
(004000a0, 110000a0), (00100028, 04680028),
(04000a00, 12000a00), (02805480, 02800100),
(000a0152, 000a0004), (00100028, 05680028),
(1400a402, 14010800), (00200050, 0a900050),
(14002402, 14010800), (0a005201, 0a000400),
(04000a00, 52000a00), (01402240, 01400080),
(001402a4, 00140008), (00140224, 00140008),
(01000280, 54800280), (01000280, 44800280),
(00a01520, 00a00040), (01402a40, 01400080),
(00a01120, 00a00040), (00500890, 00700020),
(00280448, 00280010), (02000500, a9000500),
(00500a90, 00700020), (02000500, 89000500)
3231744 -10.376119 281.97
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Table 3.8: Differentials with maximum probability for SB-[32, 8] sboxes
Round constants (α1‖α0, α9‖α8) # solutions DP (log2(.)) Time(s)
b (0a001201, 3a001000) 99232 -15.401482 405.02
f, 47, 4, 96, 7 (00a011a0, 02a00100) 90418 -15.535678 404.84
b2, a1 (010002a0, 118000a0) 90418 -15.535678 404.88
f1, 73 (010002a0, 11a000a0) 90418 -15.535678 404.86
78 (10002a00, 5a010a00) 89842 -15.544898 406.29
44, 4c (00a01180, 02a00100) 87974 -15.575210 396.84
43 (00a011a0, 02a00100), (010002a0, 11a000a0) 87264 -15.586901 405.95
82 (00a011a0, 02a00100), (010002a0, 118000a0) 87264 -15.586901 398.71
e5 (80005001, d0085000), (5000d008, 50018000) 81282 -15.689352 405.10
b5, 37, f5, (80005001, d0085000) 79488 -15.721551 405.02
ee (5000d008, 50018000) 79488 -15.721551 404.39
Table 3.9: Differential probabilities of selected differentials for SB-[48, u]
Rounds (u) Round constants Selected differential DP (log2(.))
6
27 (0400000a0000, 1a00000a0000) -10.66
15 (000400000a00, 011a00000a00) -10.66
8 (0a00001a0000, 0a0000040000) -10.66
3b (0a00001a0001, 0a0000040000) -10.66
12 (400001400023, 400001800000) -10.66
2e (000200000500, 008900000500) -10.66
8
b (0a0000120001, 3a0000100000) -15.86
f (00a00011a000, 02a000010000) -15.93
b2 (01000002a000, 01800000a000) -15.95
f1 (01000002a000, 11a00000a000) -15.93
78 (1000002a0000, 5a00010a0000) -15.95
4c (00a000118000, 02a000010000) -15.93
43 (00a00011a000, 02a000010000) -15.93
82 (00a00011a000, 02a000010000) -15.93
e5 (800000500001, d00008500000) -15.93
b5 (800000500001, d00008500000) -15.91
ee (500000d00008, 500001800000 -15.91
3.3.1.3 Notes on linear properties
The analysis of linear properties is exactly same as the differential analysis. The goal here is
to find a u-round linear hull (α1‖α0, αu+1‖αu) (αi ∈ Fn2 ) with maximum square correlation
(Definition 2.8). We first find the optimal linear characteristics square correlation values
(Table 3.4). Next, we estimate an upper bound of u-round linear hull square correlation, and
denote it by Maximum Estimated Linear Hull Square Correlation (MELHSC). We followed
similar approaches (Sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2) to compute MELHSC values which are given
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by
MELHSC(SB-[48, 6]) = 2−10.83
MELHSC(SB-[64, 8]) = 2−15.64.
3.3.2 Algebraic properties
The round function of Simeck sbox is quadratic (Section 3.2.1) which implies that the algebraic
degree of Simeck sbox is at most 2, 4, 8 and 16 after 1, 2, 3 and 4 rounds, respectively. We
have computed the algebraic degree using symbolic computation and find that the degrees
are in fact 2, 3, 5 and 8. For u ≥ 5, we are unable to perform symbolic computations because
of high density of monomials. Thus, we use a tweaked variant of bit-based division property
(Section 2.4.4.1 in Chapter 2) to provide bounds on the algebraic degree when u ≥ 5. The
corresponding MILP model and results are described below.
3.3.2.1 MILP model for bounding algebraic degree
Since the round function consists of only bitwise ANDs and XORs, the linear inequalities
can be modeled similarly to the ones mentioned in Section 2.4.4.1. The variables for the i-th
round are shown in Figure 3.4 while the entire model for u rounds with tweaks (shown in red
color) is explained below.
xi0, . . . , x
i
n−1
ui0, . . . , u
i
n−1
vi0, . . . , v
i
n−1
wi0, . . . , w
i
n−1
ti0, . . . , t
i
n−1
yi0, . . . , y
i
n−1












Figure 3.4: i-th round MILP variables for Simeck sbox
MILP model.










j , 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 and 0 ≤ i ≤ u− 1
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xuj = 0 for j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} \ {k}
yuj = 0






In the above model, the first constraint is for the division property of COPY, second
and third are for the division property of AND, and fourth is for the division property of
XOR. Since we compute the algebraic degree of xuk for some k, it is constrained to 1 and the
remaining u-th round variables are set to 0. We pass this optimization model to Gurobi solver
[2] which returns the maximum value (say d). The solution implies that there exists a degree
d monomial term in the ANF representation of xuk . Hence, the algebraic degree of x
u
k is d. To
compute the algebraic degree of yuk , we simply modify the last three constraints (in red color).
3.3.2.2 Results for algebraic degree
The bounds on algebraic degree of Simeck sboxes are given in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Algebraic degree bounds of Simeck sboxes
Rounds (u) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SB-[48, u] 2 3 5 8 13 19 27 36
SB-[64, u] 2 3 5 8 13 19 27 36
3.3.2.3 MILP model for integral distinguishers
In Table 3.10, if we consider the degree of SB-[48, 5], then it equals 13. This implies a 14-th
order derivative of SB-[48, 5] is constant. This means for a X ⊂ F482 with |X|= 214, we have⊕
x∈X
(SB-[48, 5](x))j = 0
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with probability 1 for all j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ 47. Here, SB-[48, 5]j denotes the ANF of j-th
component function of SB-[48, 5] after 5 rounds.
In order to find an integral distinguisher using the previous MILP model, we modify it
slightly as follows. We consider the simplest example where the 0-th bit of the input state is
set as constant (C) and rest as active (A). In particular, we add these additional constraints
to the model.
x00 = 0
x0j = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
y0j = 1 for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
We then evaluate the algebraic degree at the u-th round of j-th component function in terms
of the involved active bits. If the algebraic degree equals the number of active bits then the
j-th bit is unknown (U), i.e., the value of⊕
x∈X
(SB-[48, u](x))j
is unpredictable. Otherwise, it is balanced (B) in which case⊕
x∈X
(SB-[48, u](x))j = 0 (3.1)
with probability 1. Here X = {0, ?, ?, · · · , ?} where ? takes values 0 and 1. Accordingly,
|X|= 247.
Remark 3.2. In general, we can choose multiple bits to be constant and modify the model
accordingly.
3.3.3 Symmetric properties
The Simeck round function given by f(5,0,1)(x) = (L
5(x) x)⊕ L1(x) is rotationally invariant.
More precisely, we have f(5,0,1)(L
i(x)) = Li(f(5,0,1)(x)), ∀ x ∈ Fn2 . To break this propagation
of rotational property, we add round constants rci0 and rc
i
1 within the Simeck sboxes.
3.4 Security Analysis of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light
In this section, we analyze the security of the sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutations by
considering the differential and linear, and algebraic properties.
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3.4.1 Differential and linear cryptanalysis
To evaluate upper bounds on differential and linear characteristics of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-
light, we follow the Wide Trail Strategy [52] (used by AES designers and subsequently applied
to most of the designs). To the best of our knowledge, this is the best bound we can achieve.
We first compute the minimum number of differentially and linearly active Simeck sboxes
using the MILP model. Next, we use the MEDP and MELHSC bounds of Simeck sboxes
(Section 3.3.1) to provide bounds for sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light.
3.4.1.1 MILP model for bounding minimum number of active sboxes
Assumptions. We say a Simeck sbox SB-[2n, u] is active if the input difference to it is non-
zero. A non-zero input difference goes to a non-zero output difference with probability 1 as the
Simeck sbox is a permutation. For a non-invertible sbox, this holds with some probability but
not 1. The XOR operation cancels the difference with probability 2−2n, i.e., for α, β ∈ F2n2 ,
α ⊕ β = 0 ⇐⇒ α = β. Moreover, a zero difference goes to zero output difference. So, the
input difference at the beginning has to be non-zero. The non-zero and zero differences are
denoted by integer 1 and 0, respectively.
Since there are 4 blocks in sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutations, we have 24−1 possible
input differences (except the (0, 0, 0, 0) case)). For s steps, there are 22s× 15 paths. The goal
is to find a path which has the minimum number of active Simeck sboxes. We model this
problem as an optimization problem. Below, we give the exact model for sLiSCP as an
example.
MILP model for sLiSCP.




1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ s− 1, and x4, · · · , x4+2(s−1), x3+2s
2. Constraints.
Non-zero input difference: x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 1
Step 0:
x0 + x1 + x4 − 2t00 ≥ 0, t00 ≥ x0, t00 ≥ x1, t00 ≥ x4
x2 + x3 + x5 − 2t01 ≥ 0, t01 ≥ x2, t01 ≥ x3, t01 ≥ x5
Step 1:
x1 + x5 + x6 − 2t10 ≥ 0, t10 ≥ x1, t01 ≥ x5, t10 ≥ x6
x3 + x4 + x7 − 2t11 ≥ 0, t11 ≥ x3, t11 ≥ x4, t11 ≥ x7
Step i = 2 to s− 1: x2i + x2i+2 + x2i+5 − 2t
i
0 ≥ 0, ti0 ≥ x2i, ti1 ≥ x2i+2, ti0 ≥ x2i+5
x2i+1 + x2i+3 + x2i+4 − 2ti1 ≥ 0, ti1 ≥ x2i+1, ti1 ≥ x2i+3, ti1 ≥ x2i+4
3. Objective function. Minimize: x1 + x3 + · · ·+ x2s + x2s+1
In the above model, the conditions of the form a+ b+ c− 2t ≥ 0, t ≥ a, t ≥ b, t ≥ c model
the difference propagation via XOR operation, i.e., a⊕ b = c. The variables in the objective
function are inputs to the Simeck sboxes. The model for sLiSCP-light and computing linearly
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active sboxes is exactly identical1. Table 3.11 presents a lower bound on the minimum number
of active sboxes for up to 18 steps which we obtained by solving the above model.
Table 3.11: Lower bounds on the number of active Simeck sboxes for sLiSCP and sLiSCP-
light
Step (s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
min. # of active
Simeck sboxes
0 1 2 3 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 12 12 13 14 15 16 18
3.4.1.2 Estimated bounds of differential and linear characteristics
From Table 3.11, we note that the minimum number of differential/linear active sboxes are 18
and 12 for s = 18 and s = 12, respectively. Thus, the estimated upper bounds for differential
and linear characteristics for sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutation are given as follows.
sLiSCP-192: (MEDP(SB-[48, 6]))18 = (2−10.66)18 = 2−191.88
sLiSCP-256: (MEDP(SB-[64, 8]))18 = (2−15.86)18 = 2−285.48
sLiSCP-light-192: (MEDP(SB-[48, 6]))12 = (2−10.66)12 = 2−127.92
sLiSCP-light-256: (MEDP(SB-[64, 8]))12 = (2−15.86)18 = 2−190.32
sLiSCP-192: (MELHSC(SB-[48, 6]))18 = (2−10.83)12 = 2−194.94
sLiSCP-256: (MELHSC(SB-[64, 8]))18 = (2−15.64)12 = 2−281.52
sLiSCP-light-192: (MELHSC(SB-[48, 6]))12 = (2−10.83)12 = 2−129.96
sLiSCP-light-256: (MELHSC(SB-[64, 8]))12 = (2−15.64)12 = 2−187.68
3.4.1.3 Notes on differential property of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light
We consider the propagation of a six step differential characteristic to analyze which permuta-
tion offers better resistance against differential cryptanalysis. Let the input difference α 6= 0
to SB-[2n, u] go to output difference β with probability p1 and β goes to α with probability p2.
As shown in Figure 3.5, the input and output differences to both permutations are (0, 0, 0, α)
after 6-steps. In fact, it is a 6-step cycle. Also, note that the number of active sboxes is
6 (active sboxes shown in blue color). However, the differential characteristics probabilites
differ which are given as follows.
sLiSCP: (Pr(α, β))4 × (Pr(β, α))2 = p41p22
sLiSCP-light: (Pr(α, β))2 × (Pr(β, α))4 = p21p42
1For example, if XOR is replaced by AES MixColumns, then one has to be careful.
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β α 0 α
α β α 0
β α 0 0
α 0 0 0
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0 β β 0
α β 0 α
α β β 0
α β 0 0
α 0 0 0







(a) sLiSCP (b) sLiSCP-light
Figure 3.5: 6-step differential characteristic for (a) sLiSCP and (b) sLiSCP-light where S is
SB-[2n, u]
As a concrete example for SB-[48, 6], we find α = 0x010000000000 and β = 0x1D0000060000
with p1 = 2
−17.8 and p2 = 2−16.3. Thus, p41p
2
2 = 2
4×−17.8+2×16.3 ≈ 2−103.8 and p21p42 =
22×−17.8+4×16.3 ≈ 2−100.8. Since for sLiSCP-light-192 we found a differential characteristic
whose probability is greater than sLiSCP-192, we argue that sLiSCP-light is slightly weaker
than sLiSCP in terms of differential properties. Furthermore, the same observation applies
to linear characteristics.
3.4.2 Algebraic properties
To find bounds on the algebraic degree of sLiSCP-light, we extend the MILP model of the
Simeck sbox (Section 3.3.2.1) to s steps of the permutation. Table 3.12 provides an upper
bound on the algebraic degree of each component function of sLiSCP-light instances.
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Table 3.12: Upper bounds on the algebraic degree of sLiSCP-light
Component function
steps (s) 0-23 24-47 48-71 72-95 96-119 120-143 144-167 168-191
sLiSCP-light-192
1 19 13 19 13 19 13 19 13
2 57 51 57 51 57 51 57 51
3 129 125 129 125 129 125 129 125
4 178 177 178 177 178 177 178 177
5 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
steps (s) 0-31 32-63 64-95 96-127 128-159 160-191 192-223 224-255
sLiSCP-light-256
1 36 27 36 27 36 27 36 27
2 92 83 92 83 92 83 92 83
3 183 182 183 182 183 182 183 182
4 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
Integral distinguishers. We model a MILP model similar to Section 3.3.2.3 to search for
the integral distinguishers. We set the 0-th bit of the input state as constant (C) and rest as
active (A). We then evaluate the algebraic degree at the s-th step of each component function
in terms of the involved active bits. We find that for sLiSCP-light-192, after the 8-th step,
the component functions 0-59, 70-107, 118-191 have degree less than 191, and hence bits 0-59,
70-107, 118-191 are balanced. As for sLiSCP-light-256, bits 0-63, 192-255 are balanced. Thus,
8-step integral distinguishers exist for both sLiSCP-light-192 and sLiSCP-light-256.
Zero-sum distinguishers. This is a variant of integral distinguisher where all the bits of
the state are balanced. We note that the maximum number of steps covered by zero-sum
distinguishers in one direction is at most 7. This is because integral distinguisher can cover
up to 8 steps. For example CA191
7 steps−−−−→ B192, CA255 7 steps−−−−→ B256. Hence, 7 + 7 steps
zero-sum distinguisher exists for sLiSCP-light-192 (resp. sLiSCP-light-256).
Note that the number of steps in sLiSCP-light is 12, but we have found 14-step zero sum
distinguishers. To exploit such distinguishers, one has to start from an intermediate state
(s = 7) of the permutation. Since the intermediate state is never available to the adversary,
we emphasize that such distinguishers are not directly exploitable, and hence do not affect
the security.
Remarks on integral distinguisher of sLiSCP. The above analysis can be easily applied
to sLiSCP. However, we have only modeled the word-based division property of sLiSCP
permutation. The 9-step integral distinguisher for sLiSCP-192 is given in Table 3.13.
This suggests that sLiSCP-light has better algebraic properties than sLiSCP. This is also
evident from the fact that sLiSCP-light step function mixes the entire state nonlinearly. In
case of sLiSCP, the odd index blocks are updated to next step without any mixing.
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Table 3.13: 9-step integral distinguisher for sLiSCP-192
Step (s) Division property
0 {(48, 46, 48, 48)}
1 {(46, 48, 48, 48)}
2 {(10, 48, 48, 48), (29, 48, 48, 47), (48, 48, 48, 46)}
3 {(1, 48, 48, 13), (10, 48, 48, 12), (29, 48, 48, 11), (48, 48, 48, 10), (1, 48, 47, 32), (10, 48, 47, 31), (29,
48, 47, 30), (48, 48, 47, 29), (48, 48, 46, 48)}
4 {(1, 48, 13, 4), (10, 48, 13, 3), (29, 48, 13, 2), (48, 48, 13, 1), (1, 48, 12, 13), (10, 48, 12, 12), (29, 48,
12, 11), (48, 48, 12, 10), (1, 48, 11, 32), (10, 48, 11, 31), (29, 48, 11, 30), (48, 48, 11, 29), (48, 48, 10,
48), (1, 47, 32, 4), (10, 47, 32, 3), (29, 47, 32, 2), (48, 47, 32, 1), (1, 47, 31, 13), (10, 47, 31, 12), (29,
47, 31, 11), (48, 47, 31, 10), (1, 47, 30, 32), (10, 47, 30, 31), (29, 47, 30, 30), (48, 47, 30, 29), (48, 47,
29, 48), (48, 46, 48, 48)}
5 {(1, 13, 0, 4), (1, 12, 13, 4), (10, 13, 0, 3), (10, 12, 13, 3), (29, 13, 0, 2), (29, 12, 13, 2), (48, 13, 0, 1),
(48, 12, 13, 1), (1, 12, 12, 13), (10, 12, 12, 12), (29, 12, 12, 11), (48, 12, 12, 10), (1, 12, 11, 32), (10,
12, 11, 31), (29, 12, 11, 30), (48, 12, 11, 29), (48, 12, 10, 48), (1, 11, 32, 4), (10, 11, 32, 3), (29, 11, 32,
2), (48, 11, 32, 1), (1, 11, 31, 13), (10, 11, 31, 12), (29, 11, 31, 11), (48, 11, 31, 10), (1, 11, 30, 32),
(10, 11, 30, 31), (29, 11, 30, 30), (48, 11, 30, 29), (48, 11, 29, 48), (48, 10, 48, 48), (0, 32, 0, 4), (0, 31,
13, 4), (9, 32, 0, 3), (9, 31, 13, 3), (28, 32, 0, 2), (28, 31, 13, 2), (47, 32, 0, 1), (47, 31, 13, 1), (0, 31,
12, 13), (0, 31, 11, 32), (0, 30, 32, 4), (9, 30, 32, 3), (28, 30, 32, 2), (47, 30, 32, 1), (0, 30, 31, 13), (0,
30, 30, 32)}
6 {(0, 1, 0, 2), (0, 0, 4, 2), (13, 1, 0, 1), (13, 0, 4, 1), (0, 0, 3, 11), (13, 0, 3, 10), (0, 0, 2, 30), (13, 0, 2,
29), (13, 0, 1, 48), (12, 13, 0, 1), (12, 12, 13, 1), (12, 11, 32, 1), (11, 32, 0, 1), (11, 31, 13, 1), (11, 30,
32, 1), (32, 1, 0, 0), (32, 0, 4, 0), (32, 0, 3, 9), (32, 0, 2, 28), (32, 0, 1, 47), (31, 13, 0, 0), (31, 12, 13,
0), (31, 11, 32, 0), (30, 32, 0, 0), (30, 31, 13, 0), (30, 30, 32, 0)}
7 {(0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 2, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 2, 0), (0, 4, 0, 0), (0, 3, 11, 0), (0, 2, 30, 0), (0, 0, 1, 13),
(13, 0, 1, 12), (32, 0, 1, 11), (0, 0, 0, 32), (13, 0, 0, 31), (32, 0, 0, 30)}
8 {(1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (4, 0, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0, 0), (0, 1, 13, 0), (0, 0, 32, 0)}
9 {(0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (2, 0, 0, 0)}
10 {(0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,0), (0,1,0,0), (0,0,1,0)}
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design of two lightweight cryptographic permutations
sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light. We have provided an in-depth analysis of security properties of
Simeck sbox using SAT/SMT and MILP. Finally, we discussed the security of both permuta-
tions with respect to differential and linear, and algebraic distinguishers. We have shown that
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Declaration of Contributions
This chapter is based on [7]. My main contributions are as follows.
• Overall design and parameters selection with rationale.
• Modeled the following properties.
– MILP model to compute the minimum number of active Simeck sboxes. The
security bounds against differential and linear distinguishers.




A sponge-based hash function utilizing a b-bit permutation with b = r + c, r-bit rate and
c-bit capacity can only provide collision security up to c2 bits (by birthday bound) (Section
2.3.3.2). Thus, to achieve 128-bit collision security with 256-bit message digest, c should be
256. To meet this security level, we require a permutation where b ≥ 257. In this context,
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we explore the design structures of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light permutations with large state
sizes, and aim to design a permutation that can achieve a balance between hardware cost and
software efficiency for both hashing and AEAD functionalities. Furthermore, it should have
a simple analysis and sufficient security margins against distinguishing attacks.
This leads to the ACE which is often considered as one of the strongest cards in a deck
of cards. In our case, ACE is a 320-bit permutation and a generalization of sLiSCP and
sLiSCP-light permutations with five 64-bit blocks. In this chapter, we present its design and
security analysis.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the
complete specification of the ACE permutation. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 provide the detailed
security analyis and the rationale of our design choices.
4.2 The ACE Permutation
ACE is an iterative permutation that takes a 320-bit state as an input and outputs a 320-bit
state after iterating the step function ACE-step for s = 16 times (Figure 4.1). The nonlinear
operation SB-64 is applied on even indexed words, i.e., A, C and E, and hence the permutation
name. We present the algorithmic description of ACE in Algorithm 4.1 and describe the
individual components as follows.
Ai Bi Ci Di Ei
64 64 64 64 64






Ai+1 Bi+1 Ci+1 Di+1 Ei+1
Figure 4.1: ACE-step
4.2.1 The nonlinear function SB-64
We use Simeck block cipher with block size 64 and u = 8 as the nonlinear operation. In
particular, ACE utilizes SB-[64, 8] (Section 3.2.1). In the following, we denote SB-[64, 8] by
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Algorithm 4.1 ACE permutation
1: Input: S0 = A0||B0||C0||D0||E0
2: Output: S16 = A16||B16||C16||D16||E16
3: for i = 0 to 15 do:
4: Si+1 ← ACE-step(Si)
5: return S16
6: Function ACE-step(Si):
7: Ai ← SB-64(Ai1||Ai0, rci0) . Ai1, Ai0 are left and right halves of Ai
8: Ci ← SB-64(Ci1||Ci0, rci1)
9: Ei ← SB-64(Ei1||Ei0, rci2)
10: Bi ← Bi ⊕ Ci ⊕ (156||sci0)
11: Di ← Di ⊕ Ei ⊕ (156||sci1)
12: Ei ← Ei ⊕Ai ⊕ (156||sci2)
13: Ai+1 ← Di
14: Bi+1 ← Ci
15: Ci+1 ← Ai
16: Di+1 ← Ei
17: Ei+1 ← Bi
18: return (Ai+1||Bi+1||Ci+1||Di+1||Ei+1)
19: Function SB-64(x1||x0, rc):
20: (q7, q6, . . . , q0)← rc
21: for j = 2 to 9 do
22: xj ← (L5(xj−1) xj−1)⊕ L1(xj−1)⊕ xj−2 ⊕ (131||qj−2)
23: return (x9||x8)
SB-64 if u = 8 is fixed.
4.2.2 Round and step constants











where each rcij and sc
i
j is of length 8 bits and j = 0, 1, 2. We call them round constants and









2) is XORed to the words
B, D and E. In Table 4.1 we list the hexadecimal values of the constants.
Table 4.1: Round and step constants of ACE











0 - 3 (07, 53, 43), (0a, 5d, e4), (9b, 49, 5e), (e0, 7f, cc) (50, 28, 14), (5c, ae, 57), (91, 48, 24), (8d, c6, 63)
4 - 7 (d1, be, 32), (1a, 1d, 4e), (22, 28, 75), (f7, 6c, 25) (53, a9, 54), (60, 30, 18), (68, 34, 9a), (e1, 70, 38)
8 - 11 (62, 82, fd), (96, 47, f9), (71, 6b, 76), (aa, 88, a0) (f6, 7b, bd), (9d, ce, 67), (40, 20, 10), (4f, 27, 13)
12 - 15 (2b, dc, b0), (e9, 8b, 09), (cf, 59, 1e), (b7, c6, ad) (be, 5f, 2f), (5b, ad, d6), (e9, 74, ba), (7f, 3f, 1f)
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4.2.3 The linear layer
After XORing the blocks and step constants, five words are shuffled in a (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) order
(Lines 13-17 of Algorithm 4.1). This order of shuffling is different than the left cyclic shuffle
of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light (Figure 3.3).
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of ACE permutation by assessing its indistinguishability
properties against various distinguishing attacks. We also compare the linear layer of ACE
with other linear layers. In our analysis, we denote the linear layer by π, i.e., π permutates
the blocks of state. For example, if π(0, 1, 2, 3, 4) = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1), then after applying π, the
state A||B||C||D||E is transformed to D||C||A||E||B. Also, recall that u and s refer to the
number of rounds inside the Simeck sbox and the number of steps, respectively. Moreover,
by the component function fsj we refer to the ANF of the j-th bit of ACE after s steps.
4.3.1 Diffusion
Full bit diffusion. We say ACE achieves full bit diffusion after s steps if fsj is a function of
all the input state bits for each j ∈ {0, · · · , 319}. Thus, we need to find a minimum value of s
which satisfies this criterion. The value depends on the diffusion property of the Simeck sbox
as well. We find that u = 11 gives full bit diffusion within the Simeck sbox. Since ACE has
five words that are updated in each step, we note that s has to be at least 5. Accordingly, we
search for (u, s) ∈ {(i, 5)|1 ≤ i ≤ 11}. In Table 4.2, we list all the linear layers which achieve
full bit diffusion in (u, s) = (4, 5).
Table 4.2: Linear layers which achieve full bit diffusion in (u, s) = (4, 5)
No. Linear layer π
1 (1, 2, 4, 0, 3)
2 (2, 0, 3, 4, 1)
3 (2, 0, 4, 1, 3)
4 (2, 4, 1, 0, 3)
5 (3, 2, 0, 4, 1)
6 (3, 2, 4, 0, 1)
7 (4, 0, 1, 2, 3)
8 (4, 2, 0, 1, 3)
9 (4, 2, 3, 0, 1)
10 (4, 3, 1, 0, 2)
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Although (u, s) = (4, 5) is the minimal choice set, we cannot choose it as we also need
to ensure good resistance against differential and linear, and algebraic properties. For u = 8
and s = 5, the number of linear layers satisfying the full bit diffusion property are 13, and
π = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) is one among them. We justify these choices later in Section 4.4.6.
Meet-in-the-middle distinguishers. Given that (u, s) = (8, 16) and π = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) for
ACE, we claim that such a distinguisher cannot cover more than ten steps, because ten steps
guarantees full bit diffusion in both forward and backward directions.
4.3.2 Differential and linear cryptanalysis
MILP model for bounding minimum number of active sboxes. We model the dif-
ference propagation of ACE using MILP which is similar to the MILP model for sLiSCP
(Section 3.4.1.1) with minor changes. The changes are listed below.
1. Model the difference propagation for 3 XORs.
2. Change π = (1, 2, 3, 0) to π = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) for 5 blocks.
3. Change the objective function to incorporate the effect of 3 sboxes in one step.
Table 4.3 depicts the minimum number of active Simeck sboxes for ACE.
Table 4.3: Minimum number of active Simeck sboxes for s-step ACE
step (s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
# active sboxes 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 11 13 14 15 16 18 19
Estimated bounds of differential and linear characteristics. Let p denote the MEDP
of u-round Simeck sbox in log2(·) scale. An in-depth analysis of values of p has been provided in
Section 3.3.1. For (u, s) = (8, 16), we have p = −15.8 and the maximum estimated differential
characteristic probability is given by 219×−15.8 ≈ 2−300.2. The maximum estimated linear
square correlation of a linear characteristic is computed analogously using γ = −15.6 and
equals 2−296.4 where γ = MELHSC(SB-64) (Section 3.3.1.3).
4.3.3 Algebraic properties
We use the bit based division property model as described in Section 3.3.2.1 to analyze the
algebraic properties of ACE. To find the algebraic degree bounds, it is enough to find upper
bounds on the algebraic degrees of component functions fs0 , f
s













288. This is because for SB-64, the algebraic degree is 36 for the first 32 component
69
Table 4.4: Bounds on the algebraic degree of ACE. We give the lower and upper bounds when
the MILP model does not converge.
Component function



















1 36 27 36 27 36 27 36 27 36 27
2 92 83 63 62 92 83 92 83 63 62
3 126 125 119 117-120 239-247 235-245 236-249 233-248 119 118-120
4 240-247 238-246 241-248 242-247 306-312 303-311 304-313 304-311 241-248 241-247
functions while it is 27 for the remaining ones. Table 4.4 provides the bounds on the algebraic
degree for these component functions.
Note that since the number of words in ACE is odd, due to slow diffusion the algebraic
degrees are 63 and 62 for the component functions f264 and f
2
96, respectively. A similar trend
can be seen for the component functions f2256 and f
2
288. This non-uniformity in degree continues
till step five, after which the degree is stabilized to 304-313 due to full bit diffusion. We expect
that the degree reaches 319 in six steps. In Table 4.5, we list the integral distinguishers of
ACE. Note that the positions of constant bits are chosen based on the degree of Simeck sbox.
Table 4.5: Integral distinguishers of ACE
Steps s Input division property Balanced component functions
8
A32||C||A287 f864 − f8127, f8256 − f8319
A96||C||A223 None
A160||C||A159 None
A224||C||A95 f864 − f8127, f8256 − f8319
A288||C||A31 None
4.3.4 Symmetric distinguishers
In Section 3.3.3, we have seen that Simeck sbox has the rotational invariant property. This
property could propagate to multiple steps if constants are not added at each round and step.
Thus, a proper choice of round constants is required. Below we list properties of the constants
which ensure that each step function of ACE is distinct.
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, sci0 6= sci1 6= sci2
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, (rci0, rci1, rci2) 6= (sci0, sci1, sci2)
• For 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15 and i 6= j, (rci0, rci1, rci2) 6= (rcj0, rcj1, rcj2)
• For 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15 and i 6= j, (sci0, sci1, sci2) 6= (scj0, scj1, scj2).
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4.4 Design Rationale
In this section, we discuss the design choices of ACE.
4.4.1 State size
Our main objective as mentioned in Section 4.1 is to choose b that provides 128-bit security
for both hash and AEAD. The immediate choices are b = 288, 320 and 384. In ACE, we
choose b = 320 as it provides a good trade-off among hardware and software requirements,
security and efficiency. With this choice of b, ACE can have implementations in a wide range
of platforms. We discard the other state sizes for the following reasons.
- Considering the lightweight applications, 384-bit state is too heavy in hardware.
- 288 is not a multiple of 64, hence, we cannot efficiently use inbuilt 64-bit CPU instruc-
tions for software implementation.
4.4.2 Step function
We aim to build a 320-bit permutation, hence we could have used a 4-block sLiSCP-light
with 80-bit Simeck sboxes. We discarded this choice for the following reasons.
- For n > 32 and the shift parameter set (a, b, c) with a 6= b 6= c, a > b and gcd(a−b, n) =
1, it is not practical to evaluate most of the cryptographic properties.
- A Simeck sbox with parameters (a, b, c) = (5, 0, 1) and 2n = 80 has weak differential
and linear properties as gcd(5, 40) 6= 1.
- A 80-bit based software implementation is not efficient.
Consequently, we decided to use a 5-block state with three Simeck sboxes and wrap around
the linear mixing between words A and E. We also decided to XOR SB-64(A) with SB-64(E),
instead of E to avoid the need for an extra temporary 64-bit register to store the initial value
of E.
4.4.3 Nonlinear layer: Simeck sbox (SB-64)
- Simeck has a hardware friendly round function that consists of simple bitwise XOR,
AND and cyclic shift operations.
- It is practical to evaluate the MEDP and MELHSC values of SB-64 which are 2−15.8
and 2−15.6, respectively (Section 3.3.1).
- SB-64 has an algebraic degree of 36 which enables us to provide guarantees against
algebraic attacks.
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4.4.4 Linear layer: π = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1)
The choice of a linear layer is crucial for proper mixing among the blocks, which in turn affects
the differential and algebraic properties. Out of 5! possible permutations of blocks, 44 do not
exhibit fixed points. Moreover, we found that iterating such permutations for multiple rounds
achieves different differential and algebraic bounds. Accordingly, we searched their space to
find the ones that offer the best diffusion and result in the minimum number of active Simeck
sboxes in the smallest number of steps. Accordingly, we picked π = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) as our linear
layer.
4.4.5 Round and step constants




2). The 3-tuple constant value is
unique across all steps, hence it destroys any symmetry between the steps of the per-
mutation.




2). One bit of each round constant
is XORed with the state of the Simeck sbox in each round to destroy the preservation of
rotational properties. Moreover, we append 31 ‘1’ bits to each one bit constant, which
results in many inversions, and breaks the propagation of the rotational property in one
step.
4.4.6 Number of rounds and steps
Our rationale for choosing the number of rounds u and number of steps s of ACE is based
on achieving the best trade-off between security and efficiency. By security and efficiency, we
mean the value of (u, s) for which ACE is indistiguishable from a random permutation and
u× s is minimum. We now justify the choice of (u, s) = (8, 16) for ACE.
1. Our first criterion is that s should be at least 3×m where m is the number of #steps
needed to achieve full bit diffusion in the state. This choice is inspired from [69] and
directly adds a 33% security margin against meet-in-the-middle distinguishers, as in
2m steps full bit diffusion is achieved in both forward and backward directions. Hence,
m = 5 =⇒ u ≥ 4 and s ≥ 15 (Section 4.3.1). However, we found that we cannot
choose u = 4, . . . , 7, because we also aim to achieve good resistance against differential
and linear cryptanalysis. Note that having a smaller number of rounds results in a
weaker Simeck sbox.
2. The second criterion is to push the upper bound of the differential characteristic proba-
bility of ACE to below 2−320. This value depends on the MEDP of u-round Simeck sbox
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and the number of such active sboxes in s steps (denote by ns). We have n15 = 18 and
n16 = 19 (Table 4.3).
Table 4.6: Optimal differential characteristic probability p of u-round Simeck sbox and the
corresponding differential characteristics bounds of ACE for s = 15, 16.
u 4 5 6 7 8 9
log2(p) -6 -8 -12 -14 -18 -20
n15 × log2(p) -108 -144 -216 -252 -324 -360
n16 × log2(p) -114 -152 -228 -266 -342 -380
Table 4.6 depicts that (u, s) ∈ {(8, 15), (8, 16), (9, 15), (9, 16)}. However, if we consider
the differential effect (Definition 2.3), then the differential probability is 2−15.8 when u = 8.
Accordingly, we have
n15 ×−15.8 = 18×−15.8 = −284.4
n16 ×−15.8 = 19×−15.8 = −300.2
Thus, we ignore (u, s) = (8, 15) and choose (u, s) = (8, 16). The other two choices are
discarded from the efficiency perspective as u × s = 135 (resp. 144) when (u, s) = (9, 15)
(resp. (9,16)) compared to 128 iterations when (u, s) = (8, 16).
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design of ACE which is a 320-bit permutation. It is a
variant of generalized feistel structure with five branches, and uses eight round Simeck block
cipher and π = (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) as the nonlinear and linear layer, respectively. We analyzed its
security by considering its indistinguishable behavior against diffusion, differential/linear, al-
gebraic and symmetry based distinguishers. Finally, we justified the choice of each component
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Declaration of Contributions
This chapter is based on [8]. My main contributions are as follows.
• Overall design and parameters selection with rationale (except the two 7-bit sboxes and
selection of the underlying finite field F27 polynomial).
• MILP model to compute the minimum number of active sboxes and the security bounds
against differential distinguishers.
• Analysis of diffusion behavior and algebraic degree.
5.1 Motivation
Designing a secure cryptographic primitive which can guarantee theoretical randomness prop-
erties is a challenging task. For instance, the eSTREAM finalist Grain [73] uses a combination
of NLFSR and LFSR to obtain a lower bound on the period of the keystream sequence. In
particular, it is proved that the period of Grain output sequence is a multiple of the period
of LFSR [76]. On the other hand, another eSTREAM profile II submission WG [101] cipher
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adopts a single NLFSR for its key initialization phase which is switched to linear filter gener-
ator during the keystream generation phase (Section 2.5.4). Consequently, it provides proven
randomness properties such as long period, balance, large and exact linear complexity, and
ideal 2-level autocorrelation.
In the previous chapters, we have introduced sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light and ACE permuta-
tions, which according to our security analysis are indistinguishable from a random permuta-
tion. However, we cannot guarantee any randomness property similar to the WG. Thus, we
aim to design a permutation which could offer theoretical randomness properties in addition
to the classic AEAD and hash functionalities with a cheap hardware overhead. This chapter
introduces WAGE, a 259-bit permutation based on the design of WG stream cipher which can
be used as an original WG cipher by nullifying few operations in the control circuit.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present the
specification of the WAGE permutation. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 provides the detailed security
analyis and the rationale of our design choices.
5.2 Specification of WAGE
WAGE is a 259-bit permutation defined over an extension field of F27 . The primitive polyno-
mial is of degree 37 over F27 and given by
`(y) = y37 + y31 + y30 + y26 + y24 + y19 + y13 + y12 + y8 + y6 + ω
where ω is a root of the defining primitive polynomial in F27 given by
f(x) = x7 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1.
The state is divided into 37 7-bit words and denoted by Si = (Si36, · · · , Si0) at the beginning
of the i-th round. The core components of the permutation include two WGP and four SB
sboxes defined over F27 , and 7-bit round constant (rci0, rci1) tuple.
5.2.1 State update function of WAGE
The state update function of WAGE denoted by WAGE-StateUpdate(·) (Figure 5.1) takes as
input the current state Si and round constant tuple (rci0, rc
i
1), and updates the state in 3
steps as follows.
1. Compute the linear feedback fb.
fb = Si31 ⊕ Si30 ⊕ Si26 ⊕ Si24 ⊕ Si19 ⊕ Si13 ⊕ Si12 ⊕ Si8 ⊕ Si6 ⊕ (ω ⊗ Si0)
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2. Apply WGP and SB sboxes, and add round constants.
Si5 ← Si5 ⊕ SB(Si8)
Si11 ← Si11 ⊕ SB(Si15)
Si19 ← Si19 ⊕WGP(Si18)⊕ rci0
Si24 ← Si24 ⊕ SB(Si27)
Si30 ← Si30 ⊕ SB(Si34)
fb← fb ⊕WGP(Si36)⊕ rci1
3. Shift the register and update the last word with the feedback value.
















































































Figure 5.1: WAGE-StateUpdate function
5.2.2 Number of rounds and round constants
We update the state for 111 rounds with the WAGE-StateUpdate function. This value is chosen
based on our security analysis (Section 5.3). The hex values of 111 round constant pairs are
given in Appendix A.1.
5.2.3 WAGE to WG stream cipher
The WAGE permutation can be transformed to the WG stream cipher over F27 as follows.
1. Disconnect the second WGP module at position 18.
2. Disconnect all 4 SB modules at positions 8, 15, 27 and 34, and their corresponding
XORs at positions 5, 11, 24, 30, respectively.
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3. Force rci0 = 0 and rc
i
1 = 0 for all i.
4. Add the Trace function module after the output of WGP at position 36.
For the applications where both AEAD and PRBG functionalities are required, we expect
that the hardware overhead of going from WAGE to WG is much lower than two separate
implementions.
Remark 5.1. We omit the mathematical details of the sboxes (treat them as a black box)
as this is not a contribution of the thesis (see [8] for the exact details). However, we use
their cryptographic properties (obtained from other designers1 of [8]) to analyze the security
of WAGE.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of WAGE with respect to distinguishing attacks. We
primarily focus on differential properties, diffusion behavior and algebraic properties.
5.3.1 Differential properties
Maximum differential probabilities of sboxes. In WAGE, we use two distinct 7-bit
sboxes, namely WGP and SB as the nonlinear components. Since the word size is only 7 bits,
we experimentally computed the maximun differential probabilities (MDP) of sboxes. The
MDP values are given by
MDP(WGP) = 2−4.4
MDP(SB) = 2−4
Algorithmic description of MILP model. In Appendix A.2, we provide the exact
Python code for constructing the optimization model. The model is generic for WAGE-like
structures and takes as input ~c (the feedback tap positions), the position of sboxes and the
number of rounds r. The output is nr(~c) which is the minimum number of active sboxes. In
Table 5.1, we list the values of nr(~c) for varying ~c and r ∈ {37, 44, 51, 58, 74}.
Estimated bounds of differential characteristics. The maximum estimated differential
characteristic probability (say p) of WAGE is given by
p = max(2−4.42, 2−4)nr(~c) = 2−4×nr(~c)
For r = 74 and ~c = (31, 30, 26, 24, 19, 13, 12, 8, 6), we have p = 2−4×59 = 2−236 > 2−259.
Since Gurobi [2] is unable to finish for r > 74, we expect that for our choice of ~c, n111(~c) ≥ 65.
1Kalikinkar Mandal
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Table 5.1: Minimum number of active sboxes nr(~c) for different primitive polynomials. Here
‘−’ denotes that MILP optimization was too long and cannot be finished.
Primitive poly. coefficients Rounds r
~c 37 44 51 58 74
24, 23, 22, 21, 19, 6, 5, 4, 3 18 26 30 35 51
29, 27, 24, 23, 19, 11, 9, 6, 5 23 31 36 41 54
29, 28, 23, 22, 19, 11, 10, 5, 4 21 28 34 40 54
29, 28, 24, 20, 19, 11, 10, 6, 2 21 27 34 40 54
30, 28, 27, 21, 19, 12, 10, 9, 3 22 30 34 39 54
30, 29, 28, 26, 19, 12, 11, 10, 8 20 30 37 44 57
31, 25, 23, 21, 19, 13, 7, 5, 3 20 29 33 38 54
31, 26, 23, 20, 19, 13, 8, 5, 2 20 26 34 39 54
31, 28, 23, 21, 19, 13, 10, 5, 3 19 27 33 39 53
31, 30, 26, 24, 19, 13, 12, 8, 6 24 30 38 44 59
32, 25, 24, 21, 19, 14, 7, 6, 3 19 28 34 39 54
32, 29, 25, 22, 19, 14, 11, 7, 4 19 28 36 41 57
32, 29, 27, 22, 19, 14, 11, 9, 4 23 31 37 41 57
32, 29, 27, 24, 19, 14, 11, 9, 6 23 31 37 39 55
32, 30, 28, 24, 19, 14, 12, 10, 6 23 29 38 44 58
32, 31, 21, 20, 19, 14, 13, 3, 2 21 26 30 36 47
33, 27, 26, 20, 19, 15, 9, 8, 2 21 30 35 39 55
33, 29, 28, 21, 19, 15, 11, 10, 3 22 27 35 39 53
33, 30, 29, 26, 19, 15, 12, 11, 8 21 31 38 44 57
33, 31, 23, 22, 19, 15, 13, 5, 4 23 31 36 41 55
33, 31, 28, 23, 19, 15, 13, 10, 5 23 30 36 41 -
33, 31, 29, 22, 19, 15, 13, 11, 4 22 32 37 44 -
33, 31, 30, 25, 19, 15, 13, 12, 7 23 34 39 44 -
This is because for each additional 7 rounds, the number of active sboxes increases by at least
6 (row 10 in Table 5.1) which implies p ≤ 2−260 < 2−259.
5.3.2 Diffusion behavior
To achieve full bit diffusion, WAGE requires at least 21 rounds. This is because the 7 bits of
S36 are shifted to S0 in 21 clock cycles. Since the feedback function consists of 10 taps and all
six sboxes (2 WGP and 4 SB) individually have the full bit diffusion property, WAGE achieves
the full bit diffusion in at most 37 rounds. Accordingly, we claim that meet-in-the middle
distinguishers may not cover more than 74 rounds as 74 rounds guarantee full bit diffusion in
both the forward and backward directions.
5.3.3 Algebraic degree
The WGP and SB sboxes have an algebraic degree of 6. Note that if we only have WGP sbox at
position S36 along with the feedback polynomial and exclude all other sboxes and intermediate
XORs, then we get the original WG stream cipher. Such a stream cipher is resistant to attacks
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exploiting the algebraic degree if the nonlinear feedback used in the initialization phase is also
used in the key generation phase (Chapter 8). Given that WAGE has 6 sboxes and we use
nonlinear feedback for all of them, we expect that 111-round WAGE has high algebraic degree
and is secure against integral and cube attacks.
5.4 Design Rationale
In this section, we justify our design choices that lead to WAGE. Our rationale is mainly based
on security properties and hardware cost.
5.4.1 Finite field and state size
A trivial choice of finite field is F2t where t ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}. We choose F27 and discard other
choices based on the following.
- For F25 and F26 , the state has many 5-bit and 6-bit words, respectively. Thus, it is not
feasible to provide bounds for the differential distinguishers as the MILP model does
not converge.
- The hardware cost2 of WGP module over F28 is at least twice the cost of WGP module
over F27 .
Once the field size is set, we choose the state size to be a multiple of 7 and is at least 256
bits. Thus, we choose it as 37× 7 = 259 bits.
5.4.2 Choice of sboxes
To preserve the structure of WG we require a WGP sbox at index 36. A single sbox results
in a slower confusion and diffusion, and is not good from design perspective. Alternatively,
we search for a 7-bit lightweight sbox whose differential and algebraic properties are similar
to WGP. In order to keep the structure symmetric, we opt for even number of WGP and SB
sboxes.
5.4.3 Positions and number of sboxes
The linear layer of WAGE is composed of 1) L1 : a primitive polynomial of degree 37, which is
primitive over F27 and 2) L2 : input and output tap positions of WGP and SB sboxes. There
exist many choices for L1 and L2, which results in a tradeoff between (especially) security and
implementations. Note that we cannot have only L1 or only L2 as the linear layer, because
- only L1 results in a slower diffusion
2Obtained from the hardware group of [8]
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- only L2 =⇒ there are many words which are not mixed among themselves. Thus, the
entire state can be divided into multiple independent sub-states. For example, the case
when key bits are not mixed.
The required criteria for L1 and L2 are listed as follows.
1. To have a lightweight L1 we look for a primitive polynomial of the form




j + ω, cj ∈ F2
where ω is the root of the chosen field polynomial f(x), which is also a primitive element
of F27 . Including ω, we choose feedback polynomials with few non-zero tap positions
(cj = 1) which are symmetric.
2. A combination of L1 and L2 for which computing the minimum number of active sboxes
is feasible and enable us to provide bounds for differential distinguishers.
Remark 5.2. Our MILP model does not converge when the number of sboxes is at least 8,
and thus we cannot provide bounds for differential distinguishers for 8 or more sboxes. So we
chose only six sboxes for WAGE, i.e., 2 WGP and 4 SB.
We analyze the 23 symmetric polynomials3 (10 non-zero taps, Table 5.1) with respect to
minimum number of active sboxes. We chose the one that provides the maximum resistance
against differential attack. More precisely, we have
L1 : y37 + y31 + y30 + y26 + y24 + y19 + y13 + y12 + y8 + y6 + ω,
L2 : {(36, 36), (34, 30), (27, 24), (18, 19), (15, 11), (8, 5)}
where (a, b) ∈ L2 denotes the (input, output) position of an sbox (Figure 5.1).
5.4.4 Round constants
The structure of WAGE without round constants is symmetric and hence vulnerable to slide
attacks. Thus, we XOR two 7-bit round constants rci1 and rc
i





tively. The round constant tuple is distinct for each round, i.e., (rci0, rc
i
1) 6= (rcj0, rcj1) for
0 ≤ i, j ≤ 110 and i 6= j ensuring that all the rounds of WAGE are distinct.
5.4.5 Number of rounds
Our rationale for selecting the number of rounds (say nr) is to choose a value such that the
WAGE permutation is indistinguishable from a random permutation. We justify our choice of
3Obtained from the hardware group of [8]
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nr = 111 as follows.
1. WAGE adopts an LFSR structure with 37 7-bit words, and hence nr ≥ 37, otherwise the
words will not be mixed among themselves properly, which leads to meet-in-the-middle
attacks.
2. For nr = 74, the maximum estimated differential characteristic probability of WAGE
equals 2−4×59 = 2−236 > 2−259. To push this value to less than 2−259, nr ≥ 74. However,
it is infeasible to compute the value for nr ≥ 74. Thus, we expect that for nr = 111,
the maximum estimated differential characteristic probability 2−259 (Section 5.3.1).
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced WAGE which is a 259-bit permutation based on the
WG stream cipher. To keep the overall design lightweight, we opt for a symmetric feedback
polynomial with 10 non-zero taps and six 7-bit (2 WGP + 4 SB) sboxes. We analyzed the
security of WAGE with respect to differential and algebraic distinguishers. Finally, we justified
the choice of each component with their respective parameters.
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Declaration of Contributions
This chapter is based on [14, 16, 15, 7, 13, 8]. My main contributions are as follows.
• Equal contribution in design of the mode and parameters selection of AEAD and hash
algorithms.
• Choice of domain separators, rate and capacity part of the state.
• Choice of positions of state for loading key and nonce bytes, and extracting tag bytes
(except WAGE AEAD).
6.1 Motivation
The sponge framework is very diversified in terms of the offered functionalities such as AEAD,
hash, MAC and PRBG (Section 2.3). Each functionality could be attained using the same
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cryptographic permutation P. The only differences arise from the implementation cost and
security level we target. For instance, a hash digest of 256 bits restricts the size of permutation
P to a minimum of 320 bits for a rate of 64 bits. The same permutation can also provide up to
128 bits authenticated encryption security with 192-bit rate. Although, the same permutation
is used for both hash and AEAD, their hardware costs vary because of different rate values
(64 XORs and 192 XORs). Thus, it is reasonable to have a circuitry which can provide
multiple cryptographic functions with cheap overhead, which might be a determining factor
for its realistic adoption in constrained devices. In this chapter, we introduce the design of
the unified round function in a sponge framework which addresses the above problem.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the rationale
and description of the unified round function. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 give a generic description
of AEAD algorithm and their instances, respectively. We also discuss the choice and rationale
of rate positions, domain separators, loading key and nonce procedures, and tag extraction
procedures. In Section 6.5, we show how to handle short messages. Finally, we present hash
algorithms in Section 6.6 and conclude in Section 6.7.
6.2 The Unified Round Function
In this section, we first discuss the need for a unified round function in a sponge framework
and then give its explicit description.
6.2.1 Why a unified function?
We consider different scenarios which motivate us towards the design of a unified round
function.
Security and hardware cost. In sponge-based keyed modes (Section 2.3.5.2), r-bit rate
is known while c bits of capacity are unknown. An adversary with the knowledge of c bits
can invert the permutation and hence recover the entire secret key. Thus, to prevent key
recovery and forgery attacks from the knowledge of state, designs such as Ascon [60] mask the
capacity with a key during the initialization and finalization phases (Figure 6.1). However,
this masking requires an additional |K| bits XORs and multiplexers. Additionally, these
XORs and multiplexers are idle during associated data processing and encryption phases.
Furthermore, to distinguish between different phases a single bit domain separator is only
XORed to capacity after the last block of associated data is processed. This brings us to


































Figure 6.1: Duplex sponge mode for Ascon where pa and pb denote Ascon permutation with
a and b rounds, respectively. Figure is taken from [60].
Uniformity. A simple way to have uniformity is to mask capacity with key and domain
separators at each step. The former is not a good option from an efficiency perspective. Thus,
we could use domain separators after each call of P (a technique similar to the one used in
NORX [18]).
Our approach. We modify the keyed initialization and keyed finalization phases of the
Ascon, and domain separation mechanism of NORX. In particular, instead of XORing key to
capacity, we again absorb it in the state using the rate part for both phases. Moreover, we add
a single bit domain separator after each call of the permutation. This approach makes key
recovery hard even if the internal state is recovered and also brings uniformity across different
phases. Additionally, the modification makes the initialization and finalization stages more
hardware efficient and adaptable to different primitives. To this end, we only have one round
function as described next.
6.2.2 Description of the unified round function
In Figure 6.2, we depict the unified round function which can be easily adaptable to different
primitives. It incorporates absorption (X), squeezing (Y ), domain separation, and according
to the fed inputs, we decide which stage and functionality to implement (Table 6.1).
Some remarks.
- For decryption procedure, C is the input to the permutation.
- MAC is AEAD without encryption/decryption. PRBG is AEAD without associated
data processing and encryption/decryption. So, both functionalities can be obtained
from AEAD scheme only.








Figure 6.2: Schematic of the unified round function
Table 6.1: Different functionalities using the unified round function. Symbol ’-’ denotes no
output.
Functionality Phase X Y Domain separator
AEAD
Initialization K - 0x00
Associated data processing AD - 0x01
Encryption/Decryption M/C C/M 0x02
Finalization K - 0x00
Hash
Absorption M - 0x00
Squeezing - r-bit digest 0x00
MAC
Initialization K - 0x00
Message processing M - 0x01
Finalization K - 0x00
PRBG
Initialization K - 0x00
Output - r-bit random number 0x00
6.3 Generic AEAD Algorithm
In Algorithm 6.1, we present a high-level overview of an AEAD algorithm using the unified
round function. We denote it by AE-[P] where P is the underlying permutation. Also, the
b-bit (b = r + c) state of P is given by S = (Sr, Sc) where Sr and Sc denote the rate and
capacity part of the state, respectively. The encryption AEenc-[P] and decryption AEdec-[P]
procedures of AE-[P] are shown in Figure 6.3. In the following, we first illustrate the padding
rule and then describe each phase of AE-[P] in detail.
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Algorithm 6.1 AEAD algorithm AE-[P]
1: Authenticated encryption AEenc-[P](K,N,AD,M):
2: S ← Initialization(N,K)
3: if |AD|6= 0 then:
4: S ← Processing-Associated-Data(S,AD)
5: (S,C)← Encyption(S,M)
6: T ← Finalization(S,K)
7: return (C, T )
8: Initialization(N,K):
9: S ← load-AE(N,K)
10: S ← P(S)
11: (K0||· · · ||K`K−1)
r←− padr(K)
12: for i = 0 to `K − 1 do:
13: S ← (Sr ⊕Ki, Sc)
14: S ← P(S)
15: return S
16: Processing-Associated-Data(S,AD):
17: (AD0||· · · ||AD`AD−1)
r←− padr(AD)
18: for i = 0 to `AD − 1 do:
19: S ← (Sr ⊕ADi, Sc ⊕ 0c−2||01)
20: S ← P(S)
21: return S
22: Encryption(S,M):
23: (M0||· · · ||M`M−1)
r←− padr(M)
24: for i = 0 to `M − 1 do:
25: Ci ←Mi ⊕ Sr
26: S ← (Ci, Sc ⊕ 0c−2||10)
27: S ← P(S)
28: C`M−1 ← trunc-msb(C`M−1, |M |modr)
29: C ← (C0, C1, . . . , C`M−1)
30: return (S,C)
31: trunc-lsb(X,n):
32: return (xr−n, xr−n+1, . . . , xr−1)
1: Verified decryption AEdec-[P](K,N,AD,C, T ):
2: S ← Initialization(N,K)
3: if |AD|6= 0 then:
4: S ← Processing-Associated-Data(S,AD)
5: (S,M)← Decyption(S,C)
6: T ′ ← Finalization(S,K)





12: for i = 0 to `C − 2 do:
13: Mi ← Ci ⊕ Sr
14: S ← (Ci, Sc ⊕ 0c−2||10)
15: S ← P(S)
16: if |C|modr = 0 then:
17: M`C−1 ← C`C−1 ⊕ Sr
18: S ← P(C`C−1, Sc ⊕ 0c−2||10)
19: S ← P(Sr ⊕ 10r−1, Sc ⊕ 0c−2||10)
20: else:
21: M`C−1 ← C`C−1 ⊕ trunc-msb(Sr, |C|modr)
22: C`C−1 ← C`C−1||(trunc-lsb(Sr, r − |C|modr)⊕ 10r−|C| mod r)
23: S ← P(C`C−1, Sc ⊕ 0c−2||10)
24: M ← (M0,M1, . . . ,M`C−1)
25: return (S,M)
26: Finalization(S,K):
27: (K0||· · · ||K`K−1)
r←− padr(K)
28: for i = 0 to `K − 1 do:
29: S ← P(Sr ⊕Ki, Sc)
30: T ← tagextract(S)
31: return T
32: trunc-msb(X,n):
33: if n = 0 then:
34: return φ
35: else:
36: return (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1)
6.3.1 Padding
Padding is required when the length of the processed data is not a multiple of the rate r value.
The padding rule (10∗), denoting a single 1 followed by the required number of 0’s, is applied
to the message M , so that its length after padding is a multiple of r. The resulting padded
message is then divided into `M r-bit blocks M0‖· · · ‖M`M−1. A similar procedure is carried
out on the associated data AD which results in `AD r-bit blocks AD0‖· · · ‖AD`AD−1. In the
case where no associated data is present, no processing is necessary. For the secret key K, we
simply append minimum number of 0’s so that its length is a multiple of r. We summarize
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(a) Authenticated encryption algorithm AEenc-[P]





0x00 0x00 0x01 0x01 0x02 0x02 0x02 0x00 0x00
K0 K1 AD0 ADlAD−1 K0 K1
M0 MlM−2 MlM−1
C0 ClM−2 ClM−1
Initialization Processing associated data Decryption Finalization
(b) Verified decryption algorithm AEdec-[P]
Figure 6.3: AEAD algorithm AE-[P] in an unfied sponge mode for 2r-bit key
the padding rules below.
padr(K) = K‖0r−(|K| mod r), if |K| mod r 6= 0
padr(M) = M‖1‖0r−1−(|M | mod r)
padr(AD) =
φ if |AD| = 0AD‖1‖0r−1−(|AD| mod r) o.w.
6.3.2 Domain separators
We use a lightweight domain separation mechanism where a different 2-bit constant (Table
6.2) is XORed to the capacity when a new phase starts. The domain separator could be
XORed to any position in the capacity. We XOR it to the last 2 bits of the capacity for the
sake of description1. In Table 6.3, we show that this domain separation mechanism along
with the padding rule can distinguish all different types of processed data.
Table 6.2: Domain separation constants (in hex)
Initialization Procesing AD Encryption & Decryption Finalization
0x00 0x01 0x02 0x00
1However, exact position depends on the choice of P.
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Table 6.3: Domain separators sequence for different processed blocks
AD M Domain separators sequence Processed blocks
Empty
Empty 0x02 10r−1
Partial 0x02 Partial M with padding
Complete 0x02, 0x02 complete M block and 10r−1
Partial
Empty 0x01, 0x02 Partial AD block with padding and
10r−1
Partial 0x01, 0x02 Partial AD and M blocks with padding
Complete 0x01, 0x02, 0x02 Partial AD block with padding, com-
plete M block and 10r−1
Complete
Empty 0x01, 0x01, 0x02 complete AD block, 10r−1 and 10r−1
Partial 0x01, 0x01, 0x02 complete AD block, 10r−1 and partial
M block with padding
Complete 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02 completeAD block, 10r−1, completeM
block and 10r−1
6.3.3 Initialization
The goal of this phase is to initialize the state S with an n-bit public nonce N and κ-bit secret
key K. The state is first loaded using load-AE(N,K) (this function depends on the choice
of P and is explicitly defined in Section 6.4.2). Afterwards, the permutation P is applied
to the state, and the key blocks are absorbed into the state with P applied each time. The
initialization steps are described below.
S ← P(load-AE(N,K))
S ← P(Sr ⊕Ki, Sc), for i = 0 to `K − 1
6.3.4 Processing associated data
If there is associated data, each ADi block, i = 0, . . . , `AD − 1 is XORed with the rate part
of the state S, and the domain separator is XORed to capacity. Then, the permutation P is
applied to the whole state.
S ← P(Sr ⊕ADi, Sc ⊕ (0c−2‖01)), i = 0, . . . , `AD − 1
This phase is defined in Algorithm 6.1.
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6.3.5 Encryption
Similar to the processing of associated data, however, with a different domain separator, each
message block Mi, i = 0, . . . , `M − 1 is XORed to the Sr part of the state resulting in the
corresponding ciphertext Ci. After the computation of Ci, the permutation P is applied to
the state, i.e.,
Ci ← Sr ⊕Mi,
S ← P(Ci, Sc ⊕ (0c−2‖10)), i = 0, · · · , `M − 1
The last ciphertext block C`M−1 is truncated so that its length is equal to that of the last
unpadded message block. The details of encryption procedure are given in Algorithm 6.1.
The decryption procedure is symmetrical to the encryption procedure and is illustrated in
Algorithm 6.1.
6.3.6 Finalization
After the extraction of the last ciphertext block, the domain separator is reset to 0x00 indi-
cating the start of the finalization phase. Afterwards, the key blocks are absorbed into the
state. Finally, the t-bit tag is extracted using the function tagextract(·). The finalization steps
are mentioned below and illustrated in Algorithm 6.1.
S ← P(Sr ⊕Ki, Sc), for i = 0 to `K − 1
T ← tagextract(S).
Note that the tagextract(·) depends on the choice of P and is described later in Section
6.4.2.
6.3.7 On the security and data limit
The security proofs of sponge modes rely on the indistinguishability of the underlying per-
mutation from a random one [31, 35, 34, 79]. In sponge based keyed modes, nonce reuse
enables the encryption of two different messages with the same keystream, which undermines
the privacy of the primitive. Moreover, the attacker can acquire multiple combinations of
input and output differences which leak information about the capacity bits, and may lead
to the construction of full state [35, 30]. On the other hand, a nonce reuse differential attack
may be exploited if the attacker is able to inject a difference in the plaintext and cancel it
out by another difference after the permutation call. However, such an attack depends on the
probability of the best differential characteristic and the number of rounds of the underlying
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permutation. In summary, the sponge based AEAD schemes require a fresh nonce for each
encryption.
We assume a nonce-respecting adversary, i.e., for a fixed K, the nonce N is never re-
peated for an encryption query. However, it could be repeated while querying the decryption
oracle. Then to achieve κ-bit security with allowed data of 2d bits, capacity should satisfy
c ≥ κ+ d+ 1 and d  c/2 [34]. Note that the actual effective capacity is c− 2 as 2 bits are
used for domain separation. For instance, the parameters c = 256, r = 64, κ = 128 means
there does not exist a better attack (to the best of our knowledge) than exhaustive search if
d ≤ 125. Recently, Jovanovic et al. [79] have shown that sponge based AEAD achieves higher
security bound, i.e., min{2b/2, 2c, 2k}, compared to [34]. More precisely, following Jovanovic’s
bound, we could decrease the capacity to 128 and increase the rate by 3X (r = 192), and
still achieve 128-bit security for d ≤ 64. However, this requires an additional 128 XORs and
cannot meet our objective to achieve both AEAD and hash functionalities (having the same
security levels) using the unified round function. Nevertheless, this is another option with
high throughput.
Remark 6.1. The nonce size n satisfies n ≤ κ. The exact lengths for different instances are
given in Table 6.4.
6.4 AEAD Instances
In this section, we present the concrete instantiations of AE-[P] using sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light,
ACE and WAGE permutations. For a κ-bit key, the AEAD instance is denoted by AE-[P][κ].
We also give an explicit description of the load-AE(·) and tagextract(·) procedures along with
the rate (Sr) and capacity (Sc) part of the state.
6.4.1 AEAD schemes and recommended parameters
Table 6.4 presents the AEAD instances along with their parameters and claimed security
levels.
Some remarks.
- The integrity security includes the integrity of nonce, associated data and message.
- The original schemes (first 6 rows in Table 6.4) as described in [14, 15] use a 3-bit
domain separation. This is not required as shown in Section 6.3.2.
- Spix [13] utilizes sLiSCP-light-256 in a monkey duplex mode [36]. More precisely, it
uses sLiSCP-light-256 with 18 steps for intialization and finalization phases, and 9-step
sLiSCP-light-256 for associated data processing and encryption phases.
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Table 6.4: Recommended AEAD schemes
Algorithm Parameters (in bits) Security (in bits)
r c κ n t log2(d) Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity
AE-[sLiSCP-192][80] 32 160 80 80 80 72 80 80 80
AE-[sLiSCP-192][112] 32 160 112 80 112 40 112 112 112
AE-[sLiSCP-256][128] 64 192 128 128 128 56 128 128 128
AE-[sLiSCP-light-192][80] 32 160 80 80 80 72 80 80 80
AE-[sLiSCP-light-192][112] 32 160 112 80 112 40 112 112 112
AE-[sLiSCP-light-256][128] 64 192 128 128 128 56 128 128 128
AE-[ACE][128] 64 256 128 128 128 124 128 128 128
AE-[WAGE][128] 64 195 128 128 128 64 128 128 128
Spix 64 192 128 128 128 60 128 128 128
- All our proposed schemes have better or comparable performance relative to the state-
of-the-art algorithms. The reader is referred to [14, 16, 15, 7, 13, 8] for details on
hardware and software results.
6.4.2 The load-AE and tagextract procedures and rate positions
Load-AE procedure (load-AE(N,K)). Figures 6.4-6.6 show the exact positions in the
state for loading the key and nonce bytes where K[i] and N [i] denote the i-th byte of key
and nonce starting from the left, respectively. In case of AE-[WAGE]-[128], we represent the
loading procedure using bit notation.
Tagextract procedure (tagextract(·)). For AE-[WAGE]-[128], the tag bits are extracted
from the state bits where nonce is initialized (Figure 6.6). For all other AEAD instances, we
extract tag bytes from the positions where the key bytes are loaded (Figures 6.4 and 6.5).
Rate and capacity. In Figures 6.4-6.6, the gray colored bytes/bits constitute the Sr part of
state and are used for both absorbing the data (K,AD and M) and squeezing the ciphertext.
The remaining green colored bytes/bits form the Sc part of state.
Rationale of rate positions. Our permutations follow a NLFSR based design paradigm.
For the rate part, we want the input bits to be mixed properly as soon as possible so we
achieve better confusion and diffusion. Accordingly, choosing the right place for absorbing
the data determines how fast it is processed by the round function, which is important since
not all the blocks in NLFSR-based constructions receive the same amount of processing. We
also want to ensure that any injected difference in the rate part should activate as many
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Figure 6.4: Visualization of load-AE(·) procedure of different AEAD instances
as sboxes as possible in the first few rounds to enhance resistance against differential and
linear cryptanalysis. Furthermore, to decrease the probability of differential characteristics
we choose the rate bytes/bits in a non-consecutive fashion.
A third party cryptanalysis [92] of AE-[sLiSCP-192] and AE-[sLiSCP-256] instances sup-
ports our rationale. Note that the authors in [92] could only attack 6/18 steps of these
algorithms. Thus, we expect that the number of steps chosen for sLiSCP (18), sLiSCP-light
(12) and ACE (16) provide a huge security margin against the best known attacks.
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Figure 6.6: Visualization of load-AE(·) procedure of WAGE
6.5 Handling Short Messages




calls of P to
generate the tag. For |K|= 128, r = 64 and short messages, say `AD = 1 and `M = 1, the
number of calls of P is 7. We now describe two ways for handling short messages.
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6.5.1 Remove key absorption layers
A naive way is to remove the key absorption layers from the initialization and finalization
phases (Figure 6.3). This reduces the number of calls of P to 1 + `AD + `M . However, this
approach affects the security (depending on the tag size) and proper care has to be taken while
claiming security. We illustrate this fact with an example. Consider the AEAD instance
AE-[sLiSCP-192][112] (row 2 in Table 6.4). Our initial claim is 112-bit security. On removing
the key absorption layers, the security drops to 80 bits. This is because after knowing the
112-bit tag the attacker guesses the remaining 80 state bits and then inverts the permutation
to recover the master key.
6.5.2 Reduce number of rounds of P
While designing P and choosing its number of rounds, our approach was to ensure that P
is indistinguishable from a random permutation. But when P is used in the unified sponge
mode, an adversary can only control the r-bit rate part of the state. Thus, we could use
reduced-round P for all phases instead of removing the key absorption layers. Note that this
approach require proper security analysis.
Remark 6.2. We emphasize that there could be other ways of handling short messages as
well. Here, we have presented the trivial ones only.
6.6 Generic Hash Algorithm and Instances
In Algorithm 6.2, we present a high-level overview of a hash algorithm using the unified round
function. We denote it by Hash-[P] where P is the underlying permutation. Figure 6.3 shows
an example of hash algorithm with message digest size h = 4r. We now describe each phase
of Hash-[P] in detail.
P P P P P P Pload-H(IV )
c
r
M0 M1 MlM−1 0 0 0 0H0 H1 H2 H3
Initialization Absorbing Squeezing
Figure 6.7: Hash algorithm Hash-[P] with r = r′ and h = 4r
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Remark 6.3. Domain separation is not required for hash (equivalent to XORing 0x00 to
capacity) as only one type of data is processed. The case of partial/complete message block
can be distinguished by the padding rule described below.
6.6.1 Message padding
The padding rule (10∗) similar to AE-[P] is applied to the input message M where a single
1 followed by 0’s is appended to it such that its length after padding is a multiple of r. We
denote the padding rule by
padr(M) = M‖10r−1−(|M | mod r)
The resulting padded message is then divided into `M r-bit blocks M0‖· · · ‖M`M−1.
6.6.2 Initialization
The state is first initialized with IV = h/2‖r‖r′, where r/r′ denotes the number of bits
absorbed/squeezed per permutation call. Eight bits are used to encode each of the used h/2,
r and r′ sizes and loaded in the state2 [70]. The remaining bytes are set to 0x00. We denote
this process by load-H.
Remark 6.4. IV = h/2‖r‖r′ is only used to distinguish different instances of hash using the
same P. We could also start with all zero state for different P’s.
After loading the state with the IV we call P once which completes the initialization
phase.
S ← P(load-H(IV))
6.6.3 Absorbing and squeezing
Each message block is absorbed by XORing it to the Sr part of the state, then P is applied.
After absorbing all the message blocks, the h-bit output is extracted from the Sr part of the
state r′ bits (if r′ < r then we take the r′ most significant bits of Sr) at a time followed by
the application of P until a total of h/r′ extractions are completed.
6.6.4 Security
For a sponge based hash with b = r + c and h-bit message digest squeezed r′ bits at a time,
the generic security bounds [32, 70] are given by
2Exact positions are not required as IV is a constant value
98
Algorithm 6.2 Hash algorithm Hash-[P]
1: Hash-[P](M, IV ):
2: S ← Initialization(IV )
3: S ← Absorbing(S,M)
4: H ← Squeezing(S)
5: return H
6: Initialization(IV):
7: S ← load-H(IV )
8: S ← P(S)
9: return S
10: padr(M) :
11: M ←M ||10r−1−(|M| mod r)
12: return M
1: Absorbing(S,M):
2: (M0||· · · ||M`M−1)← padr(M)
3: for i = 0 to `M − 1 do:
4: S ← P(Sr ⊕Mi, Sc)
5: return S
6: Squeezing(S):
7: for i = 0 to h/r′ − 1 do:
8: if r = r′ then:
9: Hi ← Sr
10: else:
11: Hi ← trunc-msb(Sr, r′)
12: S ← P(S)
13: Hh/r′−1 ← S′r
14: return H0||H1||· · · ||Hh/r′−1
• Collision: min(2h/2, 2c/2)
• Preimage: min(2min(h,b),max(2min(h,b)−r′ , 2c/2))
• Second-preimage: min(2h, 2c/2)
6.6.5 Hash instances
Table 6.5 presents the hash instances along with their parameters and security levels. The
rate part of the state is same as described in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.
Remark 6.5. The NIST LWC’s requirement for the primary member of hash functions is
at least 112-bit overall security with message digest size of 256 bits. This requirement can
be met by using sLiSCP-256, sLiSCP-light-256 and WAGE permutations in hash mode with
rate value 32 bits (last 3 rows of Table 6.5).
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown the construction of the unified round function in a sponge
framework which is easily adaptable to multiple cryptographic primitives. As an applica-
tion of it, we have presented generic AEAD and hash algorithms along with their concrete
instantiations using sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light, ACE and WAGE permutations.
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Table 6.5: Recommended hash instances
Algorithm IV h r r′ c Preimage Sec. Preimage Collision
Hash-[sLiSCP-192] 0x502020 160 32 32 160 128 80 80
Hash-[sLiSCP-256] 0x604040 192 64 64 192 128 96 96
Hash-[sLiSCP-256] 0x604020 192 64 32 192 160 96 96
Hash-[sLiSCP-256] 0x604020 192 64 32 192 160 96 96
Hash-[sLiSCP-light-192] 0x502020 160 32 32 160 128 80 80
Hash-[sLiSCP-light-256] 0x604040 192 64 64 192 128 96 96
Hash-[sLiSCP-light-256] 0x604020 192 64 32 192 160 96 96
Hash-[ACE] 0x804040 256 64 64 256 192 128 128
Hash-[sLiSCP-256] 0x802020 256 32 32 224 224 112 112
Hash-[sLiSCP-light-256] 0x802020 256 32 32 224 224 112 112
Hash-[WAGE] 0x802020 256 32 32 227 227 112 113
100
Chapter 7
Spoc: Sponge with Masked
Capacity
Contents
7.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.2 Specification of Spoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.3 Security of Spoc Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Declaration of Contributions
This chapter is based on [12]. The design of Spoc mode comes from Ashwin Jha and Mridul
Nandi of our team, while the design of Spoc’s underlying permutation sLiSCP-light is from
this thesis. Accordingly, my main contributions are as follows.
• Design and analysis of sLiSCP-light permutation as mentioned in Chapter 3.
• Choice of positions of state for rate, loading key and nonce bytes, and extracting tag
bytes for Spoc.
7.1 Motivation
The best known bound for the sponge based AEAD in a single key setting is O(D2+DT2c )
(Jovanic et al. [79]). Here D is the data complexity (the total amount of data which is au-
thenticated and encrypted using distinct nonces) in bits, while T denotes the time complexity
which includes the number of offline evaluations of the underlying permutation P. Note that
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the advantage term addresses the collisions probabilities, distinguishing advantage, verifica-
tion query or the secret key recovery. While we have used the Bertoni et al. [34] bound in the
previous chapter to ensure the same circuitry, all our proposed AEAD instances (Table 6.4)
also satisfy the former bound. Now, for a 128-bit key, the NIST Lightweight Cryptography
Project [97] has set the minimum values of D and T to be at least 250 − 1 bytes (253 bits)
and 2112, respectively. For instance, consider sLiSCP-light-192 with c = 160 and r = 32.
This does not meet NIST’s requirement as 253+112 > 2160. So, we could either increase the
c value and decrease r, or increase the state size. Alternatively, is it possible to meet those
requirements with state sizes less than 192? In this chapter, we present the design of Spoc
which addresses the above problem. Spoc or Sponge with masked Capacity (pronounced as
Spock) is a new AEAD mode of operation which offers higher security guarantee with smaller
states. The underlying permutation of Spoc is sLiSCP-light permutation.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 details the specification
of Spoc and its recommended instances. We summarize the security claims of Spoc in Section
7.3 and then conclude in Section 7.4.
7.2 Specification of Spoc
In this section, we give a high level description of Spoc and then list its recommended in-
stances. We also discuss the choice and rationale of rate positions, loading key and nonce
procedures, and tag extraction procedures.
7.2.1 Spoc parameters
Spoc is primarily parameterized by rate r of the underlying permutation P where r ∈ {64, 128}.
We write Spoc[r] to denote Spoc with the particular choice of rate value r. The secondary
parameters are set as follows.
• Spoc[64]: In this version, r = 64, c = 128, κ = 128, n = 128 and t = 64.
• Spoc[128]: In this version, r = 128, c = 128, κ = 128, n = 128 and t = 128.
7.2.2 Description of Spoc
We denote the state of Spoc by Y ‖Z string where Y consists of c-bit capacity part of state
while Z is made of r bits of rate. Figure 7.1 shows the outer level structure of Spoc. It takes
as input X and XOR it to Y part of the state. If X is a plaintext/ciphertext block then only
Z part of state is used as the keystream. It then XORs Z with a 4-bit domain separator dX .
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Figure 7.1: Schematic of Spoc outer layer
init(N,K) P P




















Initialization Processing associated data
Encryption /Decryption Finalization
Figure 7.2: Schematic diagram of Spoc AEAD with 3 blocks of AD and M
7.2.2.1 Padding
The padding rule (10∗), denoting a single 1 followed by the required number of 0’s, is applied
to data X ∈ {AD,M}, so that its length after padding is a multiple of r. The resulting padded
data is then divided into `X r-bit blocks X0‖· · · ‖X`X−1. In case of empty or complete blocks,
no padding is required. Note that for Spoc-64, since c = 128 and |Xi|= 64, to match the
capacity size we append 64 zeros to each Xi, i.e., Xi ← Xi‖064.
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7.2.2.2 Domain separators
Here we explain the 4-bit dX that we use to separate the processing of various critical blocks.
It is defined as dX := ctrltag ctrlpt ctrlad ctrlpar. Initially, all the bits are set to 0. The bits are
set to 1 in the following manner:
1. ctrlad: The bit sets to 1 during the processing of associated data blocks. For empty AD
it remains set to 0.
2. ctrlpt: The bit sets to 1 during the processing of plaintext blocks. For empty messages
it remains set to 0.
3. ctrlpar: The bit sets to 1 at the last AD (M) block processing call if the last block is
partial. For full last block it remains set to 0.
4. ctrltag: The bit sets to 1 at tag generation call.
We XOR dX to the four most significant bits of Z. In case of encryption or decryption,
this is done after the extraction of keystream bits. Table 7.1 enumerates all possible values
for the domain separators along with their meanings.
Table 7.1: Possible values of dX
dX Meaning
0000 Implicitly used in nonce processing
0010 Full AD block processing
0011 Partial AD block processing
0100 Full M/C block processing
0101 Partial M/C block processing
1000 Tag generation in empty AD and M/C case
1010 Tag generation in non-empty AD with full last block and empty M/C
1011 Tag generation in non-empty AD with partial last block and empty M/C
1100 Tag generation in (non-)empty AD and non-empty M/C with full last block
1101 Tag generation in (non-)empty AD and non-empty M/C with partial last block
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7.2.2.3 Initialization
In this phase, we create the initial state using the nonce N = N0||N1 and the secret key
K = K0||K1. We denote it by init(N,K) and is given by
init(N,K) := Y ||Z ←
P(load-Spoc[64](N0,K))⊕ (N1||0128) for Spoc[64],load-Spoc[128](N,K) for Spoc[128]
The function load-Spoc[r](·) depends on the choice of P and assigns the nonce and key
bytes to the particular byte positions of the state. We explicitly define this function in Section
7.2.5.
7.2.2.4 Processing associated data
If there is associated data, each ADi block, i = 0, . . . , `AD − 1 is XORed to the capacity part
of the state, and the domain separator is XORed to the rate. Then, the permutation P is
applied to the whole state.
Y ‖Z ← P((Y ⊕ADi)‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖0010))), i = 0, . . . , `AD − 2
Y ‖Z ←
P((Y ⊕AD`AD−1)‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖0010))) for complete blockP((Y ⊕AD`AD−1)‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖0011))) for partial block
7.2.2.5 Encryption and decryption
During this phase, the message block is XORed to the Y part of state while keystream bits
are taken from the Z part. The encryption procedure is given by
Ci = Mi ⊕ Z, and
Y ‖Z ← P((Y ⊕Mi)‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖0100))), i = 0, . . . , `M − 2
C`M−2 = M`M−1 ⊕ Z
Y ‖Z ←
(Y ⊕M`M−1)‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖0100)) for complete block(Y ⊕M`M−1)‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖0101)) for partial block
The last ciphertext block C`M−1 is truncated so that its length is equal to that of the last
unpadded message block. For the decryption, we first compute Mi = Z ⊕ Ci and then XOR
Mi to the capacity part of the state.
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7.2.2.6 Finalization
This phase is responsible for tag generation. At the tag generation call, the control signal is
of the form 1xyz where the 3 least significant bits xyz depend on the previous processed data
blocks. We denote the process of extracting tag from state by tagextract-Spoc[r] and is given
by
tagextract-Spoc[r]← P(Y ‖(Z ⊕ (0r−4‖1000))).
The exact description of tagextract-Spoc[r] function is provided in Section 7.2.6.
7.2.3 Recommended instantiations
We instantiate Spoc with sLiSCP-light permutation (Chapter 3) to provide two lightweight
AEAD instances which offer 112-bit security. The sLiSCP-light permutation is chosen for
its well-analyzed structure and low hardware implementation cost. Table 7.2 presents the
recommended parameter sets for two lightweight instances of Spoc.
Table 7.2: Recommended parameter sets of Spoc
Instance b r κ n t Data (in bytes)
Spoc[64] sLiSCP-light[192] 192 64 128 128 64 250
Spoc[128] sLiSCP-light[256] 256 128 128 128 128 250
Remark 7.1. The two Spoc algorithms are secure while the prescribed data (250 bytes) and
time limit of 2112 are respected.
7.2.4 Positions of rate and capacity
Figure 7.3 depicts the exact positions of the state which are used for r-bit keystream and
for masking r-bits of capacity. It also shows the 1-1 correspondence between the state rep-
resentation Y ‖Z of Spoc and X0‖X1‖X2‖X3 of sLiSCP-light. Each block is given in bytes
notation, e.g., X0 = X0[0]‖X0[1]‖· · · ‖X0[5] for sLiSCP-light-192.
Rationale. The choice of rate and capacity positions for Spoc depends on the underlying
permutation. Since we instantiate Spoc with sLiSCP-light permutation, we have followed a
similar strategy in choosing the rate and capacity positions as the one that has been used in
sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light (Section 6.4.2).
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Z[0] Z[1] Z[2] Z[3] Y [12] Y [13]
Y [0] Y [1] Y [2] Y [3] Y [4] Y [5]
Z[4] Z[5] Z[6] Z[7] Y [14] Y [15]





Z[0] Z[1] Z[2] Z[3] Z[4] Z[5] Z[6] Z[7]
Y [0] Y [1] Y [2] Y [3] Y [4] Y [5] Y [6] Y [7]
Z[8] Z[9] Z[10] Z[11] Z[12] Z[13] Z[14] Z[15]
Y [8] Y [9] Y [10] Y [11] Y [12] Y [13] Y [14] Y [15]
rate byte masked capacity byte
Spoc-64 sLiSCP-light[192] Spoc-128 sLiSCP-light[256]
Figure 7.3: Rate and capacity part of Spoc
7.2.5 Loading key and nonce
Here we describe the postions where the 128-bit key K = K0||K1 and 128-bit nonce N =
N0||N1 is loaded in the state. In particular, we define the functions load-Spoc[128](N,K) and
load-Spoc[64](N0,K) of the init(N,K) procedure (Section 7.2.2.3).





load-SPOC[64](N0,K). The load-Spoc[64](N0,K) function is given by
X1[0], · · · , X1[5]← K0[0], · · · ,K0[5]
X3[0], · · · , X3[5]← K1[0] · · · ,K1[5]
X0[0] · · · , X0[3]← N0[0], · · · , N0[3]





For Spoc[128] sLiSCP-light[256], the tagextract-Spoc[128] function computes the 128-bit tag
T = T0||T1 which is given by T0 ← X1 and T1 ← X3. Similarly, tagextract-Spoc[64] computes
the 64-bit tag T of Spoc[64] sLiSCP-light[192] as follows.
T [0], · · · , T [3]← S1[0], · · · , S1[3]
T [4], · · · , T [7]← S3[0], · · · , S3[3]
7.3 Security of Spoc Instances
In Table 7.3, we list the security levels of two instances of Spoc in a nonce-respecting setting.
The numbers are based on our security analysis of sLiSCP-light permutation (Section 3.4)
which is modeled as a random permutation for 18 steps. Accordingly, we do not claim security
for Spoc with reduced-round sLiSCP-light permutation.
Table 7.3: Security levels of AEAD algorithms based on Spoc
AEAD algorithm Confidentiality Integrity
Time Data (in bytes) Time Data (in bytes)
Spoc[64] sLiSCP-light[192] 2112 250 2112 250
Spoc[128] sLiSCP-light[256] 2112 250 2112 250
Remark 7.2. For a security proof of Spoc1, the reader is referred to our NIST LWC round
2 candidate [12].
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design of Spoc, a new permutation based mode of
operation for AEAD functionality. It satisfies NIST LWC AEAD requirements with 192-bit
state when instantiated with sLiSCP-light-192.
1Not a contribution of this thesis
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Declaration of Contributions
This chapter is based on [115]. My main contributions are as follows.
• Modeled the division property based MILP models and key recovery attack on WG-5.
• Analysed and compared the design choices of WG-5 with Grain-128a and Trivium with
respect to cube attacks.
8.1 Introduction
The cube attack is a powerful cryptanalytic technique for the analysis of stream ciphers
(Section 2.4.4.2). Given the complicated algebraic normal form of keystream bits, conventional
cube attacks always regard them as blackbox functions, and the attack is only feasible for
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smaller dimensional cubes. In Crypto 2017, Todo et al. [127] proposed cube attacks in a non-
blackbox polynomial setting employing the division property [126]. Their technique takes
the polynomial structure of the stream cipher into consideration by tracing the propagation
of the division property through the initialization rounds. Accordingly, a theoretical proven
upper bound on the number of secret key bits involved in the superpoly (Example in Section
2.4.4.2)and the complexity of its recovery is obtained. Consequently, they gave the best known
key recovery attacks on reduced-round variants of Grain [11], Trivium [53] and Acorn [133].
In this chapter, we investigate the security of the key initialization phase of WG-5 [9] with
respect to cube attacks in a non-blackbox polynomial setting using the division property.
WG-5 is a lightweight version of the WG family of stream ciphers. The best cryptanalytic
result on WG-5 is a univariate algebraic attack over F25 that recovers the 80-bit secret key
using 215 keystream bits in 233 time [118]. Such an attack is applicable only when WG-5 runs
a linear feedback keystream generation phase. Thus, analyzing the nonlinear feedback based
initialization phase of WG-5 can provide better understanding of its security compared with
Grain and Trivium.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 detail the
specification of WG-5 and the attack details along with an algorithmic descriptions of all
MILP models, respectively. In Section 8.4, we analyze the design parameters of WG-5, Grain-
128a and Trivium with respect to cube attacks.
8.2 Specification of WG-5 Stream Cipher
WG-5 is a 160-bit stream cipher defined over an extension field of F25 (Figure 8.1). The 32
stage LFSR is defined using the primitive polynomial x32+x7+x6+x4+x3+x2+γ where γ =
α4+α3+α2+α+1, and α is a root of field (F25) defining polynomial x5+x4+x2+x+1. We de-
note the state of WG-5 at the beginning of the i-th round by Si = Si[0]||Si[1]||. . . ||Si[31] where








5j+4). The 80-bit secret key k0, k1, . . . , k79 and 80-bit initial-
ization vector v0, v1, . . . , v79 are denoted byK[0]||K[1]||. . . ||K[15] and IV [0]||IV [1]||. . . ||IV [15],
respectively. The cipher runs in two phases: key initialization phase and keystream generation
(KSG) phase, which are explained below.
8.2.1 Key initialization phase
Initially, the state is loaded with K and IV as follows.
S0[j] =
K[j mod 2], if j ≡ 0 mod 2IV [j mod 2], o.w.
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Figure 8.1: WG-5 stream cipher
The state is then updated for 64 rounds with the output of WGP-5 permutation feedback into
the state, i.e., for 0 ≤ i ≤ 63
fb← γ ⊗ Si[0]⊕ Si[2]⊕ Si[3]⊕ Si[4]⊕ Si[6]⊕ Si[7]⊕WGP-5((Si[31])3)
Si+1[j]← Si[j + 1], 0 ≤ j ≤ 30
Si+1[31]← fb
8.2.2 Key generation phase
During the keystream generation phase, the keystream bit is computed by applying the Trace
function Tr(·) function (Section 2.5.4) on the output of WGP-5 permutation. The state is
then updated linearly without the feedback of WGP-5. More precisely, for i ≥ 64
zi−64 ← Tr(WGP-5(Si[31]))
fb← γ ⊗ Si[0]⊕ Si[2]⊕ Si[3]⊕ Si[4]⊕ Si[6]⊕ Si[7]
Si+1[j]← Si[j + 1], 0 ≤ j ≤ 30
Si+1[31]← fb
The boolean representation of keystream bit (obtained after applying Trace function on






























































159. In what follows, we present the cube attack details on WG-5. The mathematical
description and notations related to the cube attack are described in Section 2.4.4.2.
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8.3 Cube Attack on WG-5
We adopt the techniques presented in [127] to analyze WG-5 with respect to cube attacks.
The attack procedure is similar to [127] and consists of two phases: offline phase and online
phase.
1. Offline phase. The goal of this phase is to recover a superpoly that is balanced for a
given cube CI . It consists of three steps:
Step 1.1: Create a MILP model M for WG-5 whose initialization is reduced to R rounds.
The model encodes the division property propagation for R rounds to check
the feasibility of all R-round division trails.
Step 1.2: Choose a cube CI by flipping bits in I = {i1, i2, . . . , i|I|} and then evaluate the
secret variables involved in the superpoly. Let J = {kj1 , kj2 , . . . , kj|J|} denotes
the set of involved secret variables1.
Step 1.3: Choose a value in the constant part of IV and compute
⊕
CI
f(k, v) = p(k̄, v̄),
where k̄ = {kj1 , kj2 , . . . , kj|J|}, v̄ = {v0, v1, . . . , v79} \ {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vi|I|} and all
the possible combinations of kj1 , kj2 , . . . , kj|J| are tried out, then p(k̄, v̄) is
recovered and stored in a list for all values of k̄. Assuming the best case (that
we can recover the balanced superpoly in a single trial) the time complexity
of this phase is bounded by 2|I|+|J |. However, if N cubes are used, the time
complexity is given by N2|I|+|J |.
2. Online phase. The goal of this phase is to recover the secret key. This phase is further
divided into two steps.
Step 2.1: Use the balanced superpoly recovered in the offline phase and query the cube
CI to the encryption oracle to obtain the value of p(k̄, v̄) which is then com-
pared to the previously stored values. Then one bit is recovered from J (for
example, if p(k̄, v̄) = k0+k1+1 = 0, then (k0, k1) = (1, 0) and (k0, k1) = (0, 1)
are the 2 possible key candidates out of 4 keys) as p = 0 for 2|J |−1 values and
p = 1 for the remaining half values. To recover more than 1 bit we use multiple
cubes.
Step 2.2: Guess the remaining secret key bits.
8.3.1 Automating the cube attack on WG-5 using MILP
MILP model for the WGP-5 permutation. To model the WGP-5 permutation, we
could use its boolean representation (Section 8.4). However, this approach results in large
1Step 1.2 is computationally feasible because of MILP
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number of MILP variables and constraints due to its high nonlinearity and involvement of
terms of up to degree 4 in each of the component functions. Hence, we use an alternative
approach, we treat WGP-5 as a 5-bit Sbox. Let (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4) and (y0, y1, y2, y3, y4) be the
input and output of the WGP-5 sbox, respectively. We use the inequality generator() function
in Sage [3] and Algorithms 1 and 2 in [134], and consequently find that only 12 inequalities
are sufficient to model the division property propagation of WG-5. The inequalities are given
by 
2x0 + 2x1 + 2x2 + 2x3 + 6x4 − 3y0 − 3y1 − 3y2 − 3y3 − 3y4 ≥ −1
4x3 − y0 − y1 − y2 − y3 − y4 ≥ −1
4x0 − y0 − y1 − y2 − y3 − y4 ≥ −1
−x0 − x2 − x3 − y0 + 4y1 − y2 − y3 − 2y4 ≥ −4
−6x0 − 3x1 − 6x3 − 6x4 + 2y0 − 4y1 + 3y2 − y3 + 2y4 ≥ −19
−3x0 − x1 − x2 − 3x3 − 2x4 + 9y0 + 7y1 + 8y2 + 9y3 + 9y4 ≥ 0
x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 − 3y0 − 3y1 − 3y2 − 3y3 + 5y4 ≥ −2
−x0 − 3x2 − 3x3 − 2x4 + y0 + y2 + y3 − 2y4 ≥ −8
−x0 − x1 + 2x2 − x3 − x4 − y0 − 2y1 − 2y2 + 3y3 − y4 ≥ −5
−x0 − 2x1 − 2x2 − 2x3 − x4 − 2y0 − y1 − y2 − y3 + 5y4 ≥ −8
−2x0 − x1 − 2x2 − 2x4 + y0 + y1 − y2 + y4 ≥ −6
−x0 − x2 − x3 + y0 − y4 ≥ −3.
Algorithm 8.1 describes the MILP model for the WGP-5.
Algorithm 8.1 MILP model for WGP-5
1: function WGP-5(S) . S = (s0, s1, . . . , s159)
2: M.var ← s′155+i, xi, yi as binary for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4
3: M.con← s155+i = s′155+i + xi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4
4: Add constraints to M according to the WGP-5 inequalities
5: for j = 0 to 30 do
6: S′[j] = S[j]
7: end for
8: return (M,S′, [y0, y1, y2, y3, y4])
9: end function
MILP model for the feedback function (FBK). The function FBK in Algorithm 8.2
generates the MILP variables and constraints for the feedback value γ⊗Si[0]⊕Si[2]⊕Si[3]⊕
Si[4]⊕ Si[6]⊕ Si[7]. Since γ is constant, we model γSi[0] as Si[0] for the sake of simplicity.
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Algorithm 8.2 MILP model for the FBK function
1: function FBK(S, I)
2: for i ∈ I do
3: M.var ← s′5i+j , x5i+j as binary for 0 ≤ j ≤ 4
4: end for
5: M.var ← yi as binary for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4
6: for i ∈ I do
7: M.con← s5i+j = s′5i+j + x5i+j for 0 ≤ j ≤ 4
8: end for
9: for j = 0 to 4 do
10: temp = 0
11: for i ∈ I do
12: temp = temp+ x5i+j
13: end for
14: M.con← yj = temp
15: end for
16: for j ∈ {(0, 1, . . . , 31)− I} do
17: S′[j] = S[j]
18: end for
19: return (M,S′, [y0, y1, y2, y3, y4])
20: end function
MILP model for KSG. The function KSG in Algorithm 8.3 creates the MILP variables






























































159. Furthermore, the bitwise AND and XOR operations are modeled
using Algorithm 8.4.
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Algorithm 8.3 MILP model for the KSG
1: function KSG(S)
2: (M,S1, a1) = AND(S, [155, 156])
3: (M,S2, a2) = AND(S1, [155, 157])
4: (M,S3, a3) = AND(S2, [155, 159])
5: (M,S4, a4) = AND(S3, [156, 158])
6: (M,S5, a5) = AND(S4, [156, 159])
7: (M,S6, a6) = AND(S5, [155, 156, 157])
8: (M,S7, a7) = AND(S6, [155, 157, 158])
9: (M,S8, a8) = AND(S7, [155, 157, 159])
10: (M,S9, a9) = AND(S8, [155, 158, 159])
11: (M,S10, a10) = AND(S9, [156, 157, 158])
12: (M,S11, a11) = AND(S10, [156, 158, 159])
13: (M,S12, a12) = XOR(S11, [155, 156, 157, 158, 159])
14: M.var ← z as binary
15: M.con← z = ∑12i=1 ai
16: return (M,S12, z)
17: end function
MILP model for WG-5. The MILP model for WG-5 is given in Algorithm 8.5. It incorpo-
rates the previous models for WGP-5, FBK and KSG. The function WG5eval in Algorithm 8.5
evaluates all division trails for WG-5 whose initialization round is reduced to R. The number
of MILP variables and constraints required for each function are given in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: MILP variables and constraints




R round of WG-5 160 + 159R+ 5R 161 + 115R+ 10R
8.3.2 Evaluating involved secret variables and superpoly recovery
We prepare a cube CI by flipping bits in I = {i1, i2, . . . , i|I|}, and then evaluate the involved
secret variables in superpoly using the generic algorithm proposed in [127]. We have given
the description of the utilized algorithm (Algorithm 8.6) for the sake of completeness. The
inputs to Algorithm 8.6 are the cube indices set I and the MILP model M for WG-5. The
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Algorithm 8.4 MILP model for AND and XOR operations
1: function AND(S, I)
2: M.var ← s′i, xi as binary for i in I
3: M.var ← y as binary
4: M.con← si = s′i + xi for i in I
5: M.con← y ≥ xi for i in I
6: for i ∈ {(0, 1, . . . , 159)− I} do
7: s′i = si
8: end for
9: return (M,S′, y)
10: end function
11: function XOR(S, I)
12: M.var ← s′i, xi as binary for i in I
13: M.var ← y as binary
14: M.con← si = s′i + xi for i in I
15: temp = 0
16: for i ∈ I do
17: temp = temp+ xi
18: end for
19: M.con← y = temp
20: for i in {(0, 1, . . . , 159)− I} do
21: s′i = si
22: end for
23: return (M,S′, y)
24: end function
model M evaluates all the division trails for R rounds with input division property given by
vi = 1 for i ∈ I and vi = 0 for i ∈ {{0, 1, . . . , 79} \ I}.
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Algorithm 8.5 MILP model for the initialization phase of WG-5
1: function WG5eval(R)
2: Prepare empty MILP Model M
3: M.var ← S0[j] for 0 ≤ j ≤ 31
4: for i = 1 to R do
5: (M,S′, a) = WGP-5(Si−1)
6: (M,S′′, b) = FBK(S′, [0, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7])
7: for j = 0 to 30 do
8: Si[j] = S′′[j + 1]
9: end for
10: M.con← S′′[0] = 0
11: M.var ← Si[31] as binary
12: M.con← Si[31] = a+ b
13: end for
14: (M,S′′′, z) = KSG(SR)
15: for j = 0 to 31 do
16: S′′′[j] = 0
17: end for
18: M.con← z = 1
19: end function
Algorithm 8.6 MILP model to find involved secret variables in superpoly [127]
1: function extractSecretVariables(MILP model M,Cube Indices I)
2: M.var ← ki as binary for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, . k0, k1, . . . , kn−1 are secret variables
3: M.var ← vi as binary for 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, . v0, v1, . . . , vm−1 are public variables
4: M.con← vi = 1 for i ∈ I
5: M.con← vi = 0 for i ∈ {(0, 1, . . . ,m− 1)− I}
6: M.con←∑n−1i=0 ki = 1
7: do
8: solve MILP model M
9: if M is feasible then
10: pick j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} s.t kj = 1
11: J = J ∪ {j}
12: M.con← kj = 0
13: end if




Table 8.2: Involved secret variables in superpoly for cube indices I ∈ {I1, I2, I3, I4, I5}
Rounds Involved secret variables J Time complexity log2(·)
15 {k5, k6, . . . , k54} 54
16 {k5, k6, . . . , k54} 54
17 {k5, k6, . . . , k59} 59
18 {k5, k6, . . . , k59} 59
19 {k5, k6, . . . , k64} 64
20 {k5, k6, . . . , k64} 64
21 {k5, k6, . . . , k69} 69
22 {k5, k6, . . . , k69} 69
23 {k5, k6, . . . , k74} 74
24 {k5, k6, . . . , k74} 74
I1 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, I2 = {0, 1, 2, 4}, I3 = {0, 1, 3, 4}, I4 = {0, 2, 3, 4}, I5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
Here, time complexity means the complexity to recover the superpoly.
Searching cubes. We limit our search of the cubes to indices I such that 2|I|+|J | < 280.





cubes is infeasible and the cubes in Table 8.2 are the best so far for WG-5 according to our
experimental results.
Recovering a balanced superpoly. We choose a value in the constant part of the IV and
vary all 24× 270 values to recover p(k5, k6, . . . , k74, v̄) where v̄ = {v0, v1, . . . , v79} \ {vj | j ∈ Ii}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5 and R = 24. We also store 270 values of p(k5, k6, . . . , k74, v̄) as they will be used
again in the online phase. We assume that we can recover a balanced superpoly in 1 trial for
each of the cubes in Table 8.2. If not, we repeat the experiment.
8.3.3 Theoretical key recovery attack on 24 rounds
We use the balanced superpolys recovered in the offline phase for cubes I1, I2, I3, I4 and I5




f(k, v). We then compare this sum with
⊕
CIi
f(k, v) = p(k5, k6, . . . , k74, v̄)
stored in the offline phase for all possible combinations of {k5, k6, . . . , k74}. We discard the
values of {k5, k6, . . . , k74} for which the sum is different. Since we are using a balanced
superpoly, p(k5, k6, . . . , k74, v̄) = 0 for 2
69 values and equals 1 for the remaining 269 values.
Thus, one bit of secret information can always be recovered. We use cubes I1, I2, I3, I4 and
I5 in our attack and hence can recover 5 secret variables. We then guess the remaining
75 bits to recover the entire secret key. The attack time complexity for 24 rounds equals
5× 274 + 275 ≈ 276.81.
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8.3.4 Attack comparison with algebraic attacks
The univariate algebraic attacks [118] exploit the fact that WG-5 is updated linearly during
the keystream generation phase (Section 8.2.2). Hence, using the trace representation of zt,
it is possible to find a low degree multiple g (also known as annihilator) of filtering function
f , i.e., fg = 0 which lowers the data and time complexity of the algebraic attack to 215 and
233, respectively. Such attacks do not hold if the nonlinear WGP-5 is fed back into the state
during KSG phase because the idea of annihilators no longer exists. On the other hand, our
attack is not affected by this fact and it only requires significantly low data complexity.
8.4 Comparison of the Initialization Phases
In this section, we present an argument to show how the initialization phase of WG-5 is more
resistant to cube attacks than those of Grain-128a [11] and Trivium[53].
8.4.1 Brief description of Grain128 and Trivium
Grain-128a is an NLFSR based stream cipher of Grain family with two 128-bit states repre-
sented by (b0, b1, . . . , b127) and (s0, s1, . . . , s127). The state is loaded with a 128-bit key and a
96-bit IV as follows.
(b0, b1, . . . , b127)← (k0, k1, . . . , k127),
(s0, s1, . . . , s127)← (iv0, iv1, . . . , iv95, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
The initialization phase runs for 256 rounds with the state update function given by
g ← b0 + b26 + b56 + b91 + b96 + b3b67 + b11b13
+ b17b18 + b27b59 + b40b48 + b61b65 + b68b84
+ b88b92b93b95 + b22b24b25 + b70b78b82
f ← s0 + s7 + s38 + s70 + s81 + s96
h← b12s8 + s13s20 + b95s42 + s60s79 + b12b95s94
z ← h+ s93 + b2 + b15 + b36 + b45 + b64 + b73 + b89
(b0, b1, . . . , b127)← (b1, b2, . . . , b127, g + s0 + z)
(s0, s1, . . . , s127)← (s1, s2, . . . , s127, f + z).
During the KSG phase, z is not fed back to the state and is directly used as the keystream
bit.
Trivium is another NLFSR based stream cipher with state size 288. The 80-bit key and
80-bit IV are loaded into the state as follows: (s0, s1, . . . , s92) ← (k0, k1, . . . , k79, 0, . . . , 0),
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(s93, s94, . . . , s176)← (iv0, iv1, . . . , iv79, 0, . . . , 0) and (s177, s178, . . . , s287)← (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1).
The state update function of Trivium is given by
t1 ← s65 + s92
t2 ← s161 + s176
t3 ← s242 + s287
z ← t1 + t2 + t3
t1 ← t1 + s90s91 + s170
t2 ← t2 + s174s175 + s263
t3 ← t3 + s285s286 + s68
(s0, s1, . . . , s92)← (t3, s0, . . . , s91)
(s93, s1, . . . , s176)← (t1, s93, . . . , s175)
(s177, s1, . . . , s287)← (t2, s177, . . . , s286).
The initialization phase runs for 1152 rounds without producing an output while z is used as
the keystream bit during KSG phase.
8.4.2 Observations on degree evaluation
Trivium. The degree of z is 3 after 81 rounds. The algebraic degree of z can only be
increased by AND terms s90s91, s174s175 and s285s286. Thus, the round at which the degree
of z equals 3 is min(90, 174− 93, 285− 177) = 81.
Grain128a. The degree of z is 6 after 32 rounds. The maximum index in h function is 95
(for b95 term). At round 32 (127-95) only the degree of b95 is 4 and the remaining terms are
of degree 1. Hence, the degree of z is 6 because of the b12b95s94 term.
WG-5. The degree of z is 6 in 1 round. Note that the degree of each component of S1[31]
equals 4. This can be deduced from the boolean representation of the component functions
of the WGP-5 which is given below.
y0 = x0x1x3x4 + x0x1x4 + x0x2x3x4 + x0x2x3 + x0x2x4
+ x0x4 + x0 + x1x2x3 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x3x4
y1 = x0x1x2x3 + x0x1x2x4 + x0x1x2 + x0x1x3 + x0x1x4 + x0x1 + x0x2x4
+ x0x2 + x0x3x4 + x0x4 + x1x2x3x4 + x1x4 + x1 + x2x4 + x2 + x3x4
122
y2 = x0x1x2x3 + x0x1x4 + x0x1 + x0x2 + x0x3x4 + x1x2x3x4 + x1x2 + x1x4
+ x2x3x4 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x2 + x3x4 + x3 + x4
y3 = x0x1x2x3 + x0x1x3 + x0x1 + x0x2x3x4 + x0x2x3 + x0x2x4
+ x0x3x4 + x0x4 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4 + x1x3 + x1
y4 = x0x1x2x4 + x0x1x2 + x0x1x3x4 + x0x1 + x0x2x3x4 + x0x2 + x0x3x4
+ x0x3 + x0x4 + x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4
+ x1 + x2x3x4 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x4






























































159, then the degree of z is 4 + 2 = 6.
Based on the degree comparison of 32 rounds of Grain-128a and 81 rounds of Trivium
with 1 round of WG-5, the degree in WG-5 grows faster because of the state update by the
nonlinearly generated bits at each clock cycle, which is not the case with Grain-128a and
Trivium. We also observe that all the 5 bits processed by WGP-5 at the i-th round are used to
generate the keystream bit at round (i+ 1) along with 5× 6 = 30 new bits from the feedback
function. This is not the same case with Grain-128 because the updated bits b127 and s127 in
i-th round are used in keystream bit at i+ 32 and i+ 33, respectively. Similarly, for Trivium
the values of t1, t2 and t3 at i-th round are used in keystream bit at i+ 90, i+ 81 and i+ 108
rounds, respectively. Thus, we expect that initialization phase of WG-5 is stronger than those
of Grain-128a and Trivium with respect to cube attacks.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated the security of initialization phase of WG-5 with respect
to cube attacks. We have modeled the division trails of reduced-round WG-5 using MILP and
have shown a key recovery attack on 24 rounds with data and time complexity of 26.32 and
276.81, respectively. Finally, we have provided an argument to show that the WG-5 design
parameters in terms of feedback and tap positions are more resistant to cube attacks in
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9.1 Motivation
The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a well-known generic cryptanalytic technique against
cryptographic primitives. It has broadly two types: the standard Diffie-Hellman MitM attack
[57] and the multi-dimensional MitM attack proposed by Zhu and Gong [141]. Both variants
are highly dependent on the matching phase. More precisely, for a matching phase, the key
space has to be partitioned into l independent sets if the cipher is decomposed as a composition
of l subciphers (Section 2.4.5, Figure 2.26 with l = 4). This clearly has a limitation as the
matching variable/variables can only be found for a small number of rounds, unless the key
scheduling algorithm is weak. However, most of the key scheduling algorithms are designed in
a way so that key bits are mixed properly in few rounds. Accordingly, the number of rounds
covered by MitM attacks is usually lower than that of differential and linear, and algebraic
attacks.
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In this chapter, we introduce a novel characteristic of block ciphers called correlated se-
quences. We apply the method of correlated sequences to propose a generic MitM attack on
Feistel and SPN ciphers which could cover more rounds than the traditional MitM, differential
and linear, and algebraic attacks. As an application of our attack, we break up to 85% (27/32)
of the rounds of two lightweight block ciphers Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64 (Section 2.5.3)
while the previous attacks can reach only 23 rounds (Table 9.1). Although, our attack on
these ciphers has time complexity close to that of integral attacks which is 263 encryptions, it
has a very low data complexity and success probability 1. In addition, it depicts weaknesses
which were not investigated before.
Table 9.1: State-of-the-art attacks on Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64
Attack Cipher # attacked rounds Data Memory Time Success rate
out of 32 (bytes)
Differential
Simon-32/64 [130] 21 231 - 255.25 0.51
Simon-32/64 [109] 22 232 - 258.76 0.315
Simeck-32/64 [87] 19 231 233 240 -
Simeck-32/64 [109] 22 232 - 257.9 0.417
Linear
Simon-32/64 [47] 23 231.19 - 261.84 0.277
Simeck-32/64 [110] 23 231.91 - 261.78 0.456
Integral
Simon-32/64 [131] 21 231 254 263 1
Simon-32/64 [66] 22 231 255.8 263 1
Simon-32/64 [49] 24 232 233.64 263 1
Simeck-32/64 [138] 21 231 246.22 263 1
Impossible Differential
Simon-32/64 [54] 20 232 245.5 262.8 -
Simeck-32/64 [135] 20 232 258 262.5 -
Zero correlation
Simon-32/64 [123] 21 232 231 259.4 -
Simeck-32/64 [139] 21 232 247.67 258.78 -
Meet-in-the-middle Simon-32/64 [120] 18 8 252 262.57 1
Correlated sequences Simon-32/64
24 3 249 262.87 1
25 3 249 262.94 1
Sections 9.4 and 9.5 26 3 249 262.88 1
27 3 249 262.94 1
Simeck-32/64
24 3 249 262.87 1
25 3 249 262.94 1
26 3 249 262.88 1
27 3 249 262.94 1
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Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 details the definitions
and basic properties of the correlated sequences, and applications of these sequences to MitM
attacks on Feistel and SPN ciphers. In Section 9.3, we provide the theoretical construction of
correlated sequences for Simon-like ciphers. Section 9.4 presents the application of correlated
sequences to a 25-round key recovery attack on Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64. In Section
9.5, we extend the 25-round attack to 27 rounds using the key scheduling algorithm properties.
9.2 Correlated Sequences of Block Ciphers
In this section, we formally introduce the correlated sequences and then show how to use
them in the meet-in-the-middle attack (Section 2.4.5). Consider an n-bit block cipher with
r rounds and an mn-bit master key k = (k0, k1, . . . , km−1) as depicted in Figure 9.1. Let si
denote the state at the i-th round. Then for 0 ≤ i < r, si+1 = RF(si, ki) where RF denotes
the round function (Section 2.3.2.2) and it is generally a composition of two functions, namely
1) a linear function L and 2) a nonlinear function N. Note that the order of composition, i.e.,
L ◦N or N ◦ L is cipher dependent and we omit it for the general description.
RF RF RF RFs0 s1 s2 s3 sr−1 sr
k0 k1 k2 kr−1
n n n n
n
Figure 9.1: A generic diagram of a block cipher
9.2.1 General idea
Definition 9.1 (Keyed sequence). Given k ∈ K and 1 ≤ t < r, we say that S(k,t) =
(s0, s1, . . . , st−1) is a keyed sequence of length t if si+1 = RF(si, ki) for 0 ≤ i < t− 1.
From Definition 9.1, it is clear that we need to compute RF t times to obtain S(k,t).
This implies that N is computed t times in total. Thus, to obtain another sequence S(k′,t)
of the same length t, the worst case is to compute N exactly t times. The idea of correlated
sequences is “Given S(k,t) and k
′ 6= k, obtain the sequence S(k′,t) by computing the
nonlinear function N less than t times.” We present a toy example to illustrate this
notion before providing the formal definition. In the following, we use “+” to denote bitwise
XOR and integer addition if the meaning is clear in the context.
Example 9.1. Consider a 4-bit toy Simon-like block cipher with 8-bit blocksize and 16-bit key
as shown in Figure 9.2. Let the nonlinear function be given by N(x) = xL(x)+ L2(x) where
x ∈ F42 and Li(·) denotes the left cyclic shift by i bits. The length seven keyed sequences when
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k0 = 0 and k1 = 0 are given in Table 9.2 (values given in integers). We note the following
observations from Table 9.2.
1. For all k = (k0, k1, k2, k3), s4 = k2, s5 = 0 and s6 = k2 + k4.



















3. For each row, k′3 = k3 + 1 and s
′





N(x) = x L(x) + L2(x)
ki ki+1 ki+2 ki+3
ki+1 + L
3(ki+1) ki+3 + L(ki+3)
(1, 1, 0, zi)
z = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure 9.2: 4-bit toy Simon-like cipher
We now define the correlated sequences in Definition 9.2.
Definition 9.2 ((σ, t)-correlated sequences). Given S(k,t) and 0 ≤ σ < t, we say S(k,t) and
S(k′,t) are (σ, t)-correlated sequences if S(k′,t) can be obtained from S(k,t) by computing the
nonlinear function N exactly σ times.
Remark 9.1. σ = 0 =⇒ S(k,t) and S(k′,t) are linearly related.
Definition 9.3 (Linear correlated keys). Given S(k,t), we define linear correlated keys as the
set
CK(k) = {k′ | S(k,t) and S(k′,t) are (0, t)-correlated sequences}.
For example, in Table 9.2, for each row S(k,t) and S(k′,t) are (1,7) correlated sequences.
Further |CK((0,0,0,0))| = 15 and |CK((0,0,0,1))| = 15, i.e., the last 15 sequences can be
computed linearly from the sequence corresponding to the keys (0, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1),
respectively. More precisely, to obtain all 32 sequences, we only need to compute N exactly
once.
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Table 9.2: Keyed sequences (values given in integers)

























0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
0 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 7
0 0 2 8 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 2 9 7 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
0 0 3 14 14 0 0 0 0 3 0 13 0 0 3 15 13 0 0 0 0 3 1 10
0 0 4 1 14 0 0 0 0 4 0 10 0 0 4 0 13 0 0 0 0 4 1 13
0 0 5 5 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 7 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 0
0 0 6 13 11 0 0 0 0 6 0 13 0 0 6 12 8 0 0 0 0 6 1 10
0 0 7 11 1 0 0 0 0 7 0 6 0 0 7 10 2 0 0 0 0 7 1 1
0 0 8 2 11 0 0 0 0 8 0 3 0 0 8 3 8 0 0 0 0 8 1 4
0 0 9 7 4 0 0 0 0 9 0 13 0 0 9 6 7 0 0 0 0 9 1 10
0 0 10 10 2 0 0 0 0 10 0 8 0 0 10 11 1 0 0 0 0 10 1 15
0 0 11 13 11 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 11 12 8 0 0 0 0 11 1 7
0 0 12 11 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 13 0 0 12 10 2 0 0 0 0 12 1 10
0 0 13 14 14 0 0 0 0 13 0 3 0 0 13 15 13 0 0 0 0 13 1 4
0 0 14 7 4 0 0 0 0 14 0 10 0 0 14 6 7 0 0 0 0 14 1 13
0 0 15 0 13 0 0 0 0 15 0 2 0 0 15 1 14 0 0 0 0 15 1 5
9.2.2 Applications to MitM attack
Let (s0, sr) denote the plaintext and ciphertext pair encrypted with the mn-bit master key.
As depicted in Figure 9.3, we first use s0 to construct (σ, t)-correlated sequences and their
corresponding CK(·) for t rounds. Next, starting with sr, we follow the same approach. We
then do partial encryption for l rounds starting from t-th round and match the state values
at (t+ l)-th round. Thus, when RF is an SPN round, the number of attacked rounds is 2t+ l.
For a Feistel RF the number of attacked rounds is 2t− 4 + l (length t sequence corresponds
to the output of (t− 2)-th round), and equals 2t− 3 + l if matching is done on half state.
s0 sr










Figure 9.3: MitM attack using correlated sequences
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
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Proposition 9.1. If there are (σ, t)-correlated sequences, then there exists an MitM attack
for 2t − 3 + l (resp. 2t + l) rounds for Feistel (resp. SPN) ciphers, where l is the number of
rounds of partial encryption.
Time complexity. Let T e (resp. T d) denote the number of computations of N to construct
(σ, t)-correlated sequences and their corresponding CK(·) in encryption (resp. decryption)
direction. Then, the time complexity in terms of the number of computations of N is given by
T = T e + T d + |K|× lr where K denotes the space of keys. Clearly, T < |K| if T e + T d  |K|.
Data complexity. The above attack filters 2n(m−1) keys that map s0 to sr. The correct
key can then be found out by performing an exhaustive search on the remaining known m−1
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Note that for a Feistel cipher, an additional plaintext-ciphertext
pair is needed if matching is done on half state.
9.3 Correlated Sequences of Simon-like Ciphers
In this section, we show the construction of correlated sequences of Simon-like ciphers (Section
2.5.3) where the key length is twice the block size. We first look at the theoretical properties
of nonlinear function f(a,b,c). Next, we use these properties to construct (1, 8)-correlated
sequences. We assume that a 6= b 6= c.
9.3.1 Properties of simon-like nonlinear function
Property 9.1. Let s be the coset leader corresponding to the coset Cs. Then for 0 ≤ i < |Cs|,
the following assertions hold.
1. f(a,b,c)(L
i(s)) = Li(f(a,b,c)(s))
2. f(a,b,c)(s) = L
a−1(s) + Lb−1(s) + Lc−1(s) if s = 011 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Property 9.2. Let s = 0101 . . . 01︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
and a, b are not both simultaneously even or odd. Then
f(a,b,c)(s) =
{
s if c ≡ 0 mod 2
L(s) otherwise.
Properties 9.1 and 9.2 imply that it is enough to compute the values of f(a,b,c) for coset
leaders1 only. As f(a,b,c) is quadratic and the only linear term involved in it is L
c(.), we have
f(a,b,c)(x) = L
c(x) + z for all x ∈ Fn2 and some constant z ∈ Fn2 . As a result, we partition the
coset leaders based on the values of z. Since f(a,b,c) is linear on each partition, we call such a
partition a z-linear segment set and formally define it in Definition 9.4 as follows.




Definition 9.4 (z-linear segment set). A z-linear segment set of f(a,b,c) is the set of coset
leaders CLz given by
CLz = {s | f(a,b,c)(s) + Lc(s) = z}.
Table 9.3 lists the z-linear segment sets for n = 8 and (a, b, c) = (8, 1, 2) while the number of
z-linear segments (denoted by Nz) for varying n are presented in Table 9.4. (Note that since
n = 8, the shifts (8, 1, 2) is equivalent to (0, 1, 2).)
Table 9.3: z-linear segment sets for n = 8 and (a, b, c) = (8, 1, 2)
z CLz z CLz
0 {0, 1, 5, 9, 17, 21, 37, 85} 2 {3, 11, 19, 43}
6 {7, 23, 39, 87 } 8 {13, 45}
14 {15, 47} 16 {25}
18 {27, 91 } 24 {29}
30 {31, 95} 32 {53}
34 {51} 38 {55}
50 {59} 56 {61}
62 {63} 78 {111}
102 {119} 126 {127}
255 {255} - -
Table 9.4: Number of z-linear segment sets for varying n
n # coset leaders Nz
(a, b, c)
(8, 1, 2) (5, 0, 1)
8 36 20 17
10 108 42 14
12 352 119 119
14 1182 50 287
16 4116 909 798
Example 9.2. In Table 9.3, consider z = 2 and 3 ∈ CL2. Then for all the elements of coset
with coset leader 3, i.e.,
x ∈ C3 = {3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, 192, 129},
the computation of f(8,1,2)(·) is listed in Table 9.5.
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Table 9.5: Computation of f(8,1,2)(x) for x ∈ C3
x f(8,1,2)(x)
3 L2(3) + 2 = 14
6 L2(6) + L(2) = 28
12 L2(12) + L2(2) = 56
24 L2(24) + L3(2) = 112
48 L2(28) + L4(2) = 224
96 L2(96) + L5(2) = 193
192 L2(192) + L6(2) = 131
129 L2(129) + L7(2) = 7
9.3.2 Construction of (1, 8)-correlated sequences
Let (s0, s1) be any random 2n-bit value and K(k0,k1) = {(k0, k1, k2, k3) | (k2, k3) ∈ Fn2 × Fn2}
be the set of 22n keys with k0 and k1 fixed to some constant value. For t ≥ 6 and 0 ≤ i < 2n,
define
P(i, t,K(k0,k1)) = {(k, S(k,t)) | k ∈ K(k0,k1) and s5 = i}
as the set of keys and their corresponding sequences that map s5 to i.
We start with the simpler case, i.e., s5 = 0. First, we construct P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)) and then
show how to construct P(i, 8,K(k0,k1)) from the knowledge of P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)).
9.3.2.1 Construction of P(0, 8,K(k0,k1))
We divide the construction of P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)) into 3 steps, namely 1) Finding P(0, 6,K(k0,k1)),
2) Obtaining P(0, 7,K(k0,k1)) from P(0, 6,K(k0,k1)), and 3) Obtaining P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)) from
P(0, 7,K(k0,k1)). For each step, we denote the number of computations of f(a,b,c) by Tstep.
Step 1: Finding P(0, 6,K(k0,k1)). We note that ∀k ∈ K(k0,k1), S(k,4) is a constant sequence
and requires only 2 computations of f(a,b,c). Hence, finding the keys for which s5 = 0 is
equivalent to solving the equation
f(a,b,c)(X + k2) = k3 + s3
where X = f(a,b,c)(s3) + s2. We use z-linear segments (Definition 9.4) to solve this equation.
As a result, Tstep1 = 3 + Nz. Note that |P(0, 6,K(k0,k1))|= 2n, as s4 = X + k2 can take
all 2n distinct values. Thus for all (k, S(k,6)) ∈ P(0, 6,K(k0,k1)) the pair (k2, k3) is unique.
Accordingly, let I(k0,k1) = {k3 | (k, S(k,6)) ∈ P(0, 6,K(k0,k1))}, then |I(k0,k1)|= 2n.
132
Step 2: Obtaining P(0, 7,K(k0,k1)) from P(0, 6,K(k0,k1)). Let (k, S(k,6)) ∈ P(0, 6,K(k0,k1))
and consider the following relation s4 + s6. We have
s4 + s6 = s4 + f(a,b,c)(s5) + k4
= s4 + 0 + s4 + k4
=⇒ s6 = s4 + k4.
Thus Tstep2 = 0.
Step 3: Obtaining P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)) from P(0, 7,K(k0,k1)). For a given (k, S(k,7)) in
P(0, 7,K(k0,k1)) we compute s7 as follows.
s7 = f(a,b,c)(s6) + s5 + k5 = f(a,b,c)(s6) + k5
= f(a,b,c)(s
′
4) + k5 (By step 1)
= f(a,b,c)(X + k
′





= s3 + I(k0,k1)[k
′
2] + k5 (as s
′
3 = s3)
= s3 + I(k0,k1)[k2 + k4] + k5
Note that since s6 = X + k
′
2 =⇒ k′2 = s6 + X = s4 + k4 + X = k2 + k4 (s4 + X = k2
follows from Step 1). Furthermore Tstep3 = 0.
Corollary 9.1. Given P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)), I(k0,k1) and k = (k0, k1, 0, I(k0,k1)[0]). Then
|CK(k)| = 2n − 1
We could use a similar construction shown to the one above to get P(i, 8,K(k0,k1)) for
1 ≤ i < 2n. However, this would require 2n(3 + Nz) computations of f(a,b,c) in total. Next,
we show how to reduce this number to (3 + 2Nz).
9.3.2.2 Computing P(i, 8,K(k0,k1)) from P(0, 8,K(k0,k1))
Theorem 9.1. Given I(k0,k1), k = (k0, k1, 0, I(k0,k1)[0]), (k, S(k,8)) ∈ P(0, 8,K(k0,k1)) and X =
f(a,b,c)(s3)+s2. Let 1 ≤ i < 2n and k̃ = (k0, k1, 0, I(k0,k1)[0] + i). Then the following assertions
hold.
1. S(k,5) = S(k̃,5)
2. (k̃, S(k̃,6)) ∈ P(i, 6,K(k0,k1))
3. s̃6 = s3 + I(k0,k1)[X + i] +X + k̃2 + k̃4
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4. s̃7 = s3 + i+ k̃5 + I(k0,k1)[s̃6 +X]
5. |CK(k̄)|= 2n − 1
Proof. 1. Since k2 = k̃2 = 0 =⇒ s4 = s̃4 = X =⇒ S(k,5) = S(k̃,5).
2. It is enough to show that s̃5 = i. We have
s̃5 = f(a,b,c)(s̃4) + s̃3 + k̃3 = f(a,b,c)(s4) + s3 + k̃3
= I(k0,k1)[0] + s3 + s3 + I(k0,k1)[0] + i = i.
3. We compute s̃6 as follows.
s̃6 = f(a,b,c)(s̃5) + s̃4 + k̃4 = f(a,b,c)(i) + s̃4 + k̃4
= s3 + I(k0,k1)[X + i] +X + k̃2 + k̃4.
4. The proof is similar to the assertion 3.
5. Note that for 1 ≤ j < 2n, (k0, k1, j, I(k0,k1)[j]) ∈ CK(k) ⇐⇒ (k0, k1, j, I(k0,k1)[j] + i) ∈
CK(k̄). This follows because s5 + s̄5 = k3 + k̄3 =⇒ k3 + k̄3 = i. Thus, |CK(k̄)|= 2n−1.
We use Theorem 9.1 together with z-linear segment sets to compute all partitions. A
brief comparison of different approaches with the number of computations of f(a,b,c) to obtain
P(i, 8,K(k0,k1)) is provided in Table 9.6.
Table 9.6: Comparison of different approaches with the number of computations of f(a,b,c) for
6 out of r rounds
Approach # computations of f(a,b,c)
(a, b, c)
(8, 1, 2) (5, 0, 1)
Naive 264 × 6r 264 × 6r
Theorem 9.1 and z-linear segment sets 232 × (3+1818)r 232 ×
(3+1596)
r
9.4 Key Recovery Attack on 25-round Simon and Simeck
In this section, we show the key recovery attack procedure on 25-round Simon-32/64 and
Simeck-32/64. We note that construction of (1, 8)-correlated sequences as shown in Section
9.3 is independent of the key scheduling algorithms. Thus, we simply utilize these sequences
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for 6 encryption and 6 decryption rounds in an MitM attack (Figure 9.4). As a result, we do
partial encryption for 12 rounds, starting from round 6 and match the left half of state, i.e.,
s19 at 19-th round.






6-round 12-round partial encryption Match 6-round
Figure 9.4: 25-round key recovery procedure








and DSe/DSd as the i-th element









set and stored data structure from encryption/decryption side, respectively. For example,
se0 = s0, s
e
1 = s1, s
d
0 = s26, s
d




0 and so on.
In Algorithm 9.1, we present a generic procedure for recovering the secret key. It takes the
input as 3 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs encrypted either by Simon-32/64 or Simeck-32/64
and returns the secret key. The attack is divided into two phases, namely 1) Offline phase
and 2) Online phase. The time complexities of both phases are given by T offline and T online
where a subscript (e.g., T onlinei ) denotes the time complexity of i-th step of the corresponding
phase. In what follows, we present the details of both phases.
9.4.1 Offline phase
In this phase, we first compute z-linear segment sets using Defintion 9.4. Next, we construct a
data structure DSd that is used in the online phase to compute the value of sd7 without doing









only need the values of sd3, X
d and I(kd0 ,kd1)
(Theorem 9.1). Hence, we store the array [sd3, X
d,
I(kd0 ,kd1)
] as the (L16(kd0)||kd1)-th row of DSd for a fixed (kd0 , kd1) pair.
The procedures compute zs and construct ds in Algorithm 9.1 constitute the offline phase.
In Appendix B.1, we provide an example of DSd for a toy Simon cipher.
Memory complexity. The memory required to store z-linear segment sets in bits is (Nz +
# coset leaders)× 16. Furthermore, to store a single row of DSd, (1 + 1 + 216)× 16 bit space
is needed. Thus the total memory (Mem) is given by
MemSimon-32/64 = (Nz + # coset leaders)× 16 + 232 × (1 + 1 + 216)× 16
= (909 + 4116)× 16 + 232 × (2 + 216)× 16 ≈ 252 bits = 249 bytes.
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Algorithm 9.1 Key recovery algorithm
1: Input : {(se,00 , se,01 ), (sd,00 , sd,01 )}, {(se,10 , se,11 ), (sd,10 , sd,11 )}, {(se,20 , se,21 ), (sd,20 , sd,21 )}
2: Output : secret key k
3: Procedure main :
4: // Offline phase . T offline
5: call procedure compute zs
6: call procedure construct ds
7: // Online phase . T online
8: call procedure recover sk
9:
10: Procedure compute zs : . T offline0
11: // Compute z-linear segment sets using Definition 9.4
12: n = 16, (a, b, c) = (8, 1, 2) / (5, 0, 1)
13: return(Z, CLz)
14:
15: Procedure construct ds : . T offline1
16: // Construct data structure for 6 decryption rounds
17: DSd = [ [ ] ]







19: for kd0 = 0 to 2
16 − 1 do
20: for kd1 = 0 to 2
16 − 1 do
21: Compute sd3, X
d, I(kd0 ,kd1)







27: Procedure recover sk :
28: // Filtering keys with Algorithm 9.2
29: K = filter keys . T online0
30: // Exhaustive search on K using second plaintext-ciphertext pair
31: for γ ∈ K do . T online1
32: if encryption of (se,10 , s
e,1








36: // Exhaustive search on K1 using third plaintext-ciphertext pair
37: for γ ∈ K1 do . T online2
38: if encryption of (se,20 , s
e,2








42: return(K2) . K2 = {k}
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Similarly, MemSimeck-32/64 ≈ 249 bytes as Nz = 798 (Table 9.4).
Time complexity. The time complexity in terms of the number of computations of f(a,b,c)
is given by
T offline = T offline0 + T
offline
1





# computations of f(a,b,c) to get I(kd0 ,k
d
1 )
Thus, T offline ≈ 237.18 and 237 for Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64, respectively.
9.4.2 Online phase
In this phase, we recover the secret key that maps the plaintext (se,i0 , s
e,i
1 ) to ciphertext
(sd,i0 , s
d,i









filter keys procedure in Algorithm 9.2. Note that |K|= 248 as partial matching is done at
the 19-th round (step 16 of Algorithm 9.2). Next, we perform an exhaustive search on the
remaining 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs to get the correct key (steps 31-41 of Algorithm 9.1).
We now present the details of filter keys procedure.
Procedure filter keys. For a fixed (ke0, k
e








and the indexing set I(ke0,ke1). Then we use Theorem 9.1 and z-linear segment sets to compute
partitions P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1)) (steps 7-14 of Algorithm 9.2). Next, we do encryption for 12 rounds
and check whether se19 matches with s
d
7 or not. If so, the corresponding key is a possible key
candidate. The number of computations of f(a,b,c) is then calculated as follows:
3 +Nz
25︸ ︷︷ ︸
















+ 232 × 12
25
The time complexity (T online0 ) of filter keys then equals 2
32 × (3+2Nz25 + 232 × 1225) ≈ 264 × 1225 .
In Appendix B.2, we provide an example of computation of sd7 from DS
d.
137














2: K = []
3: Procedure filter keys :
4: for ke0 = 0 to 2
16 − 1 do
5: for ke1 = 0 to 2
16 − 1 do






7: for z in z-linear segment sets do
8: for x ∈ CLz do
9: for i = 0 to |Cx|−1
10: f = Lc(Cx[i]) + L
i(z)
11: for j = 0 to 216 − 1 do
12: k = (ke0, k
e
1, j, I(ke0,ke1)[j] + Cx[i])
13: se6 = f +X
e + ke2 + k
e
4








15: Encrypt (se7, s
e
6) for 12 rounds and get s
e
19














27: Procedure compute sd7(k, DS
d) :
28: // Compute 8-th element of sequence from decryption side (Theorem 9.1)








= DSd[L16(kd0) + k
d
1 ][2]




33: sd6 = I(kd0 ,kd1)
[p+Xd] + sd3 +X
d + kd2 + k
d
4








Time complexity. The time complexity of the complete attack is dominated by T online
which is given by:





= 264 × 12
25
+ 248 + 216 ≈ 262.94
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Remark 9.2. For the 24-round attack, the data and memory complexities are the same.
However, the time complexity is 264 × 1124 ≈ 262.87.
9.4.3 Experimental verification
We have implemented the complete attack in Python. We ran experiments for toy versions of
both ciphers, i.e., with blocksize/keysize, 8/16 and 16/32-bit. We have found that the attack
works for all keys, and for any 3 distinct random plaintext encrypted either by Simon-8/16
(Simon-16/32) or Simeck-8/16 (Simeck-16/32). Hence, a success probability of 1 implies that
the similar results hold for Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64.
9.5 Improved Key Recovery Attacks
In this section, we show how to improve the key recovery attack presented in the previous
section by 2 rounds with the same complexities as the 25-round attack. For a fixed partition
P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1)), we incorporate the properties of key scheduling algorithms (Section 2.5.3) and
one round differentials and show that P(i, 9,K(ke0,ke1)) can be computed from P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1))
by computing f(a,b,c) at most 2
15 times. As a result, both forward and middle rounds can
be extended by one round each, i.e., partial encryption starts from round 7 and matching is
done at the 20-th round. The results of the following two properties can be obtained directly
by the definition of P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1)) and the key scheduling algorithm. We present the main
result of this section in Lemma 9.1.
Property 9.3 (Simon KSA and P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1))). Let F : F
16
2 → F162 be such that F (x) =
f(8,1,2)(x+ ∆y) +x+L
15(x) +L10(y) +L8(y), where y = I(ke0,ke1)[x] and ∆y = L
13(y) +L12(y).
Then |Img(F )|≤ 215 where Img(F ) is the image set of F .





4 is constant for all 2
n × 2n values of ke2 and ke3.
Property 9.5 (Differential property [86]). Let n ≥ 4, ∆ ∈ Fn2 be fixed. Then
|Img(f(a,b,c)(x) + f(a,b,c)(x+ ∆))|≤ 2n−1.
Lemma 9.1. Given n = 16 and (a, b, c) = (8, 1, 2)/(5, 0, 1). Then for all (k, S(k,8)) ∈
P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1)), s
e
7 can take at most 2
15 values.
Proof. Consider the value of se7 in the following cases:
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e + ke2 + k
e



















Here C0 and C1 are constants and given by
C0 = X














By Property 9.3, se7 can take at most 2
15 values.















e + ke2 + k
e








= f(5,0,1)(∆ + k
e
2) + C1 + f(5,0,1)(k
e
2) (Property 9.4)
Similar to previous case, ∆ and C1 are constants and given by:





C1 = i+ Z1 + k
e
1
The proof then follows from Property 9.5.
From Lemma 9.1, we note that for each partition P(i, 8,K(ke0,ke1)), s
e
7 can take at most 2
15
values. Accordingly, we only modify steps 11-18 of Algorithm 9.2. The partial encryption




21 is then used for the matching. The modification is presented in
Algorithm 9.3.
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Algorithm 9.3 Modified algorithm for 27-round key recovery attack
1: TEMP S6 = [ ]
2: TEMP S7= [ ]
3: TEMP Uniq S7 = [ ]
4: for j = 0 to 216 − 1 do
5: k = (ke0, k
e
1, j, I(ke0,ke1)[j] + Cx[i])
6: se6 = f +X
e + ke2 + k
e
4












12: // Unique value of TEMP S7
13: TEMP Uniq S7 = unique(TEMP S7)
14:
15: for u in TEMP Uniq S7 do
16: te = f(a,b,c)(u)
17: // get index finds indexes l such that TEMP S7[l] = u
18: Indices = get index(TEMP S7)
19: for ind in Indices do
20: k = (ke0, k
e
1, ind, I(ke0,ke1)[ind] + Cx[i])
21: se8 = t
e + ke6+TEMP S6[ind]
22: Encrypt (se8, u) for 13 rounds and get s
e
21








Attack complexities. The data and memory complexities are the same as the 25-round
attack. The time complexity is given by:
T online = 232 × T online0 + T online1 + T online2
≈ 232(3 + 2Nz
27
+ 231 × 1
27
+ 232 × 13
27
) + 248 + 216
≈ 264 × 13
27
≈ 262.94
Remark 9.3. The complexities of 26-round attack are calculated accordingly.
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9.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a new characteristic of block ciphers called correlated
sequences and demonstrated its application in a meet-in-the-middle attack. As a result, we
presented a 2t− 3 + l (resp. 2t+ l)-round attack for Feistel, i.e., NLFSR (resp. SPN) ciphers
with t length correlated sequences and l rounds of partial encryption. We have applied our
technique on two lightweight block ciphers Simon-32/64 and Simeck-32/64 and presented the
first 24, 25, 26, 27-round attacks on these ciphers with data and memory complexities of 3
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10.1 Introduction
Limdolen and HERN are round 1 candidates of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standard-
ization Project [5]. Limdolen is a family of lightweight AEAD algorithms with key sizes 128
and 256 bits. It adopts a Parallelizable Message Authentication Code (PMAC) [39] mode to
compute a tag and then uses counter mode of encryption to generate the ciphertext. However,
compared to PMAC where random and indistinguishable secret masks1 are used, Limdolen-
128/(256) utilizes two distinct 128(256)-bit secret masks only. The designers state that “Due
to Limdolen’s target of constrained environments, rather than a series of calculations, we will
alternate between i = 0 and i = 1, the two most common values of i in γiL.” Moreover,
during the tag computation phase, the associated data and message are first combined to-
gether to form a single input and then the padding procedure ie executed. Based on the design
choices and security proofs of PMAC and counter mode of encryption, the designers claim
128(256)-bit integrity security for Limdolen-128(256).
1masks derived from PMAC key where PMAC key equals EncK(0
n)
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On the other hand, HERN is a 128-bit authenticated encryption scheme and adopts a
stream cipher style construction similar to the CAESAR finalist Acorn [1, 133]. The state size
is 256 bits and at each clock cycle, 4 nonlinear bits are fed back to the state (except during
ciphertext and tag generation phase). After processing the associated data, the state is updated
512 times by adding ‘0’ bit stream to the feedback bits. A similar procedure is applied after
plaintext processing. Accordingly, they claim that HERN achieves 128-bit integrity security.
In this chapter, we show that some non-conservative design choices (highlighted in italics
above) made by the designers solely to achieve a lightweight design lead to practical forgery
attacks. In particular, we show the construction of associated data-only, ciphertext-only and
associated data and ciphertext forgeries which require a feasible number of forging attempts.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of Limdolen
is provided in Section 10.2. In Section 10.3, we present the details of forgery attacks on
Limdolen along with the experimental results. Sections 10.4 and 10.5 present the specification
and forgery attacks on HERN, respectively. Finally, we conclude in Section 10.6.
10.2 Specification of Limdolen
Limdolen [98] is a family of lightweight AEAD algorithms with key sizes 128 and 256 bits. We
denote an instance of Limdolen by Limdolen-n and its corresponding underlying block cipher2
by Limdolen-BC-n where n ∈ {128, 256}. In this section, we first give a brief overview of
Limdolen-n and then list the security goals claimed by the designers.
10.2.1 Description of Limdolen AEAD
Limdolen adopts a tweaked PMAC based construction to provide AEAD functionality. It has
two variants Limdolen-n, n ∈ {128, 256}. For both the variants, the size of key, nonce and
tag are equal to n bits. A high level overview of individual phases of Limdolen-n is described
below.
Padding. The associated data AD and the message M are first concatenated together to
form a single input message. It is then divided into chunks of n-bit blocks, i.e., (X0, · · · , Xl−1) n←−
AD||M . If |Xl−1|= n, then a single byte is XORed to the last byte of Xl−1. This pad byte
equals 0xC0 (0x80) depending on whether the length of associated data is zero (non-zero).
In case the number of bytes of Xl−1 is less than n/8, first a pad byte is appended to Xl−1,
followed by adding zero bytes until the block length becomes n. This procedure is denoted
by addPaddingMarker(·).
2Our attack is independent of the block cipher specification and hence the reader is referred to [98] for more
details.
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Remark 10.1. The padding rule described above follows the Limdolen’s specification docu-
ment. However, in the reference implementation the pad byte is always XORed to the last
byte of Xl−1. We emphasize that our attacks are independent of location of this byte.
Tag generation. The tag computation of Limdolen-n is similar to PMAC and is shown in
Figure 10.1. First the PMAC key is derived by encrypting nonce N with the master key K.
We denote it by aK where aK = Limdolen-BC-n(K,N). Next, three n-bit masks given by
α = Limdolen-BC-n(aK, 0n)
alpha x = LB(α)
alpha inv x = RB(α)
are computed where the function LB(α) (resp. RB(α)) rotates each byte of α left (resp. right)
by 1. Each n-bit block Xi (except the last block) is XORed alternately with α or alpha x which
is then encrypted with Limdolen-BC-n using aK as the key. At each iteration, the output is
XORed to δc which acts as a checksum. The tag is then given by









aK · · ·
Xl−1
addPadddingMarker
α αalpha x alpha x
alpha inv x
Limdolen-BC-naK









Figure 10.1: Tag generation phase of Limdolen-n
Encryption. The encryption is similar to the counter-mode of operation. The XOR value
of nonce and tag is used as the intial counter. This phase is shown in Figure 10.2. The


















(M0, · · · ,Ml−1) n←−M
T ⊕N +1 +1
Figure 10.2: Encryption phase of Limdolen-n
10.2.2 Security claims
The security claims of Limdolen in the nonce-respecting setting are summarized in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1: Security claims of Limdolen in bits [98]
Goal Limdolen-128 Limdolen-256
Confidentiality of plaintext 128 256
Integrity of plaintext 128 256
Integrity of associated data 128 256
Data limit (in blocks) 264 2128
10.3 Forgery Attacks on Limdolen
In this section, we present the details of forgery attacks on both variants of Limdolen. First,
we give a brief overview of the adversarial model and the main idea of our attack. Next, we
show the construction of associated data-only, ciphertext-only and associated data and cipher-
text forgeries that require a single encryption query and one forging attempt for successful
verification. Finally, we provide the experimental results.
10.3.1 Adversarial model
We assume that the adversary A is nonce-respecting, which means it never makes two queries
to the encryption oracle with the same nonce. Nevertheless, A is allowed to repeat nonces in
decryption queries. We say that “A forges” if the decryption oracle ever returns a plaintext
other than error symbol ⊥ on input of (N,AD,C, T ) where (C, T ) has never been output by
encryption oracle on input of a query (N,AD,M) for some AD and M [113].
In the sequel, we classify three types of forgeries based on the input modification.
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• associated data-only: “A forges” by changing AD and/or T
• ciphertext-only: “A forges” by changing C and/or T
• associated data and ciphertext: “A forges” by changing both AD and C, and/or T .
10.3.2 Core idea of forgery
For simplicity, we explain the idea for a single complete block of associated data which is
given in Lemma 10.1.
Lemma 10.1. Let K
$←− {0, 1}n be fixed. Let N $←− {0, 1}n, AD0 $←− {0, 1}n, M = ε and
(ε, T ) be the corresponding ciphertext and tag pair. Then for a positive integer i ≥ 1 and
AD′0
$←− {0, 1}n, AD′1
$←− {0, 1}n and AD′ = (AD′0‖AD′1‖AD′0‖AD′1)i‖AD0, we have C ′ = ε
and T ′ = T .
Proof. Since M ′ = M = ε =⇒ C ′ = C = ε. We now look at the tag generation of AD and
AD′. The respective tags are given by
T = Limdolen-BC-n(aK, alpha inv˙x ⊕ addPaddingMarker(AD0))
T ′ = Limdolen-BC-n(aK, δ′c ⊕ alpha inv x ⊕ addPaddingMarker(AD0)),
where δ′c = 0
n (i = 1 case is shown in Figure 10.3 for ). Thus T ′ = T .


























Figure 10.3: Limdolen forgery for a single AD block
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Corollary 10.1. To construct forgery for arbitrary number of blocks, we only need to ensure
that the XOR sum δ′c (Figure 10.3) before the last call of block cipher is a constant.
Remark 10.2. Lemma 10.1 trivially holds for partial last block.
In what follows, we describe the basic minimal example of the forgery attack against
Limdolen-n. We assume that blocks are complete and the number of blocks is at least 1. From
now onwards, we refer Limdolen-BC-n with key K by EnK(·).
10.3.3 Associated data-only forgery
Let u ≥ 1 and i ≥ 1 be two positive integers. Fix K $←− {0, 1}n. We construct forgery as
follows.
Step 1 Let N
$←− {0, 1}n, AD ← {0, 1}u×n, (AD0, · · · , ADu−1) n←− AD and M = ε. Encrypt
(N,AD,M) and observe (C, T ).
Step 2 Let X,Y
$←− {0, 1}n and W = X‖Y ‖X‖Y .
Step 3 Forge with (N,AD′, C, T ) where
AD′ = AD0‖· · · ‖ADu−2‖W i‖ADu−1.
Note that AD′ 6= AD =⇒ the decryption query is valid. This will pass the verification
with probability 1 and returns empty plaintext as the output.










EnaK(ADi ⊕ alpha x)







EnaK(ADi ⊕ alpha x)
2i
⊕
(EnaK(X ⊕ α)⊕ EnaK(Y ⊕ alpha x))
= δc ⊕ 0n =⇒ T ′ = T.
Similarly, if u is odd then δ′c = δc ⊕ 0n and T ′ = T . The only difference is that masks α and
alpha x are interchanged.
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Some observations on associated data-only forgery.
1. The converse also holds true, i.e., given AD = AD0‖· · · ‖ADu−2‖W i‖ADu−1, the modi-
fied associated data of the form AD0‖· · · ‖ADu−2‖W l‖ADu−1 will give the same tag for
all l satisfying 1 ≤ l < i.
2. The forgery is independent of whether the last block is a partial AD/M block or consists
of both AD and M bytes.
3. We can modify AD in a number of ways. For instance, the following modification also
results in a successful forgery.
AD′ =
X‖Y ‖AD0‖· · · ‖ADu−2‖X‖Y ‖ADu−1 if u is odd,Y ‖X‖AD0‖· · · ‖ADu−2‖X‖Y ‖ADu−1 o.w.
10.3.4 Ciphertext-only forgery
Fix an integer u ≥ 4 and K $←− {0, 1}n. Let Se = {0, 2, · · · , } and So = {1, 3, · · · , } be the
set of even and odd integers less than u − 1. Consider two permutations π and ψ which
permute the sets Se and So, respectively. Assume that π and ψ are not identity permutations
simultaneously. We now construct a forgery as follows.
Step 1 Let N
$←− {0, 1}n, AD = ε, M n←− {0, 1}u×n and (M0, · · · ,Mu−1) n←− M . Encrypt
(N,AD,M) and observe (C, T ).
Step 2 Let (C0, · · · , Cu−2, Cu−1) n←− C and compute Zi = Mi ⊕ Ci for i = 0, · · · , u− 2.
Step 3 Forge with (N,AD,C ′, T ) where
C ′ = Z0 ⊕Mπ(0)‖Z1 ⊕Mψ(0)‖Z2 ⊕Mπ(1)‖Z3 ⊕Mψ(1)‖· · · ‖Cl−1.
We have C ′ 6= C =⇒ the decryption query is valid. This will always pass the verification
and returns
Mπ(0)‖Mψ(0)‖Mπ(1)‖Mψ(1)‖· · · ‖Ml−1
as the output.
Correctness. To see the correctness of this forgery, consider the decryption of (N,AD,C ′, T ).
First note that the ciphertext computation is done via counter mode of operation (Figure
10.2). Since the counter T ⊕N is same for both encryption and decryption queries, then
M ′ = Mπ(0)‖Mψ(0)‖Mπ(1)‖Mψ(1)‖· · · ‖Ml−1 is obtained (not released yet). Next, to see if the
tags of M ′ and M are same it is enough to show that δ′c = δc. This follows trivially as the
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masking value is α and alpha x for each element in Se and So, respectively. So, permutating














EnaK(Mi ⊕ alpha x)
= δc =⇒ T ′ = T.
Remark 10.3. If π and ψ both are identity permutations then C ′ = C =⇒ the decryption
query is not valid. The number of valid forgeries then equals du2 edu−12 e − 1. Furthermore,
these are independent of the length of the last message block.
Remark 10.4. Associated data and ciphertext forgery is a direct application of associated
data-only and ciphertext-only forgeries.
10.3.5 Forgeries sssociated with last block
Until now, we have considered the cases where the last block is not modified. To forge the
last block, all the previous blocks before it must contain AD bytes. Assume there is only 1
block and it consists of u bytes of AD and v bytes of M such that u+ v ≤ n/8. The forgery
then proceeds as follows.
Step 1 Let N
$←− {0, 1}n. Encrypt (N,AD,M) and observe (C, T ).
Step 2 Compute the keystream bytes Z[i] = M [i]⊕ C[i] for i = 0, · · · , v − 1
Step 3 For 1 ≤ l ≤ v, forge with (N,AD′, C ′, T ) where AD′ = AD‖M [0]‖M [l − 1] and
C ′ =
ε if l = v,Z[0]⊕M [l]‖· · · ‖Z[v − l − 1]⊕M [v − 1] o.w.
We have AD′ 6= AD and C ′ 6= C. Thus, the decryption query is valid and will pass the
verification with probability 1 as AD′‖M ′ = AD‖M . The output is M ′ = M [l]‖· · · ‖M [v−1].
Further note that this is a special case of associated data and ciphertext forgery.
Remark 10.5. The above forgery incorporates both cases of Remark 10.1 whether pad byte is
XORed to the last byte of block or it is appended after AD and M bytes in case of u+v < n/8.
10.3.6 Experimental verification
We have verified the attacks using the reference implementation of Limdolen. In Tables 10.2
and 10.3, we list the examples of forgeries for Limdolen-128 and Limdolen-256, respectively.
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Table 10.2: Examples of forgeries for Limdolen-128








M Empty string Empty string






















10.4 Specification of HERN
HERN adopts a stream cipher based construction similar to the CAESAR finalist Acorn [133].
The state consists of four 64-bit registers which are updated in an LFSR based style by feeding
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Table 10.3: Examples of forgeries for Limdolen-256








M Empty string Empty string






















the two nonlinearly generated bits a and b to the registers. A pictorial representation of the
HERN state update function is shown in Figure 10.4 and the individual core components are
illustrated in Algorithm 10.1.
s00s
0
1 · · · s063 s10s11 · · · s163 s20s21 · · · s263 s30s31 · · · s363









a b a b
Figure 10.4: Schematic of HERN state update function
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Algorithm 10.1 Core components of HERN
1: function H core step:
2: a← SB(s030, s029, s132, s124, s231, s24, s315, s314)
3: b← SB’(s030, s029, s132, s124, s231, s24, s315, s314)⊕ s032
4: f0 ← s00 ⊕ s031 ⊕ s032 ⊕ s113
5: f1 ← s10 ⊕ s128 ⊕ s130 ⊕ s21
6: f2 ← s20 ⊕ s222 ⊕ s227 ⊕ s326
7: f3 ← s30 ⊕ s38 ⊕ s319 ⊕ s031
8: sij ← sij+1, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and j = 0, · · · , 62
9: si63 ← f i, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3
10: function SB(x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3):
11: return 1⊕ x0y0 ⊕ x1y1 ⊕ x2y2 ⊕ x3y3
12: function SB’(x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3):
13: return x0y2 ⊕ y0y3 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ y1x2
1: function Adda:
2: s063 ← s063 ⊕ a
3: s263 ← s263 ⊕ a
4: function Addb:
5: s163 ← s163 ⊕ b
6: s363 ← s363 ⊕ b
7: function H if step(x):
8: H core step
9: a← a⊕ x
10: Adda
11: Addb
12: function H enc step(m):





10.4.1 Description of HERN AEAD
The HERN AEAD algorithm takes as input a 128-bit key K, 128-bit nonce N , adlen bits
associated data AD, mlen bits plaintext M and outputs a mlen bits ciphertext C and 128-
bit authentication tag T . The encryption consists of 3 phases, namely 1) Initialization, 2)
Processing plaintext and 3) Finalization, which are described as follows.
Initialization. The initialization consists of loading the key K and constants into the state
and processing the nonce N , associated data AD and running H if step (Algorithm 10.1) for
512 steps with zero input.
• Load the state with K and constants. We refer the reader to [137] for more details as
this part is irrelevant for our attack.
• Process N = n0, n1, . . . , n127. At each step, one bit of N is used to update the state,
i.e., H if step(ni), for i = 0, · · · , 127.
• Process AD = ad0, ad1, . . . , adadlen−1. At each step, one bit of AD is used to update
the state, i.e., H if step(adi), for i = 0, · · · , adlen− 1.
• Run the H if step for 512 steps with zero-stream, i.e., H if step(0), for i = 0, · · · , 511.
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Processing plaintext. The plaintext M = m0,m1, · · · ,mmlen−1 is used to update the state
bit-by-bit and the corresponding ciphertext bit is generated using the function H enc step(·)
(Algorithm 10.1).
• C ← ε
• ci ← H enc step(mi), C ← C‖ci, for i = 0, · · · ,mlen− 1
Finalization. After processing all the plaintext bits, the H if step runs for 512 times with
zero input, and then the tag is generated.
• H if step(0), for i = 0, · · · , 511.
• T ← ε
• ti ← H enc step(0), T ← T‖ti, for i = 0, · · · ,mlen− 1
• return (C, T )
The decryption procedure is identical to encryption.
10.4.2 Security claims
The designers state that “HERN is designed to have confidentiality of the plaintexts under
adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks and the integrity of the ciphertexts under adaptive forgery
attacks.” Considering the nonce-respecting setting and a data limit of 264 bits (i.e., adlen+
mlen ≤ 264), they claim 128-bit security for confidentiality and integrity.
10.5 Forgery Attacks on HERN
In this section, we provide the details of forgery attacks on HERN. In particular, we show that
a message can be modified by appending or removing a sequence of consecutive ‘0’ bits of
length n. Moreover, we show that the best success rate of forgery is achieved for n = 1 case.
The adversarial model is similar to Section 10.3.1. In the following, we explain the minimal
example of our forgery attack against HERN. For the description of forgeries, we let Si, ai, bi
denote the state of HERN and two nonlinearly generated bits a and b at the beginning of the
i-th round.
10.5.1 Associated data-only forgery
Let 1 ≤ n ≤ 63 and K $←− {0, 1}128 be fixed. To construct the forgery we proceed as follows.
Step 1 Let N
$←− {0, 1}128, AD $←− {0, 1}? and M = ε. Encrypt (N,AD,M) and observe
(C, T ).
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Step 2 Repeat Step 1 until we obtain a tag whose first n bits are all zero. Define this query
as Q :
def
= (N,AD,M,C, T ).
Step 3 For each i = 0 to 2n − 1, decrypt (N ′, AD′, C ′, T ′) where
N ′ = N, AD′ = AD‖0n, C ′ = ε
T ′ = T  n | (i0‖· · · ‖in−1), and (i0, · · · , in−1) 1←− i.







a) Encryption for Q
Process N
Process AD
H if step(0) 512 times
H if step(0) 512 times
H if step(0) n times









a) Encryption for Q′
Process N
Process AD
H if step(0) n times
(last n bits of AD are zero)
H if step(0) 512 times
H if step(0) 512 times
Figure 10.5: Associated data-only forgery of HERN
The decryption queries are valid as AD′ 6= AD and T ′ 6= T . To see why such a query
work, consider the encryption of Q and Q′ def= (N,AD′, ε). This is illustrated in Lemma 10.2
(also shown in Figure 10.5).
Lemma 10.2. Let Q and Q′ be defined as above and |AD| = u. Then T ′ = T  n | ∆ where
∆ is an n-bit string.
Proof. After processing 128 bits of nonce and the first u bits of AD, the states are same, i.e.,
S128+u = S
′
128+u. For query Q, as M is empty, H if step(·) runs for 1024 times with zero input.
For Q′, since AD′ = AD‖0n and M ′ = ε, H if step(·) is iterated for n+ 1024 times with zero
bit. The tag generation phase for Q and Q′ starts from S1152+u and S′1152+u+n, respectively.
Note that the first n bits of T are zero and they are not added to the state. This is
equivalent to the fact that H if step(0) runs for another n times starting from round 1152 +u.
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Hence, S1152+u+n = S
′
1152+u+n =⇒ the last 128 − n bits of T are the same as the first
128−n bits of T ′. Since the states are unknown, the last n bits of T ′ has to be guessed. Thus,
T ′ = T  n | ∆.
Attack complexities. On average Step 2 requires 2n encryption queries while Step 3 needs
2n decryption queries. Thus, for 1 ≤ n ≤ 63, the success rate of forgery is 2−n. For n = 1
the success rate is 2−1 after querying the encryption oracle 2 times. This clearly violates the
designers claim that success rate of forgery is 2−127 after two encryption queries.
Some observations on associated data-only forgery.
1. The designers imposed a data limit of 264 bits before a re-keying is done. In order to
satisfy this constraint, we restrict the values of n in the range 1, · · · , 63. However, this
is just a theoretical reasoning and we do not need so many queries especially when we
can construct forgery for the n = 1 case.
2. The forgery still works if we change 512 to some other number. Hence, it is independent
of the number of rounds.
10.5.2 Ciphertext-only forgery
Let 1 ≤ n ≤ 31 and K $←− {0, 1}128 be fixed. We construct forgery a as follows.
Step 1 Let N
$←− {0, 1}128, AD $←− {0, 1}?, M ← {0, 1}≥1. Encrypt (N,AD,M‖0n) and
observe (C, T ).
Step 2 Repeat Step 1 until a ciphertext whose last n bits are zero is obtained. Denote this
query by (N,AD,M,C, T ).
Step 3 Decrypt (N ′, AD′, C ′, T ′) where
N ′ = N, AD′ = AD
C ′ = c0‖· · · ‖c|M |−n−1
T ′ = 0n|T  n.
Step 4 If verification fails, repeat Step 2 and Step 3.
We have C ′ 6= C as the lengths are different and T ′ 6= T . Thus, each query in step 3 is
a valid decryption query. Upon successful verification, only the first |M |−n bits of M are
returned. A formal proof of correctness of the decryption query is given in Lemma 10.3.
Lemma 10.3. Let Q :
def
= (N,AD,M) satisy Step 2 with output as (C, T ). Let AD′ =
AD, M ′ = m0‖· · · ‖m|M |−n−1 and Q′ :def= (N,AD′,M ′). Then T ′ = 0n | T  n iff the bits
b1152+|AD|+|M |−n, · · · , b1152+|AD|+|M |−1 are all zero.
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Proof. We have AD′ = AD and m′i = mi =⇒ c′i = ci, for 0 ≤ i ≤ |M |−n − 1. There-
fore, S1152+u+|M |−n = S′1152+u+|M |−n. However, the tag generation phase for Q starts from
S640+u+|M |, and for Q′ it starts from S′640+u+|M |−n. The corresponding tag bits are given by:




Now, the last n bits of bothM and C being zero =⇒ S1152+|AD|+|M |−n = S′1152+|AD|+|M |−n.
So, given b1152+|AD|+|M |−n, · · · , b1152+|AD|+|M |−1 are all zero, then T ′ = 0n | T  n.
Attack complexities. Step 2 requires 2n encryption queries (on average), while to satisy
both Step 2 and Step 3 simultaneously, 22n encryption queries (on average) are needed. Thus,
for 1 ≤ n ≤ 31, the success rate of forgery is 2−n after observing the output of 22n encryption
queries. The value of n is chosen to satisfy the data limit restriction of 264 bits.
Remark 10.6. Similar to the associated data-only forgery, the best success rate is achieved
for the n = 1 case which is 2−1 after 4 encryption queries.
10.5.3 Associated data and ciphertext forgery
Let 1 ≤ n ≤ 63 and K $←− {0, 1}128 be fixed. The forgery then proceeds as follows.
Step 1 Let N
$←− {0, 1}128, AD $←− {0, 1}?, M = 0n. Encrypt (N,AD,M) and observe (C, T ).
Step 2 Repeat step 1 until we obtain C = 0n. Denote this query by (N,AD,M,C, T ).
Step 3 Forge with (N ′, AD′, C ′, T ′) where
N ′ = N, AD′ = AD‖0n, C ′ = ε, and T ′ = T,
which will always be successful (with empty message as an output) as the states after 640 +
|AD|+n rounds are the same. The proof is similar to Lemma 10.2.
Attack complexities. Step 2 requires 2n encryption queries on average, while Step 3 requires
only a single decryption query. Thus, for 1 ≤ n ≤ 63, the success rate of forgery is 1.
10.5.4 Experimental verification
We have verified the attacks using the reference implementation of HERN [137]. In Table
10.4, we list the examples for n = 8.
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Table 10.4: Examples of forgeries for HERN




M Empty string Empty string













M 00 Empty string
CT 00 Empty string
T A72C78D89FAD7A7D785EF13AB2EC085B A72C78D89FAD7A7D785EF13AB2EC085B
10.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have demonstrated a series of practical forgery attacks on Limdolen and
HERN which defeat the designers’ claim of 128(256) and 128-bit integrity security of Lim-
dolen-128(256) and HERN, respectively. For both variants of Limdolen, we have shown the
constructions of forgeries which require a single encryption and a single decryption query, and
have a success probability of 1. For HERN we have presented round independent associated
data-only, ciphertext-only and associated data and ciphertext forgeries which have the success
rate of 1 after 2(2), 4(2) and 2(1) encryption(decryption) queries, respectively. Following our
attack, both submissions were eliminated from round 2 of the NIST LWC project.
Possible fixes. To resist our attacks on Limdolen, the period 2 masking sequence has to
be replaced by a sequence with unpredictable properties. A simple fix for HERN seems to
be to complement a state bit (except the last bit of each register) after 640 + |AD| and
640 + |AD|+|M | clock cycles. However, the security needs to be studied thoroughly.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we have presented novel research contributions in the area of lightweight cryp-
tography, including both the design and cryptanalysis. We have proposed lightweight per-
mutations, and instantiated them in two different modes to provide several AEAD and hash
algorithms with varying security levels. We have also analyzed existing lightweight ciphers
with respect to cube attacks, correlated sequences and forgery attacks. In the following, we
give the concluding remarks and then discuss the potential future research directions.
11.1 Concluding Remarks
The contributions of the thesis consists of three parts. Part I is composed of Chapters 3-
5, which present new lightweight cryptographic permutations. Part II contains Chapters 6
and 7, which discuss how to design modes in the sponge framework and their instantiations
using these lightweight cryptographic permutations, and Part III includes Chapter 8-10, which
provide cryptanalysis results for lightweight ciphers.
In Chapter 3, we have first introduced the design of sLiSCP permutation, a lightweight
permutation which consists of hardware friendly bitwise XOR and AND operations. We
adopted a combination of large Simeck sboxes (with sizes 48 and 64 bits) and type-II gen-
eralized Feistel round (with 4 branches) to design its step function. We then analyzed the
cryptographic properties such as differential, linear and algebraic degree of Simeck sboxes,
and thus sLiSCP using SAT/SMT and MILP tools. Later we noticed that the 2 Simeck
sboxes which are placed in between the odd and even branches can in fact be positioned at
odd branches only. This saved the cost of two extra 48(64)-bit registers and lead to the design
of sLiSCP-light, which has lower area and higher throughput than sLiSCP. Our security
analysis later revealed that sLiSCP-light has better algebraic properties than sLiSCP, but it
is weaker in differential and linear properties, a trade-off one would expect while optimizing
design parameters.
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The former two permutations cannot be used to achieve hash functionality with a 256-bit
message digest and 128-bit collision security. Motivated by this requirement, in Chapter 4,
we generalized the structures of sLiSCP and sLiSCP-light to five branches, and proposed
a 320-bit permutation ACE. Although ACE utilizes 3 Simeck sboxes each of size 64 bits,
we found that there exist linear layers which can offer better security properties than the
traditional left blockwise shuffle. Accordingly, we chose (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) as the linear layer of ACE
and then analyzed the security of the permutation with respect to distinguishing attacks.
In Chapter 5, we extended our design approach to cryptographic permutations which are
indistinguishable from random permutations, and at the same time can guarantee certain
theoretical randomness properties. As a result, we proposed WAGE, a permutation defined
over the extension field F27 , which can be transformed to the original WG stream cipher with
simple tweaks.
In Chapter 6, we discussed the need for uniform circuitry for achieving multiple crypto-
graphic functionalities using a cryptographic permutation in a sponge mode, and consequently,
introduced the idea of the unified round function. In terms of uniformity and the number
of domain separator bits (2 in our case), this is the minimum one can achieve. We have
presented AEAD and hash schemes with varying data limits and security levels. One of our
interesting proposal is Hash-[ACE] and AE-[ACE] for which key size = nonce size = tag size
= number of rounds = security level = 128, and rate = 64. Other AEAD instances with a
64-bit rate provide 128-bit security, but in hash mode the collision security is limited to 96
bits with the same rate. In Chapter 7, we presented Spoc which offers 112-bit security (data
limit 250 bytes) when instantiated with sLiSCP-light-192 and 64-bit rate. The same security
could not be achieved with the traditional sponge AEAD mode. However, the trade-off is that
one now needs an additional 64-bit XOR, 64-bit multiplexers and 4 domain separator bits. In
a nutshell, our proposed schemes in addition to the 4 NIST LWC round 2 candidates, namely
ACE, Spix, Spoc and WAGE have different performance and hence target a wide range of
applications.
In Chapter 8, we have used the division property based cube attacks to analyze the
nonlinear initialization phase of the lightweight stream cipher WG-5. In our analyis, we
modeled the divison property of each component of the cipher as a set of linear inequalites.
The reduced-round WG-5 is then translated to an optimization model whose solutions are the
secret key bits involved in the superpoly for a given cube. We used multiple cubes and then
presented a key recovery attack on 24 (out of 64) rounds with data and time complexity of
26.32 and 276.81, respectively. We further provided an argument to show that the WG-5 design
parameters in terms of feedback and tap positions are more resistant to cube attacks than
Grain-128a and Trivium. We expect that the analysis on WG-5 can provide more confidence
in the design (especially number of rounds) of WAGE.
In Chapter 9, we have proposed a novel property of block ciphers called correlated se-
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quences which could extend the number of rounds of classic meet-in-the-middle attacks. As
an application, we have shown the construction of length 8 correlated sequences of Simon-
32/64 and Simeck-32/64, and utilized them for MitM attacks on both ciphers which covered
27 (out of 32) rounds. The attack requires 3 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and has a time
complexity close to that of 263 27-round encryptions. The successful probability of our attack
is 1. It is worth noting that the sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light and ACE permutations are based on
reduced-round Simeck. Here we emphasize that correlated sequences are not applicable to
them as the permutations are public.
Finally, in Chapter 10, we have presented simple, yet practical and devastating, forgeries
on two NIST LWC round 1 candidates Limdolen and HERN. For Limdolen, we observed that
its masking values have a period of 2. We exploited this observation and constructed forgeries
by adding, removing or permutating an arbitrary number of blocks. For HERN, we have found
that associated data and message processing phases are not distinguishable. Consequently,
we have shown the construction of forgeries by appending or removing a sequence of zero bits
in associated data or message. We further discussed that fixes are simple but require design
changes (especially for Limdolen).
11.2 Future Research Problems
Lightweight alternatives of Simeck sboxes. An sbox with a smaller area and similar
cryptographic properties as of the Simeck sbox can reduce the area of sLiSCP, sLiSCP-light
and ACE permutations. Thus, it is worth exploring different design options at the sbox level.
For instance,
- Use multiple 4-bit sboxes and combine them with a cheap linear layer, e.g., lightweight
MDS matrix or a variant of reduced-round PRESENT [42] or GIFT [21].
- Simeck-like round function with equal number of ANDs and XORs (as AND is cheaper
in hardware than XOR).
Optimal linear layers for GFS type-II structures. While designing ACE we found
that there exist linear layers which can offer better differential and linear properties than left
blockwise shuffle. A few interesting problems for designers in this direction are as follows.
1. Let n 6≡ 0 mod 2 and n ≥ 6 be the number of branches of GFS type-II structure and
r denote the number of rounds. Find a permutation π of (0, 1, . . . , n − 1) or a class
of permutations which gives the maximum of minimum number of active sboxes for
r = 2n, 3n and 4n.
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2. If there exists a class of permutations in (1), then how are the permutations in this class
related ? Is it possible to generalize this class for any n?
Note that there exist results in the literature which targeted optimal linear layers based on
diffusion [55, 46, 124]. However, the differential property is much stronger than diffusion and
we are not aware of any such results.
Further analysis of WAGE. The WAGE permutation requires further security analysis as
this is a completely new design. We could provide tighter bounds for the maximum differential
characteristic probability by finding the minimum number of active sboxes for at least 75
rounds.
Applications of correlated sequences. The current attacks on Simon-32/64 and Simeck-
32/64 cover 27 rounds by utilizing length 8 correlated sequences. Thus, it is natural to ask
how to improve it further. We believe that improvement in number of rounds and time
complexity can be achieved by finding correlated sequences of length at least 9. Furthermore,
such sequences may have similar applications to other variants of Simon and Simeck. In
addition, investigating the underlying ciphers’ structure to construct correlated sequences is
another interesting problem.
Masking schemes of NIST LWC round 2 candidates. Most of the NIST LWC round
2 candidates (especially the ones based on block ciphers) use varying masking schemes to
randomize the input of primitives. Thus, it would be interesting to look at their indistin-
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[41] Bogdanov, A., Knežević, M., Leander, G., Toz, D., Varıcı, K., and Verbauwhede, I.
Spongent: A lightweight hash function. In: B. Preneel and T. Takagi (eds), CHES
2011. LNCS, vol. 6917, pp. 312–325. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
[42] Bogdanov, A., Knudsen, L. R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M.
J. B., Seurin, Y., and Vikkelsoe, C. PRESENT: An ultra-lightweight block cipher.
In: P. Paillier and I. Verbauwhede (eds), CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 450–466.
Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
166
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A.1 Round Constants of WAGE
Round i Round constant (rci1, rc
i
0)
0 - 9 (3f, 7f) (0f, 1f) (03, 07) (40, 01) (10, 20) (04, 08) (41, 02) (30, 60) (0c, 18) (43, 06)
10 - 19 (50, 21) (14, 28) (45, 0a) (71, 62) (3c, 78) (4f, 1e) (13, 27) (44, 09) (51, 22) (34, 68)
20 - 29 (4d, 1a) (66, 73) (5c, 39) (57, 2e) (15, 2b) (65, 4a) (79, 72) (3e, 7c) (2f, 5f) (0b, 17)
30 - 39 (42, 05) (70, 61) (1c, 38) (47, 0e) (11, 23) (24, 48) (49, 12) (32, 64) (6c, 59) (5b, 36)
40 - 49 (56, 2d) (35, 6b) (6d, 5a) (7b, 76) (5e, 3d) (37, 6f) (0d, 1b) (63, 46) (58, 31) (16, 2c)
50 - 59 (25, 4b) (69, 52) (74, 3a) (6e, 5d) (3b, 77) (4e, 1d) (33, 67) (4c, 19) (53, 26) (54, 29)
60 - 69 (55, 2a) (75, 6a) (7d, 7a) (7f, 7e) (1f, 3f) (07, 0f) (01, 03) (20, 40) (08, 10) (02, 04)
70 - 79 (60, 41) (18, 30) (06, 0c) (21, 43) (28, 50) (0a, 14) (62, 45) (78, 71) (1e, 3c) (27, 4f)
80 - 89 (09, 13) (22, 44) (68, 51) (1a, 34) (66, 4d) (39, 73) (2e, 5c) (2b, 57) (4a, 15) (72, 65)
90 - 99 (7c, 79) (5f, 3e) (17, 2f) (05, 0b) (61, 42) (38, 70) (0e, 1c) (23, 47) (48, 11) (12, 24)
100 - 109 (64, 49) (59, 32) (36, 6c) (2d, 5b) (6b, 56) (5a, 35) (76, 6d) (3d, 7b) (6f, 5e) (1b, 37)
110 (46, 0d)
A.2 MILP Model for Computing Minimum Number of Active
Sboxes
1 from gurobipy import *
2 import time
3
4 class wg :
5 def __init__(self, rounds, ft, sut, mid, nw):
6 self.rounds = rounds # Number of rounds
7 self.ft = ft # Feedback taps including last sbox
8 self.sut = sut # Sbox and updated taps (without last
and middle wgp sbox)
9 self.nw = nw # Number of words in LFSR
10 self.mid = mid # Tap position of middle wgp sbox
11 self.file_model = "wg_" + str(self.rounds) + ".lp"
12 self.file_binary = "wg_Binary" + str(self.rounds) +".txt"
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13 fp = open(self.file_model,"w")
14 fp.close()
15 fp = open(self.file_binary,"w")
16 fp.close()
17
18 def create_variables(self, x, r, len):
19 variable = []
20 for i in range(len):
21 variable.append(x + "_" + str(r) + "_" + str(i))
22 return variable
23
24 def create_dvariables(self, x, r): # Dummy variable for XOR
25 variable = []
26 variable.append(x + "_" + str(r))
27 return variable
28
29 def xor_two_words(self, x_in0, x_in1, x_out, r, ind): # XOR of two words
30 D = self.create_dvariables(’d’+str(ind), r)
31
32 fp = open(self.file_binary, "a")
33 fp.write(D[0] + str("\n")) ; fp.close() ;
34
35 fp = open(self.file_model, "a")
36 fp.write(x_in0 + " + " + x_in1 + " + " + x_out + " - 2 " + D[0] + " >= 0 \n")
37 fp.write(D[0] + " - " + x_in0 + " >= 0\n")
38 fp.write(D[0] + " - " + x_in1 + " >= 0\n")
39 fp.write(D[0] + " - " + x_out + " >= 0\n")
40 fp.close()
41
42 def fb_xor(self, X, Y, r): # constraints for the feedback
43 D = self.create_dvariables(’d’+str(self.nw-1), r)
44 fp = open(self.file_binary, "a")
45 fp.write(D[0] + str("\n"))
46 fp.close()
47
48 fp = open(self.file_model, "a")
49 temp = []
50




55 temp = " + ".join(temp)
56 temp = temp + " - 2 " + D[0] + " >= 0"
57 fp.write(temp + "\n")
58
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59 for t in X:
60 fp.write(D[0] + " - " + t + " >= 0\n")
61 fp.write(D[0] + " - " + Y[0] + " >= 0\n")
62 fp.close()
63
64 def shift_state(self, X, Y):
65 for i in range(self.nw - 1):
66 X[i] = X[i+1]




71 X = self.create_variables(’x’, 0, self.nw) # Initial state variables
72
73 fp = open(self.file_binary, "a")
74 for i in range(self.nw):
75 fp.write(X[i] + "\n")
76 fp.close()
77
78 for i in range(self.rounds):
79
80 Y = self.create_variables(’x’, i+1, self.nw)
81
82 fp = open(self.file_binary,’a’)
83 fp.write(Y[-1] + "\n")
84 for t in self.sut:
85 fp.write(Y[t[1]] + "\n")
86 fp.write(Y[self.mid+1] + "\n")
87 fp.close()
88
89 self.fb_xor([X[t] for t in self.ft], [Y[-1]], i)
90
91 for t in self.sut:
92 self.xor_two_words(X[t[0]], X[t[1]], Y[t[1]], i, t[1])
93
94 self.xor_two_words(X[self.mid], X[self.mid + 1], Y[self.mid+1], i, self.mid
+1)
95
96 for t in self.sut:
97 X[t[1]] = Y[t[1]]
98 X[self.mid + 1] = Y[self.mid + 1]








106 temp = []
107 X = self.create_variables(’x’, 0, self.nw)
108





114 for i in range(self.rounds-1):
115 Y = self.create_variables(’x’, i+1, self.nw)
116
117 for t in self.sut:
118 X[t[1]] = Y[t[1]]
119 X[self.mid + 1] = Y[self.mid + 1]
120 X = self.shift_state(X, Y[-1])









130 temp = []
131 for i in range(self.nw):
132 temp.append(’x_0_’+str(i))
133 temp = " + ".join(temp)








142 fileobj = open(self.file_model, "a")
143 fileobj1 = open(self.file_binary, "r")
144 fileobj.write("Binary\n")








152 m = read(self.file_model)
153 m.optimize()
154 if(m.Status ==2):






Consider a toy Simon-8/16 cipher as given in Example 9.1. Let k = (1, 2, 3, 4) and se0 = 15,
se1 = 14, then s
d
0 = 5 and s
d
1 = 11. In Table B.1, we provide the data structure DS
d that is
used for 6 decryption rounds.
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Table B.1: Data structure for toy Simon
i DSd[i]
0 [9, 15, [9, 14, 7, 2, 4, 3, 14, 11, 2, 4, 12, 8, 7, 1, 13, 9]]
1 [8, 10, [2, 5, 10, 15, 15, 8, 3, 6, 0, 6, 8, 12, 5, 3, 9, 13]]
2 [11, 5, [14, 10, 0, 6, 15, 11, 5, 3, 5, 0, 11, 12, 12, 9, 6, 1]]
3 [10, 2, [2, 4, 10, 14, 7, 1, 11, 15, 0, 7, 8, 13, 13, 10, 1, 4]]
4 [13, 6, [0, 6, 12, 8, 5, 3, 13, 9, 10, 13, 6, 3, 7, 0, 15, 10]]
5 [12, 3, [2, 4, 8, 12, 7, 1, 9, 13, 1, 6, 11, 14, 12, 11, 2, 7]]
6 [15, 8, [13, 8, 5, 2, 4, 1, 8, 15, 15, 11, 7, 1, 14, 10, 2, 4]]
7 [14, 15, [14, 9, 0, 5, 3, 4, 9, 12, 5, 3, 11, 15, 0, 6, 10, 14]]
8 [1, 12, [10, 15, 6, 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 0, 4, 12, 10, 1, 5, 9, 15]]
9 [0, 8, [2, 7, 10, 13, 11, 14, 7, 0, 0, 4, 8, 14, 1, 5, 13, 11]]
10 [3, 6, [14, 8, 2, 6, 11, 13, 3, 7, 4, 3, 8, 13, 9, 14, 1, 4]]
11 [2, 0, [2, 6, 10, 12, 3, 7, 15, 9, 0, 5, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 2]]
12 [5, 13, [11, 14, 5, 2, 2, 7, 8, 15, 0, 4, 14, 8, 1, 5, 11, 13]]
13 [4, 9, [3, 6, 9, 14, 10, 15, 4, 3, 0, 4, 10, 12, 1, 5, 15, 9]]
14 [7, 3, [9, 15, 3, 7, 12, 10, 2, 6, 10, 13, 0, 5, 7, 0, 9, 12]]
15 [6, 5, [3, 7, 13, 11, 2, 6, 8, 14, 8, 13, 6, 1, 1, 4, 11, 12]]
16 [12, 2, [4, 2, 12, 8, 1, 7, 13, 9, 6, 1, 14, 11, 11, 12, 7, 2]]
17 [13, 7, [6, 0, 8, 12, 3, 5, 9, 13, 13, 10, 3, 6, 0, 7, 10, 15]]
18 [14, 14, [9, 14, 5, 0, 4, 3, 12, 9, 3, 5, 15, 11, 6, 0, 14, 10]]
19 [15, 9, [8, 13, 2, 5, 1, 4, 15, 8, 11, 15, 1, 7, 10, 14, 4, 2]]
20 [8, 11, [5, 2, 15, 10, 8, 15, 6, 3, 6, 0, 12, 8, 3, 5, 13, 9]]
21 [9, 14, [14, 9, 2, 7, 3, 4, 11, 14, 4, 2, 8, 12, 1, 7, 9, 13]]
22 [10, 3, [4, 2, 14, 10, 1, 7, 15, 11, 7, 0, 13, 8, 10, 13, 4, 1]]
23 [11, 4, [10, 14, 6, 0, 11, 15, 3, 5, 0, 5, 12, 11, 9, 12, 1, 6]]
24 [4, 8, [6, 3, 14, 9, 15, 10, 3, 4, 4, 0, 12, 10, 5, 1, 9, 15]]
25 [5, 12, [14, 11, 2, 5, 7, 2, 15, 8, 4, 0, 8, 14, 5, 1, 13, 11]]
26 [6, 4, [7, 3, 11, 13, 6, 2, 14, 8, 13, 8, 1, 6, 4, 1, 12, 11]]
27 [7, 2, [15, 9, 7, 3, 10, 12, 6, 2, 13, 10, 5, 0, 0, 7, 12, 9]]
28 [0, 9, [7, 2, 13, 10, 14, 11, 0, 7, 4, 0, 14, 8, 5, 1, 11, 13]]
29 [1, 13, [15, 10, 1, 6, 6, 3, 12, 11, 4, 0, 10, 12, 5, 1, 15, 9]]
30 [2, 1, [6, 2, 12, 10, 7, 3, 9, 15, 5, 0, 15, 8, 12, 9, 2, 5]]
31 [3, 7, [8, 14, 6, 2, 13, 11, 7, 3, 3, 4, 13, 8, 14, 9, 4, 1]]
32 [1, 14, [6, 1, 10, 15, 11, 12, 3, 6, 12, 10, 0, 4, 9, 15, 1, 5]]
33 [0, 10, [10, 13, 2, 7, 7, 0, 11, 14, 8, 14, 0, 4, 13, 11, 1, 5]]
34 [3, 4, [2, 6, 14, 8, 3, 7, 11, 13, 8, 13, 4, 3, 1, 4, 9, 14]]
35 [2, 2, [10, 12, 2, 6, 15, 9, 3, 7, 8, 15, 0, 5, 5, 2, 9, 12]]
36 [5, 15, [5, 2, 11, 14, 8, 15, 2, 7, 14, 8, 0, 4, 11, 13, 1, 5]]
37 [4, 11, [9, 14, 3, 6, 4, 3, 10, 15, 10, 12, 0, 4, 15, 9, 1, 5]]
38 [7, 1, [3, 7, 9, 15, 2, 6, 12, 10, 0, 5, 10, 13, 9, 12, 7, 0]]
39 [6, 7, [13, 11, 3, 7, 8, 14, 2, 6, 6, 1, 8, 13, 11, 12, 1, 4]]
40 [9, 13, [7, 2, 9, 14, 14, 11, 4, 3, 12, 8, 2, 4, 13, 9, 7, 1]]
41 [8, 8, [10, 15, 2, 5, 3, 6, 15, 8, 8, 12, 0, 6, 9, 13, 5, 3]]
42 [11, 7, [0, 6, 14, 10, 5, 3, 15, 11, 11, 12, 5, 0, 6, 1, 12, 9]]
43 [10, 0, [10, 14, 2, 4, 11, 15, 7, 1, 8, 13, 0, 7, 1, 4, 13, 10]]
44 [13, 4, [12, 8, 0, 6, 13, 9, 5, 3, 6, 3, 10, 13, 15, 10, 7, 0]]
45 [12, 1, [8, 12, 2, 4, 9, 13, 7, 1, 11, 14, 1, 6, 2, 7, 12, 11]]
46 [15, 10, [5, 2, 13, 8, 8, 15, 4, 1, 7, 1, 15, 11, 2, 4, 14, 10]]
47 [14, 13, [0, 5, 14, 9, 9, 12, 3, 4, 11, 15, 5, 3, 10, 14, 0, 6]]
48 [6, 6, [11, 13, 7, 3, 14, 8, 6, 2, 1, 6, 13, 8, 12, 11, 4, 1]]
49 [7, 0, [7, 3, 15, 9, 6, 2, 10, 12, 5, 0, 13, 10, 12, 9, 0, 7]]
50 [4, 10, [14, 9, 6, 3, 3, 4, 15, 10, 12, 10, 4, 0, 9, 15, 5, 1]]
51 [5, 14, [2, 5, 14, 11, 15, 8, 7, 2, 8, 14, 4, 0, 13, 11, 5, 1]]
52 [2, 3, [12, 10, 6, 2, 9, 15, 7, 3, 15, 8, 5, 0, 2, 5, 12, 9]]
53 [3, 5, [6, 2, 8, 14, 7, 3, 13, 11, 13, 8, 3, 4, 4, 1, 14, 9]]
54 [0, 11, [13, 10, 7, 2, 0, 7, 14, 11, 14, 8, 4, 0, 11, 13, 5, 1]]
55 [1, 15, [1, 6, 15, 10, 12, 11, 6, 3, 10, 12, 4, 0, 15, 9, 5, 1]]
56 [14, 12, [5, 0, 9, 14, 12, 9, 4, 3, 15, 11, 3, 5, 14, 10, 6, 0]]
57 [15, 11, [2, 5, 8, 13, 15, 8, 1, 4, 1, 7, 11, 15, 4, 2, 10, 14]]
58 [12, 0, [12, 8, 4, 2, 13, 9, 1, 7, 14, 11, 6, 1, 7, 2, 11, 12]]
59 [13, 5, [8, 12, 6, 0, 9, 13, 3, 5, 3, 6, 13, 10, 10, 15, 0, 7]]
60 [10, 1, [14, 10, 4, 2, 15, 11, 1, 7, 13, 8, 7, 0, 4, 1, 10, 13]]
61 [11, 6, [6, 0, 10, 14, 3, 5, 11, 15, 12, 11, 0, 5, 1, 6, 9, 12]]
62 [8, 9, [15, 10, 5, 2, 6, 3, 8, 15, 12, 8, 6, 0, 13, 9, 3, 5]]
63 [9, 12, [2, 7, 14, 9, 11, 14, 3, 4, 8, 12, 4, 2, 9, 13, 1, 7]]
64 [0, 12, [11, 14, 7, 0, 2, 7, 10, 13, 1, 5, 13, 11, 0, 4, 8, 14]]
i DSd[i]
65 [1, 8, [3, 6, 11, 12, 10, 15, 6, 1, 1, 5, 9, 15, 0, 4, 12, 10]]
66 [2, 4, [3, 7, 15, 9, 2, 6, 10, 12, 9, 12, 5, 2, 0, 5, 8, 15]]
67 [3, 2, [11, 13, 3, 7, 14, 8, 2, 6, 9, 14, 1, 4, 4, 3, 8, 13]]
68 [4, 13, [10, 15, 4, 3, 3, 6, 9, 14, 1, 5, 15, 9, 0, 4, 10, 12]]
69 [5, 9, [2, 7, 8, 15, 11, 14, 5, 2, 1, 5, 11, 13, 0, 4, 14, 8]]
70 [6, 1, [2, 6, 8, 14, 3, 7, 13, 11, 1, 4, 11, 12, 8, 13, 6, 1]]
71 [7, 7, [12, 10, 2, 6, 9, 15, 3, 7, 7, 0, 9, 12, 10, 13, 0, 5]]
72 [8, 14, [15, 8, 3, 6, 2, 5, 10, 15, 5, 3, 9, 13, 0, 6, 8, 12]]
73 [9, 11, [4, 3, 14, 11, 9, 14, 7, 2, 7, 1, 13, 9, 2, 4, 12, 8]]
74 [10, 6, [7, 1, 11, 15, 2, 4, 10, 14, 13, 10, 1, 4, 0, 7, 8, 13]]
75 [11, 1, [15, 11, 5, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6, 12, 9, 6, 1, 5, 0, 11, 12]]
76 [12, 7, [7, 1, 9, 13, 2, 4, 8, 12, 12, 11, 2, 7, 1, 6, 11, 14]]
77 [13, 2, [5, 3, 13, 9, 0, 6, 12, 8, 7, 0, 15, 10, 10, 13, 6, 3]]
78 [14, 11, [3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 9, 0, 5, 0, 6, 10, 14, 5, 3, 11, 15]]
79 [15, 12, [4, 1, 8, 15, 13, 8, 5, 2, 14, 10, 2, 4, 15, 11, 7, 1]]
80 [5, 8, [7, 2, 15, 8, 14, 11, 2, 5, 5, 1, 13, 11, 4, 0, 8, 14]]
81 [4, 12, [15, 10, 3, 4, 6, 3, 14, 9, 5, 1, 9, 15, 4, 0, 12, 10]]
82 [7, 6, [10, 12, 6, 2, 15, 9, 7, 3, 0, 7, 12, 9, 13, 10, 5, 0]]
83 [6, 0, [6, 2, 14, 8, 7, 3, 11, 13, 4, 1, 12, 11, 13, 8, 1, 6]]
84 [1, 9, [6, 3, 12, 11, 15, 10, 1, 6, 5, 1, 15, 9, 4, 0, 10, 12]]
85 [0, 13, [14, 11, 0, 7, 7, 2, 13, 10, 5, 1, 11, 13, 4, 0, 14, 8]]
86 [3, 3, [13, 11, 7, 3, 8, 14, 6, 2, 14, 9, 4, 1, 3, 4, 13, 8]]
87 [2, 5, [7, 3, 9, 15, 6, 2, 12, 10, 12, 9, 2, 5, 5, 0, 15, 8]]
88 [13, 3, [3, 5, 9, 13, 6, 0, 8, 12, 0, 7, 10, 15, 13, 10, 3, 6]]
89 [12, 6, [1, 7, 13, 9, 4, 2, 12, 8, 11, 12, 7, 2, 6, 1, 14, 11]]
90 [15, 13, [1, 4, 15, 8, 8, 13, 2, 5, 10, 14, 4, 2, 11, 15, 1, 7]]
91 [14, 10, [4, 3, 12, 9, 9, 14, 5, 0, 6, 0, 14, 10, 3, 5, 15, 11]]
92 [9, 10, [3, 4, 11, 14, 14, 9, 2, 7, 1, 7, 9, 13, 4, 2, 8, 12]]
93 [8, 15, [8, 15, 6, 3, 5, 2, 15, 10, 3, 5, 13, 9, 6, 0, 12, 8]]
94 [11, 0, [11, 15, 3, 5, 10, 14, 6, 0, 9, 12, 1, 6, 0, 5, 12, 11]]
95 [10, 7, [1, 7, 15, 11, 4, 2, 14, 10, 10, 13, 4, 1, 7, 0, 13, 8]]
96 [12, 5, [9, 13, 7, 1, 8, 12, 2, 4, 2, 7, 12, 11, 11, 14, 1, 6]]
97 [13, 0, [13, 9, 5, 3, 12, 8, 0, 6, 15, 10, 7, 0, 6, 3, 10, 13]]
98 [14, 9, [9, 12, 3, 4, 0, 5, 14, 9, 10, 14, 0, 6, 11, 15, 5, 3]]
99 [15, 14, [8, 15, 4, 1, 5, 2, 13, 8, 2, 4, 14, 10, 7, 1, 15, 11]]
100 [8, 12, [3, 6, 15, 8, 10, 15, 2, 5, 9, 13, 5, 3, 8, 12, 0, 6]]
101 [9, 9, [14, 11, 4, 3, 7, 2, 9, 14, 13, 9, 7, 1, 12, 8, 2, 4]]
102 [10, 4, [11, 15, 7, 1, 10, 14, 2, 4, 1, 4, 13, 10, 8, 13, 0, 7]]
103 [11, 3, [5, 3, 15, 11, 0, 6, 14, 10, 6, 1, 12, 9, 11, 12, 5, 0]]
104 [4, 15, [4, 3, 10, 15, 9, 14, 3, 6, 15, 9, 1, 5, 10, 12, 0, 4]]
105 [5, 11, [8, 15, 2, 7, 5, 2, 11, 14, 11, 13, 1, 5, 14, 8, 0, 4]]
106 [6, 3, [8, 14, 2, 6, 13, 11, 3, 7, 11, 12, 1, 4, 6, 1, 8, 13]]
107 [7, 5, [2, 6, 12, 10, 3, 7, 9, 15, 9, 12, 7, 0, 0, 5, 10, 13]]
108 [0, 14, [7, 0, 11, 14, 10, 13, 2, 7, 13, 11, 1, 5, 8, 14, 0, 4]]
109 [1, 10, [11, 12, 3, 6, 6, 1, 10, 15, 9, 15, 1, 5, 12, 10, 0, 4]]
110 [2, 6, [15, 9, 3, 7, 10, 12, 2, 6, 5, 2, 9, 12, 8, 15, 0, 5]]
111 [3, 0, [3, 7, 11, 13, 2, 6, 14, 8, 1, 4, 9, 14, 8, 13, 4, 3]]
112 [11, 2, [3, 5, 11, 15, 6, 0, 10, 14, 1, 6, 9, 12, 12, 11, 0, 5]]
113 [10, 5, [15, 11, 1, 7, 14, 10, 4, 2, 4, 1, 10, 13, 13, 8, 7, 0]]
114 [9, 8, [11, 14, 3, 4, 2, 7, 14, 9, 9, 13, 1, 7, 8, 12, 4, 2]]
115 [8, 13, [6, 3, 8, 15, 15, 10, 5, 2, 13, 9, 3, 5, 12, 8, 6, 0]]
116 [15, 15, [15, 8, 1, 4, 2, 5, 8, 13, 4, 2, 10, 14, 1, 7, 11, 15]]
117 [14, 8, [12, 9, 4, 3, 5, 0, 9, 14, 14, 10, 6, 0, 15, 11, 3, 5]]
118 [13, 1, [9, 13, 3, 5, 8, 12, 6, 0, 10, 15, 0, 7, 3, 6, 13, 10]]
119 [12, 4, [13, 9, 1, 7, 12, 8, 4, 2, 7, 2, 11, 12, 14, 11, 6, 1]]
120 [3, 1, [7, 3, 13, 11, 6, 2, 8, 14, 4, 1, 14, 9, 13, 8, 3, 4]]
121 [2, 7, [9, 15, 7, 3, 12, 10, 6, 2, 2, 5, 12, 9, 15, 8, 5, 0]]
122 [1, 11, [12, 11, 6, 3, 1, 6, 15, 10, 15, 9, 5, 1, 10, 12, 4, 0]]
123 [0, 15, [0, 7, 14, 11, 13, 10, 7, 2, 11, 13, 5, 1, 14, 8, 4, 0]]
124 [7, 4, [6, 2, 10, 12, 7, 3, 15, 9, 12, 9, 0, 7, 5, 0, 13, 10]]
125 [6, 2, [14, 8, 6, 2, 11, 13, 7, 3, 12, 11, 4, 1, 1, 6, 13, 8]]
126 [5, 10, [15, 8, 7, 2, 2, 5, 14, 11, 13, 11, 5, 1, 8, 14, 4, 0]]
127 [4, 14, [3, 4, 15, 10, 14, 9, 6, 3, 9, 15, 5, 1, 12, 10, 4, 0]]
128 [11, 13, [5, 0, 11, 12, 12, 9, 6, 1, 14, 10, 0, 6, 15, 11, 5, 3]]
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i DSd[i]
129 [10, 10, [0, 7, 8, 13, 13, 10, 1, 4, 2, 4, 10, 14, 7, 1, 11, 15]]
130 [9, 7, [2, 4, 12, 8, 7, 1, 13, 9, 9, 14, 7, 2, 4, 3, 14, 11]]
131 [8, 2, [0, 6, 8, 12, 5, 3, 9, 13, 2, 5, 10, 15, 15, 8, 3, 6]]
132 [15, 0, [15, 11, 7, 1, 14, 10, 2, 4, 13, 8, 5, 2, 4, 1, 8, 15]]
133 [14, 7, [5, 3, 11, 15, 0, 6, 10, 14, 14, 9, 0, 5, 3, 4, 9, 12]]
134 [13, 14, [10, 13, 6, 3, 7, 0, 15, 10, 0, 6, 12, 8, 5, 3, 13, 9]]
135 [12, 11, [1, 6, 11, 14, 12, 11, 2, 7, 2, 4, 8, 12, 7, 1, 9, 13]]
136 [3, 14, [4, 3, 8, 13, 9, 14, 1, 4, 14, 8, 2, 6, 11, 13, 3, 7]]
137 [2, 8, [0, 5, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 2, 2, 6, 10, 12, 3, 7, 15, 9]]
138 [1, 4, [0, 4, 12, 10, 1, 5, 9, 15, 10, 15, 6, 1, 3, 6, 11, 12]]
139 [0, 0, [0, 4, 8, 14, 1, 5, 13, 11, 2, 7, 10, 13, 11, 14, 7, 0]]
140 [7, 11, [10, 13, 0, 5, 7, 0, 9, 12, 9, 15, 3, 7, 12, 10, 2, 6]]
141 [6, 13, [8, 13, 6, 1, 1, 4, 11, 12, 3, 7, 13, 11, 2, 6, 8, 14]]
142 [5, 5, [0, 4, 14, 8, 1, 5, 11, 13, 11, 14, 5, 2, 2, 7, 8, 15]]
143 [4, 1, [0, 4, 10, 12, 1, 5, 15, 9, 3, 6, 9, 14, 10, 15, 4, 3]]
144 [15, 1, [11, 15, 1, 7, 10, 14, 4, 2, 8, 13, 2, 5, 1, 4, 15, 8]]
145 [14, 6, [3, 5, 15, 11, 6, 0, 14, 10, 9, 14, 5, 0, 4, 3, 12, 9]]
146 [13, 15, [13, 10, 3, 6, 0, 7, 10, 15, 6, 0, 8, 12, 3, 5, 9, 13]]
147 [12, 10, [6, 1, 14, 11, 11, 12, 7, 2, 4, 2, 12, 8, 1, 7, 13, 9]]
148 [11, 12, [0, 5, 12, 11, 9, 12, 1, 6, 10, 14, 6, 0, 11, 15, 3, 5]]
149 [10, 11, [7, 0, 13, 8, 10, 13, 4, 1, 4, 2, 14, 10, 1, 7, 15, 11]]
150 [9, 6, [4, 2, 8, 12, 1, 7, 9, 13, 14, 9, 2, 7, 3, 4, 11, 14]]
151 [8, 3, [6, 0, 12, 8, 3, 5, 13, 9, 5, 2, 15, 10, 8, 15, 6, 3]]
152 [7, 10, [13, 10, 5, 0, 0, 7, 12, 9, 15, 9, 7, 3, 10, 12, 6, 2]]
153 [6, 12, [13, 8, 1, 6, 4, 1, 12, 11, 7, 3, 11, 13, 6, 2, 14, 8]]
154 [5, 4, [4, 0, 8, 14, 5, 1, 13, 11, 14, 11, 2, 5, 7, 2, 15, 8]]
155 [4, 0, [4, 0, 12, 10, 5, 1, 9, 15, 6, 3, 14, 9, 15, 10, 3, 4]]
156 [3, 15, [3, 4, 13, 8, 14, 9, 4, 1, 8, 14, 6, 2, 13, 11, 7, 3]]
157 [2, 9, [5, 0, 15, 8, 12, 9, 2, 5, 6, 2, 12, 10, 7, 3, 9, 15]]
158 [1, 5, [4, 0, 10, 12, 5, 1, 15, 9, 15, 10, 1, 6, 6, 3, 12, 11]]
159 [0, 1, [4, 0, 14, 8, 5, 1, 11, 13, 7, 2, 13, 10, 14, 11, 0, 7]]
160 [3, 12, [8, 13, 4, 3, 1, 4, 9, 14, 2, 6, 14, 8, 3, 7, 11, 13]]
161 [2, 10, [8, 15, 0, 5, 5, 2, 9, 12, 10, 12, 2, 6, 15, 9, 3, 7]]
162 [1, 6, [12, 10, 0, 4, 9, 15, 1, 5, 6, 1, 10, 15, 11, 12, 3, 6]]
163 [0, 2, [8, 14, 0, 4, 13, 11, 1, 5, 10, 13, 2, 7, 7, 0, 11, 14]]
164 [7, 9, [0, 5, 10, 13, 9, 12, 7, 0, 3, 7, 9, 15, 2, 6, 12, 10]]
165 [6, 15, [6, 1, 8, 13, 11, 12, 1, 4, 13, 11, 3, 7, 8, 14, 2, 6]]
166 [5, 7, [14, 8, 0, 4, 11, 13, 1, 5, 5, 2, 11, 14, 8, 15, 2, 7]]
167 [4, 3, [10, 12, 0, 4, 15, 9, 1, 5, 9, 14, 3, 6, 4, 3, 10, 15]]
168 [11, 15, [11, 12, 5, 0, 6, 1, 12, 9, 0, 6, 14, 10, 5, 3, 15, 11]]
169 [10, 8, [8, 13, 0, 7, 1, 4, 13, 10, 10, 14, 2, 4, 11, 15, 7, 1]]
170 [9, 5, [12, 8, 2, 4, 13, 9, 7, 1, 7, 2, 9, 14, 14, 11, 4, 3]]
171 [8, 0, [8, 12, 0, 6, 9, 13, 5, 3, 10, 15, 2, 5, 3, 6, 15, 8]]
172 [15, 2, [7, 1, 15, 11, 2, 4, 14, 10, 5, 2, 13, 8, 8, 15, 4, 1]]
173 [14, 5, [11, 15, 5, 3, 10, 14, 0, 6, 0, 5, 14, 9, 9, 12, 3, 4]]
174 [13, 12, [6, 3, 10, 13, 15, 10, 7, 0, 12, 8, 0, 6, 13, 9, 5, 3]]
175 [12, 9, [11, 14, 1, 6, 2, 7, 12, 11, 8, 12, 2, 4, 9, 13, 7, 1]]
176 [5, 6, [8, 14, 4, 0, 13, 11, 5, 1, 2, 5, 14, 11, 15, 8, 7, 2]]
177 [4, 2, [12, 10, 4, 0, 9, 15, 5, 1, 14, 9, 6, 3, 3, 4, 15, 10]]
178 [7, 8, [5, 0, 13, 10, 12, 9, 0, 7, 7, 3, 15, 9, 6, 2, 10, 12]]
179 [6, 14, [1, 6, 13, 8, 12, 11, 4, 1, 11, 13, 7, 3, 14, 8, 6, 2]]
180 [1, 7, [10, 12, 4, 0, 15, 9, 5, 1, 1, 6, 15, 10, 12, 11, 6, 3]]
181 [0, 3, [14, 8, 4, 0, 11, 13, 5, 1, 13, 10, 7, 2, 0, 7, 14, 11]]
182 [3, 13, [13, 8, 3, 4, 4, 1, 14, 9, 6, 2, 8, 14, 7, 3, 13, 11]]
183 [2, 11, [15, 8, 5, 0, 2, 5, 12, 9, 12, 10, 6, 2, 9, 15, 7, 3]]
184 [13, 13, [3, 6, 13, 10, 10, 15, 0, 7, 8, 12, 6, 0, 9, 13, 3, 5]]
185 [12, 8, [14, 11, 6, 1, 7, 2, 11, 12, 12, 8, 4, 2, 13, 9, 1, 7]]
186 [15, 3, [1, 7, 11, 15, 4, 2, 10, 14, 2, 5, 8, 13, 15, 8, 1, 4]]
187 [14, 4, [15, 11, 3, 5, 14, 10, 6, 0, 5, 0, 9, 14, 12, 9, 4, 3]]
188 [9, 4, [8, 12, 4, 2, 9, 13, 1, 7, 2, 7, 14, 9, 11, 14, 3, 4]]
189 [8, 1, [12, 8, 6, 0, 13, 9, 3, 5, 15, 10, 5, 2, 6, 3, 8, 15]]
190 [11, 14, [12, 11, 0, 5, 1, 6, 9, 12, 6, 0, 10, 14, 3, 5, 11, 15]]
191 [10, 9, [13, 8, 7, 0, 4, 1, 10, 13, 14, 10, 4, 2, 15, 11, 1, 7]]
192 [10, 14, [13, 10, 1, 4, 0, 7, 8, 13, 7, 1, 11, 15, 2, 4, 10, 14]]
i DSd[i]
193 [11, 9, [12, 9, 6, 1, 5, 0, 11, 12, 15, 11, 5, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6]]
194 [8, 6, [5, 3, 9, 13, 0, 6, 8, 12, 15, 8, 3, 6, 2, 5, 10, 15]]
195 [9, 3, [7, 1, 13, 9, 2, 4, 12, 8, 4, 3, 14, 11, 9, 14, 7, 2]]
196 [14, 3, [0, 6, 10, 14, 5, 3, 11, 15, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 9, 0, 5]]
197 [15, 4, [14, 10, 2, 4, 15, 11, 7, 1, 4, 1, 8, 15, 13, 8, 5, 2]]
198 [12, 15, [12, 11, 2, 7, 1, 6, 11, 14, 7, 1, 9, 13, 2, 4, 8, 12]]
199 [13, 10, [7, 0, 15, 10, 10, 13, 6, 3, 5, 3, 13, 9, 0, 6, 12, 8]]
200 [2, 12, [9, 12, 5, 2, 0, 5, 8, 15, 3, 7, 15, 9, 2, 6, 10, 12]]
201 [3, 10, [9, 14, 1, 4, 4, 3, 8, 13, 11, 13, 3, 7, 14, 8, 2, 6]]
202 [0, 4, [1, 5, 13, 11, 0, 4, 8, 14, 11, 14, 7, 0, 2, 7, 10, 13]]
203 [1, 0, [1, 5, 9, 15, 0, 4, 12, 10, 3, 6, 11, 12, 10, 15, 6, 1]]
204 [6, 9, [1, 4, 11, 12, 8, 13, 6, 1, 2, 6, 8, 14, 3, 7, 13, 11]]
205 [7, 15, [7, 0, 9, 12, 10, 13, 0, 5, 12, 10, 2, 6, 9, 15, 3, 7]]
206 [4, 5, [1, 5, 15, 9, 0, 4, 10, 12, 10, 15, 4, 3, 3, 6, 9, 14]]
207 [5, 1, [1, 5, 11, 13, 0, 4, 14, 8, 2, 7, 8, 15, 11, 14, 5, 2]]
208 [14, 2, [6, 0, 14, 10, 3, 5, 15, 11, 4, 3, 12, 9, 9, 14, 5, 0]]
209 [15, 5, [10, 14, 4, 2, 11, 15, 1, 7, 1, 4, 15, 8, 8, 13, 2, 5]]
210 [12, 14, [11, 12, 7, 2, 6, 1, 14, 11, 1, 7, 13, 9, 4, 2, 12, 8]]
211 [13, 11, [0, 7, 10, 15, 13, 10, 3, 6, 3, 5, 9, 13, 6, 0, 8, 12]]
212 [10, 15, [10, 13, 4, 1, 7, 0, 13, 8, 1, 7, 15, 11, 4, 2, 14, 10]]
213 [11, 8, [9, 12, 1, 6, 0, 5, 12, 11, 11, 15, 3, 5, 10, 14, 6, 0]]
214 [8, 7, [3, 5, 13, 9, 6, 0, 12, 8, 8, 15, 6, 3, 5, 2, 15, 10]]
215 [9, 2, [1, 7, 9, 13, 4, 2, 8, 12, 3, 4, 11, 14, 14, 9, 2, 7]]
216 [6, 8, [4, 1, 12, 11, 13, 8, 1, 6, 6, 2, 14, 8, 7, 3, 11, 13]]
217 [7, 14, [0, 7, 12, 9, 13, 10, 5, 0, 10, 12, 6, 2, 15, 9, 7, 3]]
218 [4, 4, [5, 1, 9, 15, 4, 0, 12, 10, 15, 10, 3, 4, 6, 3, 14, 9]]
219 [5, 0, [5, 1, 13, 11, 4, 0, 8, 14, 7, 2, 15, 8, 14, 11, 2, 5]]
220 [2, 13, [12, 9, 2, 5, 5, 0, 15, 8, 7, 3, 9, 15, 6, 2, 12, 10]]
221 [3, 11, [14, 9, 4, 1, 3, 4, 13, 8, 13, 11, 7, 3, 8, 14, 6, 2]]
222 [0, 5, [5, 1, 11, 13, 4, 0, 14, 8, 14, 11, 0, 7, 7, 2, 13, 10]]
223 [1, 1, [5, 1, 15, 9, 4, 0, 10, 12, 6, 3, 12, 11, 15, 10, 1, 6]]
224 [6, 11, [11, 12, 1, 4, 6, 1, 8, 13, 8, 14, 2, 6, 13, 11, 3, 7]]
225 [7, 13, [9, 12, 7, 0, 0, 5, 10, 13, 2, 6, 12, 10, 3, 7, 9, 15]]
226 [4, 7, [15, 9, 1, 5, 10, 12, 0, 4, 4, 3, 10, 15, 9, 14, 3, 6]]
227 [5, 3, [11, 13, 1, 5, 14, 8, 0, 4, 8, 15, 2, 7, 5, 2, 11, 14]]
228 [2, 14, [5, 2, 9, 12, 8, 15, 0, 5, 15, 9, 3, 7, 10, 12, 2, 6]]
229 [3, 8, [1, 4, 9, 14, 8, 13, 4, 3, 3, 7, 11, 13, 2, 6, 14, 8]]
230 [0, 6, [13, 11, 1, 5, 8, 14, 0, 4, 7, 0, 11, 14, 10, 13, 2, 7]]
231 [1, 2, [9, 15, 1, 5, 12, 10, 0, 4, 11, 12, 3, 6, 6, 1, 10, 15]]
232 [14, 1, [10, 14, 0, 6, 11, 15, 5, 3, 9, 12, 3, 4, 0, 5, 14, 9]]
233 [15, 6, [2, 4, 14, 10, 7, 1, 15, 11, 8, 15, 4, 1, 5, 2, 13, 8]]
234 [12, 13, [2, 7, 12, 11, 11, 14, 1, 6, 9, 13, 7, 1, 8, 12, 2, 4]]
235 [13, 8, [15, 10, 7, 0, 6, 3, 10, 13, 13, 9, 5, 3, 12, 8, 0, 6]]
236 [10, 12, [1, 4, 13, 10, 8, 13, 0, 7, 11, 15, 7, 1, 10, 14, 2, 4]]
237 [11, 11, [6, 1, 12, 9, 11, 12, 5, 0, 5, 3, 15, 11, 0, 6, 14, 10]]
238 [8, 4, [9, 13, 5, 3, 8, 12, 0, 6, 3, 6, 15, 8, 10, 15, 2, 5]]
239 [9, 1, [13, 9, 7, 1, 12, 8, 2, 4, 14, 11, 4, 3, 7, 2, 9, 14]]
240 [0, 7, [11, 13, 5, 1, 14, 8, 4, 0, 0, 7, 14, 11, 13, 10, 7, 2]]
241 [1, 3, [15, 9, 5, 1, 10, 12, 4, 0, 12, 11, 6, 3, 1, 6, 15, 10]]
242 [2, 15, [2, 5, 12, 9, 15, 8, 5, 0, 9, 15, 7, 3, 12, 10, 6, 2]]
243 [3, 9, [4, 1, 14, 9, 13, 8, 3, 4, 7, 3, 13, 11, 6, 2, 8, 14]]
244 [4, 6, [9, 15, 5, 1, 12, 10, 4, 0, 3, 4, 15, 10, 14, 9, 6, 3]]
245 [5, 2, [13, 11, 5, 1, 8, 14, 4, 0, 15, 8, 7, 2, 2, 5, 14, 11]]
246 [6, 10, [12, 11, 4, 1, 1, 6, 13, 8, 14, 8, 6, 2, 11, 13, 7, 3]]
247 [7, 12, [12, 9, 0, 7, 5, 0, 13, 10, 6, 2, 10, 12, 7, 3, 15, 9]]
248 [8, 5, [13, 9, 3, 5, 12, 8, 6, 0, 6, 3, 8, 15, 15, 10, 5, 2]]
249 [9, 0, [9, 13, 1, 7, 8, 12, 4, 2, 11, 14, 3, 4, 2, 7, 14, 9]]
250 [10, 13, [4, 1, 10, 13, 13, 8, 7, 0, 15, 11, 1, 7, 14, 10, 4, 2]]
251 [11, 10, [1, 6, 9, 12, 12, 11, 0, 5, 3, 5, 11, 15, 6, 0, 10, 14]]
252 [12, 12, [7, 2, 11, 12, 14, 11, 6, 1, 13, 9, 1, 7, 12, 8, 4, 2]]
253 [13, 9, [10, 15, 0, 7, 3, 6, 13, 10, 9, 13, 3, 5, 8, 12, 6, 0]]
254 [14, 0, [14, 10, 6, 0, 15, 11, 3, 5, 12, 9, 4, 3, 5, 0, 9, 14]]
255 [15, 7, [4, 2, 10, 14, 1, 7, 11, 15, 15, 8, 1, 4, 2, 5, 8, 13]]
185
B.2 Computing the Eighth Element of the Sequence
Consider the parameters as given in Appendix B.1. The 25-round sequence is given in
Table B.2.
Table B.2: 25-round sequence
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
kei 1 2 3 4 3 0 8 10 1 3 15 15 7 -
sei 15 14 9 11 7 4 5 1 9 12 3 1 8 -
i 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
kei 6 8 6 4 11 13 11 2 3 3 1 7 - -
sei 12 4 11 1 9 2 10 5 4 6 10 15 11 5
We compute sd7 using the data structure given in Table B.1 in the following 3 steps.
1. Find the row corresponding to (kd0 , k
d
1) in DS
d. The value of row is given by:
row = L4(kd0)||kd1
= 7||1 = 113 (as kd0 = ke24 = 7 and kd1 = ke23 = 1)
2. Compute the partition p = DSd[113][2][kd2 ]+k
d
3 = DS
d[113][2][3]+3 = DSd[113][2][3]+3 =
7 + 3 = 4. Note that DSd[113][0][0] = sd3 = s
e
23 = 10 and X
d = 5.





5 + p+ DS
d[113][2][sd6 +X
d]
= 10 + 11 + 4 + DSd[113][2][5 + 5]
= 5 + DSd[113][2][0] = 5 + 15 = 10 = se19.
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